

A Table of Humane  
Passions.

With their Causes and Effects.

Written by y<sup>e</sup> Reverend Father in  
God F. N. Coeffeteau, Bishop of  
Hardania, Councillor to y<sup>e</sup> French  
King in his Councils of Estate,  
Suffragane and Administrator ge-  
nerall of y<sup>e</sup> Bishopricke of Metz.

Translated into English by  
Edm: Grimeston  
Sergiant at  
Armes.

Pleasure.

Feare.

Paine.


Hope.

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TO THE RIGHT  
HONORABLE,  
GEORGE, Marquess of Buc-  
*kingham, High Admirall*  
of England, &c.

**M**OST worthy  
to be most ho-  
nored Lord;  
All outward  
honors and accomplish-  
ments of height, already  
most abundantly & bles-  
sedly adorning you; I  
thrice humbly submit to  
your Lordship, (in as  
A 2 much

## *The Epistle*

much as this little Volume may containe) as ample means to all inward addition and illustration : In teaching all Manly and Lordly gouernment of those inward *Passions* and perturbations that are euermore excited by outward Pleasures, and all their storme-rockt soothinges of security and licence. For no more doth the Sun and Wind, exhale and blow vpper pasttemper, Vapors and Tempests; then the graces, and amplifications  
of

## *Dedicatory.*

of Kings; cause æstures & vprores of affection and *Passion*; Yet is there not any more sencible variety of medicine and cure, for all bodily wounds and maladies: then there are intelligible and reasonable repressions and settlings of all the vnquiet, and raging ouerflowes of our Spirits and minds. Neither is there any so deadly danger layd open in the one, as abides hid in the other. For as that tempest is more dangerous that suffers not a ship to repaire to her ha-

A. 3 uen,

## *The Epistle*

uen, then that which sustaines not shee should sayle at all ; So most difficult are the minds stormes, that let a man to containe himselfe ; nor suffer him to quiet and settle his disturbed reason. And therefore all men floting on the high-going seas of Fortune, if destitute of Pylots, Cables, and Anchors ; and moued only with tumultuous and vnbounded errors, in vncertaine and dangerous courses ; may for a time perhaps in safety and pleasure enioy, and  
extend

## *Dedicatory.*

extend them : But at length (as t'were suddainly raiſht by the neckes) they are driuen helplesly headlong on the more horrible ſhip-wrackes. Since then your Lordſhips diſpoſition to all goodneſſe is in nature moſt ſweete, moſt flexible; vouchſafe care a little to artificiall and experimenc't aduices, that may rectifie, accompliſh and eſtabliſh you in all the heights of your honors. Wherein my humble and poore endeauors obtaining their deſired

A 4 ends;



## *The Epistle &c.*

ends; I shall holde my  
selfe happy, and rest in all  
seruiceable de-  
uotion,

Your Lordships  
euermore most sub-  
missiuecly vowed :


Ed : Grimeston.

*Of*



## *Of Humane Passions.*

### *The Preface.*

 *S* *Provident* Nature hath prescribed certaine ends to all the Creatures of this *Universe*, whom She hath clothed with certaine qualities and allurements fit to inflame them with their *Loue*; So there is not any one in this world but doth endeavor by all meanes to attaine unto those ends which are propounded. As the *Sunne* hauing bin placed in the firmament, to contribute to the birth

## To the Reader.

and preservation of Beasts and Plants; runnes continually from one Hemisphere to the other, to poure out the beames of his influence and light ouer all. So after his example, there is not any other cause in all this great world, but is carefull to seeke and pursue her end, according to the motions which Nature hath ingrafted. But to make them capable, it was necessary that the same Nature which hath prescribed them their ends, should also giue them as it were two wings to raise them up: That is to say, it was needefull she should impart vnto them the knowledge, and ingraft in them the inclination and desire to pursue them. Desire alone were not sufficient, for that is fastened in the Appetite, which is a blind power, and requires some light

## To the Reader.

light to guide and conduct it in its motions; Even as they say the whale, which hath a weak and heavy sight, hath need of a guide to conduct it through the waves of the Sea, lest that this great and weighty masse which she drawes after her, should strike against some rocke and be crusht in peeces. Neither were knowledge alone sufficient, for that it proceedes from a faculty which being borne to give light, doth necessarily presuppose another power, which doth receive the beames of her light, and as we may say, suffers it selfe to be guided by that light. As for example, to cause the King (being incited by the glory of his Ancestors, or induced by the greatnessse of his courage) to undertake the sacke of Constanti-nople, or to replant the Cross:

## To the Reader.

*in Palestina; it were not sufficient that he knew where Constantinople stood, or in what part of the world Palestina were; but besides all this it were needfull, that with this knowledge the heat and ardor to carry him to so glorious a Conquest should breede a desire. As in old time to thrust on Alexander to undertake the voyage of Persia, or of the Indies, it was not onely requisite this Prince should haue some knowledge of that stately Empire and of those rich Prouinces; But it was also necessary his generosity should beget in him a passion and will to conquer them. So as no man imbraceth any designe whatsoever, untill that knowledge be united with desire, and desire ioyned vnto knowledge. In this manner then if things knewe their*

## To the Reader.

their ends and did not desire them, or if they desired them without the knowledge, they could not be drawne to endeavour to get them: For as much as through the want of those helps, they should be in danger to labor in vaine, and to lose all the paines of their pursutes. So as to effect it they had neede of knowledge and desire. The proofes hercof are seene in all the Creatures which make a part of this Vniuersall world. For leauing apart the Angels of heauen, whose actions show sufficiently that their substance is indued with an understanding full of knowledge, and a will capable to frame diuers desires; if we will fixe our eyes upon visible nature, we shall find that there is not any Creature, not onely among those that haue life,



## To the Reader.

life, but even among those that haue no soules, in the motions and course of whose actions this truth doth not appeare and demonstrate it selfe plainly. It is true, that in things which are insensible and without life, it is not necessary that the knowledge of their ends should remaine in themselves, as the desires and inclinations to attaine vnto them do reside, but it sufficeth that they bee guided and conducted by a cause conioyned to their actions. And to returne to our last example, as it was necessary (to draw Alexander to undertake the voyage of Asia and the Indies) he should haue knowledge of the Prouinces, yet he might borrow this knowledge from those which had seene them, and obserued them: euen as blind men, who led by their guides

## To the Reader.

guides go where their affaires do call them; even so, although that naturall things which of themselves are not indued with any knowledge, besides the inclination which they haue vnto their end, haue yet some need to know it, to the end they may affect it and seeke it; yet hauing a desire, it imports not whether the knowledge be precisely in themselves, or that some other cause supplies this defect, and insinuates it selfe into this action to guide it. The reason whereof is, that although they be deprived of knowledge, yet it binders not the force of their motions; for that they are united to that great intelligence which knoweth all things, and cannot erre in her knowledge, but guides all the naturall causes to their ends by her wise prouidence. But these things

## To the Reader.

things haue alwayes neede of knowledge and desire, to put them into action, although that in regard of knowledge it is not absolutely necessary it reside in them, but it sufficeth that it be imparted vnto them by the influence and assistance of a more eminent cause. As for those which haue life, it may be plainly obserued in the course of their liues. But we must remember that the soule being the forme of liuing thinges, and naturall formes hauing this in particular, that the more Noble containes the perfection of that which is lesse Noble, as a quadrangle comprehendes with a certaine eminency, all that enters into the composition of a Triangle; and as the formes of beasts containe the formes of the Elements; It followes that there

## To the Reader.

there beeing three degrees of Soules, that is to say, that which giues life, which is the lesse perfect; that which giues sense, which is the second ranke, and the Reasonable which is the noblest of all; this Reasonable soule which is peculiar onely to Man, containes all the powers and perfections of the other, and can effect as much as all the rest together. By reason whereof man hath a Vegetatiue soule, which is common with plants; he hath the sensitiue, which he hath common with bruit beasts; But he alone is in possession of the Reasonable soule, whereby he hath nothing common with the rest of the Creatures. After this, either of these soules hath a number of powers besitting the operations which must arise. The powers of the Vegetatiue soule

## To the Reader.

foule are principally those which nourish, which contribute to the growing and increase, and which serve to Generation: And those have other powers for instruments to their actions, as the power to draw, the power to retaine, the power to expell the excrements, the power to digest the nourishment, and others which Philosophers assigne unto them.

Moreover, there is a power which is as it were the Queene of all the rest, to whose command and conduct they referre all their actions: And that is the power of the naturall Appetite, the which (as wee have sayd) is one of those two things necessary to accomplish the actions of Nature. According unto these Lawes we see that the power

## To the Reader.

ner we call Attractive, draws  
the nourishment vnto her; for  
that the Naturall Appetite  
doth presse and command her;  
and in like manner the power  
which they call Expulsive, doth  
cast forth and expell those  
things which the same Natural  
Appetite doth abhorre; and so  
of the other Powers which are  
ordained to diuerse ends. But  
for that the Appetite which is  
blind and voyde of all Know-  
ledge, is not sufficient in Ve-  
getatiue things to exercise  
their action, but withall it is  
requisite that they be accompa-  
nied with Knowledge; it  
therefore happens that the Vege-  
tatiue soule being not so Noble  
that among all her powers, there  
is not any one indued with  
Knowledge: the vniuersall  
Nature which prouides for all,  
sup



## To the Reader.

*supplies this defect, and conducts by her Light the inclination of Vegetatiue substances to their ends, and by the same meanes guides all the other powers which follow her motions in their actions. So as Nature knowing the substance fitting and proper for the Nourishment, shewes it and instructs the Naturall Appetite, and ordaines that it shalbee drawne and digested, and converted into Nourishment for the preservation of the Vegetable Indiuidue; and the like may bee sayd of the other actions; wherein doubtlesse liuing things differ not much from those that haue no life, And we must not obiect that Plants seeme to bee indued with Knowledge, for that they can distinguish a Iuice which is proper for them, from that*

## To the Reader.

that which is pernicious, the which seemes to bee a marke of Knowledge; for although there were Pilosophers which did attribute vnto Plants a feeling of things, which they sayd was lesse pure and lesse actiue then that of Creatures: Yet it is most certaine that the Nature of the Vegetatiue soule is too earthly, to bee fit for the functions of the Sences, which require other Organs then those of the Plants. And therefore although they draw vnto them good Iuice, and reiect the bad, it proceeds not from any Knowledge wherewith they are indued, but from their Naturall vertues, and properties, guided by that Soueraigne Intelligence which disperseth her care ouer al the Creatures how base and abiect soeuer: And it is also by her

## To the Reader.

her motion that the same  
Plants fly their Contraries  
as the Vine flourishes the Bay  
tree; and that they shew fast  
grace & beauty in their workes  
as we see in the Spring time; So  
as all these things bind vs not to  
beleene that they are indued  
with Knowledge.

But let vs returne to our dis-  
course, and (leaving the Vege-  
tatiue soule) ascend a degree  
higher, and come to the Sensi-  
tiue. This as the more Noble  
hath in her selfe the possession  
of Knowledge and hath no  
need to borrow it, like vnto the  
Vegetatiue soule, and things  
without Life. Moreover shee  
hath three kinds of Powers,  
that is to say, the faculty to  
know, the faculty to desire,  
and the mouing power. By  
the mouing power, I under-  
stand

## To the Reader.

And that which exceeds the motion, from one place to another, as it is commanded and ordained by the faculty where the Desire is framed, after that it is enlightened and guided by Knowledge.

The Knowing powers are of two sorts, that is to say, the Exterior and the Interior. The Exterior are the five senses of Nature, as Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, & Touching, the which as messengers carry to the Interior powers indued with Knowledge, whatsoever we can comprehend and desire. These Exterior powers of the senses answer in some sort to the bodies of the Universe, whereof they comprehend the Colours, the Sounds, the Smells, the Savors, the Cold, the Heat, and the other naturall

qua-

## To the Reader.

*qualities wherewith they were  
cloathed. The Interior powers  
capable of Knowledge are  
three, whereof the first is the  
Common sence; the which is  
called by that name, for that it is  
as it were the Center, to which  
doe flow the formes which are  
sent vnto it from the other sen-  
ces: So as from the Eyes it re-  
ceiues the formes of Colours  
which they haue seene: From  
the Hearing the formes of  
Sounds which haue toucht the  
Eare; from Smelling the  
formes of Sauors which it hath  
sented; from the Tongue, the  
forme of Sweetnesse or Bit-  
ternesse which it hath tasted;  
and from the body the formes of  
those things which fall vnder  
the sence of Touching. And it  
not onely receiues the formes  
which the other sences send on*

## To the Reader.

to it, but it also Compares them, Discernes them, and Iudgeth of them, the which the particular sences cannot do, for that they are limited and tyed to their particular objects, and neuer exceed the bounds thereof.

For the Eyes are onely imployed to iudge of the difference of Colours, as betwixt White and Blacke, and neuer seeke to meddle with that, which concerns the Sound, Smelling, or the other Qualities which haue nothing common with Colours. The Common sence then is necessary to iudge thus generally of all the objects of the other Sences, that by meanes thereof the Creature may distinguish that which is healthfull from that is hurtfull.



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But to the end the Knowledge, which this sense hath gathered from the Objects whose formes are presented unto it by the Exterior senses, be not lost by their absence, it sends all it hath gathered Compared and Distinguished, to another Power meerely Knowing, which is called the Imaginative; as that wherein are grauen the formes of things which are offered unto it by the Common sense, to the end the Knowledge may remaine after they are vanished away. Besides this Imaginative, there is another power proper to preserve things, which is the memory, the which although it bee not directly ordained to Iudge but rather to serue as a Store-house and Treasury to shut up, and to preserve the formes of things which

## To the Reader.

*which are imprinted in her; yet for that she doth continually represent unto the Common sense the formes which are con- signed unto her, she may well bee sayd also to helpe to Know- ledge. These then are the three Interior powers capable of Knowledge, to the which al- though that some adde others, yet I wil hold with their opinion who not willing to multiply the powers without necessity, reiect them as superfluous, seeing the Imaginative power sufficeth to do all the offices which are at- tributed unto them. There are then in the Sensitiue soule eight knowing faculties, five Externall, and three Internall as we haue shewed.*

*As for the Appetitiue pow- ers where the desires are for- med, there are but two, that is to*

## To the Reader.

say, the Concupiscible or desiring power, and the Irascible or Angry power: The one of which without the other sufficeth not for the health of the Creatures. For if the Lyon had no other inclination, nor any other spurre of desire then to runne after meate fit for his nourishment, doubtlesse the least difficulty and obstacle he should incounter, would hinder the pursuite of his prey; for that hee should be without any desire to surmount this difficulty, and so he should not be able to preserve his life for want of nourishment.

In like manner men would bee daunted for the least crosses they should finde in the pursuite of any good thing, or in the avoiding of euill; and although the danger were not great nor urgent

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gent yet would they not dare to oppose themselves and encounter it : And so they would yeeld to these difficulties, and not pursue the objects of their desires, how great soeuer their inclination were to seeke them. wherefore prouident Nature to prevent this inconuenience, besides the other powers, hath giuen vnto the Sensitiue soule two Appetites, that is to say, the Concupiscible and the Irascible; whereof this last, when as any difficulty ariseth and opposeth it selfe to the desire of the Concupiscible, comes presently to succour it; and inflaming the blood, excites Choler, Hope, Courage, or some other like Passion destinated and ordained to make him surmount the difficulties which crosse the contentment of the Soule. For

## To the Reader.

*that which concernes the powers of the Sensitive soule, there remaines none but the faculty moving from one place to another, which is disperst and resides in the sinnewes, Muscles and Ligaments, and which is dispersed ouer all the members of the Creature. This Power being commanded by the Appetite, doth presently exercise his office, seruing for an instrument to that part of the blood which for the great subtility and purenes thereof hath gotten the name of Spirit.*

*To come now to the Reasonable soule, it hath two principall Powers, the one indued with Knowledge, which is the vnderstanding; and the other capable of Desire, which is the Will; the which being blind as all the Appetites are naturally,*  
*she*

## To the Reader.

ſhe followeth in the purſuite of  
her objects, the light of the vn-  
derſtanding, by reaſon where-  
of ſhe is termed the Intellectu-  
all Appetite, but more properly  
the Will. The office of our vn-  
derſtanding, particularly of  
that which we call poſſible, is to  
receiue, and in receiuing to  
know, and in knowing to offer  
vnto the will thoſe kinds or  
formes, which are ſent vnto it  
from the Imagination. It is  
true, that being a more Noble  
power then the Senſitiue, it  
cannot receiue thoſe Images and  
formes, ſo materiall, groſſe and  
ſenſible, as they are of them-  
ſelues in their particular being,  
for that they are not proportio-  
nable to the purity and excellen-  
cy of her condition. By rea-  
ſon whereof the Philoſophers  
haue placed in our ſoules ano-

## To the Reader.

ther power wonderfully Noble, whose office is to purge and to clothe as it were with a new Lustre, all the Images or formes which are found in the Imagination or fantasie; and by the meanes of this Light, to cause those formes which were Materiall, Sensible, and Singular, to become so purified from these earthly conditions as they seeme Vniuersall, and so well proportioned to the purenesse of our vnderstanding, as they easily receiue the impression. Thus then the powers of all the three Soules concur in man in regard of the Rationall, the which as more Noble then the Sensitiue or Vegetatiue, comprehends all their powers, and withall addes many things to their perfection. In the meane time, wee must consider that  
man



## To the Reader.

man hath no kind of command, neither over the powers of the Vegetative soule; whose actions are meereley naturall; nor over those of the Sensitive soule, which are destinated to Knowledge, as the Interior and Exterior senses; unlesse it bee by accident; when as by a resolution of his will, hee denies these powers the meanes which are necessary to put them in action; but hee may well haue power over those of the Sensitive Appetite, which are proper to obey the discourse of reason, and the command of the Will, as over the Irascible and Concupiscible.

To the end then that amidst the bond of the Intellectuall powers with the Sensitive; and the communication, and correspondence which is betwixt



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*them for the exercise of their functions, we may the better see how the lesse Noble, obey and serue the more Noble, and execute their offices, wee must heere represent the forme. As soone as the Exterior senses, busied about the Obiects which are proper for them, haue gathered the formes of things which come from without, they carry them to the common sence, the which receiues them, iudgeth of them, and distinguisheth them; and then to preserue them in the absence of their obiects, presents them to the Imagination, which hauing gathered them together, to the end she may represent them whensoever need shall require, she deliuers them to the custody of the Memory, from whence retiring them when occasion requires, she propounds*

## To the Reader.

pounds them vnto the Appetite, vnder the apparance of things that are pleasing or troublesome, that is to say, vnder the forme of Good and Euill; and at the same instant the same formes enlightned with the Light of the vnderstanding, and purged from the sensible and singular conditions, which they retaine in the Imagination, and instead of that which they represented of particular things, representing them generall, they become capable to be imbracea by the vnderstanding; the which vnder the apparance of things which are profitable or hurtfull, that is to say, vnder the forme of Good and Euill, represents them vnto the Will: the which being blind referrcs it selfe to that which the vnderstanding proposeth vnto.

## To the Reader.

unto it: And then as Queene  
of the powers of the soule she or-  
daines what they shall embrace,  
& what they shall fly as it pleaseth  
her; whereunto the Sensitive  
Appetite yeelding a prompt o-  
bedience to execute her com-  
mand, from the which it neuer  
strayes, so long as it containes it  
selfe within the bounds and or-  
der prescrib'd by Nature, quick-  
neth all the powers and passi-  
ons ouer which shee commands,  
and sets to worke those which  
are necessary to that action, and  
by their meanes commands the  
mouing power, dispersed ouer  
all the members, to follow or fly,  
to approach or to recoyle, or to do  
any other motion which it re-  
quireth. And shee obeying sud-  
denly if shee bee not hindered,  
moves, the whole body with the  
Organs which reside in the  
parts,

## To the Reader.

parts, and induceth them to fly  
or embrace things according to  
the command which she hath re-  
ceined.

After this manner Man  
proceeds in his free operati-  
ons, if he will obserue the order  
which he ought. The which I say,  
for that oftentimes hee over-  
throws and perverts this order,  
either by bad education, or by  
custome, or the organs being  
vnfound, or for that his will  
hath bad inclination, so as rea-  
son cannot enioy her power, &  
subiect the Sensuall Appetite  
vnto her; but contrariwise hee  
abandons himselfe in prey vnto  
this disordered Appetite, and  
suffers himselfe to bee transpor-  
ted by his furious motiōs. So as  
suddenly when as fantasie offers  
to the Appetite, the formes  
which shee receiues from the  
Sences,

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Sences, vnder the shew of Good or Euill; he without stay to haue them iudged by the discourse of vnderstanding, and chosen by the will, commands of himselfe the moving power, & makes it to act according to his pleasure. And herein consistes the disorder which the passions cause in the life of man, which diuert him many times from the lawes of Reason. But wee haue spoken enough hereof, let vs now enter into the subiect, and beginne by the definition of passions to know their Nature and Essence.

To



To his long-lou'd and worthy  
*friend*, M<sup>r</sup>. Edward Grimeston,  
Sergeant at Armes; of his vnwea-  
*ried and honored labors.*

SVch is the vnequall, and inhumane vice  
Of these vile *Times*, that each man sets his price  
On others Labors; And the lasiest *Drone*  
That neuer drop of honey, of his owne  
Brought to the publique *Hive*, distasts all ours  
And (in the worlds wit) feeds far worthier Powers.  
Tis Noble to be idle; Base to be  
Of any Art, Good Mind, or Industry.  
Another sort of dull Opinionists,  
Consume their stupid liues in learned mists;  
Yet wold be seene (poore soules) beyond the Sun;  
But that like *Dolon*, in the darke they run,  
Other *Exp'orers* fearing. And these men  
Like *Cheaters*, foyst in false dice to their *Den*,  
To win mens thoughts of th'onely truly learnd,  
And feede on that conceit, before tis earnd.  
To strengthen which, their Markets are the Marts  
Where sounds and Names of *Artismen*, & all *Arts*  
They stuffe their windy memories withall;  
And then when ere their Creditors shall call  
They pay them, with these *Tokens*, all they owe;  
Then, Honest men they are, then all things know.  
When

When all employd in priuate conference;  
 They count all rude that are of open braines  
 Feare to be foolcs in print, though in their Cells  
 (In Learn'd mens vizards) they are little else.  
 They that for feare of being cald foolcs, hide,  
 Like hid men more they stir the more are spied;  
 Whose learnings are as ignorantly applied,  
 As those illiterate Peripaticke soules;  
 That all their lines, do nought but measure Poules;  
 Yet neuer know how short or long it is,  
 More then their liues, or all their idle blisse.  
 In short, All men that least deseruings haue,  
 Men of most merit euer most depraue.  
 How euer (friend) tis in vs must assure  
 Our outward Acts; and signe their passe secure.  
 Nor feare to find your Noble paines impeacht,  
 But write as long as Foxe, or Norwell preacht:  
 For when all wizards haue their bolts let fly,  
 There's no such prooffe of worth, as Industry.

*E merito solers Industria reddat honorem.*

George Chapman.





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**ters contained in this**

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Dread. fol. 428.

CHAP. 1. Of Shame. fol. 473.

CHAP. 2. Of the Effects of  
Shame. 494.

CHAP. 1. Of Hope and De-  
spaire. fol. 507.

CHAP. 1. Of Choler. fol. 547.

CHAP. 2. Of those against  
whom wee are angry.

fol. 575.

CHAP. 3. Of the Effects  
and remedies of Choler.

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CHAP. 1. Of Mildnesse and  
Gentlenesse. fol. 633.

CHAP.

## The Table.


CHAP. I. *Of the diuers Passions of men according to their ages and conditions.*

*fol. 654.*

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



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# A Table of Humaine *Passions.*

## CHAPTER I.

*wherein is expounded what  
Passion is.*

**S**eeing there can  
be no better or-  
der obserued, to  
expresse the na-  
ture of things,  
then to beginne by the defi-  
nitions, which haue vsually  
giuen vs a full light of their  
essence, wee must enter into  
this treaty of passions, by the  
definition which Philoso-  
phers

phers giue. That which is called passion, say they, is no other thing, but a motion of the sensitiue appetite, caused by the apprehensio or imagination of good or euill, the which is followed with a change or alteration in the body, contrary to the Lawes of Nature. Whereby it appeares, that passions, to speak properly, reside onely in the sensitiue appetite, and that they are not fashioned but in the irrationall part of the soule: so as if we should giue the name of passions to the motions of the vnderstanding, or of the will; it is by a kind of improper and figuratiue speech, alluding to the passions of the senses, with the which they haue some resemblance. The reason why  
passions

passions are not found in the rationall part of the soule, is, for that this part doth not imploy any corporeal organs in her actions, and that her office is not to alter or bring any change vnto the body; the which notwithstanding, is an action which doth accompany the passions inseparably. But seeing they are not to be found in any other part of the soule, but in the sensitiue appetite: there riseth heere a great question, whether this appetite shalbe diuided into the irascible & concupiscible or desiring power, as into two different and distinct powers, or whether it makes but one power of both. The common opinion is, that as their obiects are diuers, so they are two

distinct powers : whereof the reason is gathered, by that which experience doth shew vs in all other things subiect to corruption; for we see in other corruptible creatures, that they haue not onely an inclination and power to seek after those things which are fit and conuenient for them, and to flie those which may hurt or anoy them; but moreouer, they haue another faculty or power, to resist and fight against that which may crosse their actions, or destroy their beeing. As for example, fire is not onely indued with lightnesse, to flie vp high, but it hath also receiued heate from nature, by meanes whereof, it doth resist and fight against any thing that is contrary to his

his action. In like manner it was necessary for the good of man, that hee should haue two kindes of inclinations, the one to pursue those things which are pleasing & agreeable to the senses, and to auoyde those which may any way annoy him : and this we call the concupiscible or desiring power ; and the other, by meanes whereof hee may incounter and vanquish whatsoeuer opposeth it selfe, crosseth his inclinations, or that tends to the destruction of his being, or the decay of his contentment , which is that wee call the irascible or angry power. This differs from the concupiscible , for that the concupiscible tends to the sensible good , absolutely considered , and with-

out any crosses ; whereas the irascible doth alwayes aime at the good which is inuiro-  
ned with some difficulty, the which she striues to vanquish to the end shee may take all obstacles from the concupiscible power, which crosse her content, and hinder her from enioying the good which she desires to attaine vnto : so as the irascible is as a sword and target to the concupiscible, for that she combates for her content, and resists any thing that may crosse her.

There are many things proue, that they are two different and distinct powers : For as Mathematicians ha-  
uing noted diuers apparent irregularities in the Planets, and obserued, that they seem sometimes to hasten their  
course,



course, and sometimes to  
slacke it; sometimes they  
stand as it were fixed, and  
sometimes to returne backe  
in the Zodiaque; sometimes  
they seem neare to the earth,  
& sometimes they appear far  
off; they haue held it necessa-  
ry to multiply their heauens,  
and to giue them many to a-  
uoyd all disorder in these ex-  
cellent bodiyes of the Vni-  
uerse. In like manner the di-  
uersity of passions in man, the  
contrary motions & desires,  
wherewith his soule is tost,  
haue let philosophers vn-  
derstand, that there is in him  
not onely a concupiscible  
power, but also an irascible:  
for that many times we haue  
a desire of that which wee  
strive against, and resist with  
vehemency; and if wee suffer

our selues to be vanquished, wee are griued; as hee who desiring to see the bodies of such as had beene executed, suppressed this desire, and diuerted his eies from this infamous spectacle, yet suffering himselfe to bee vanquished by his curiosity, and hauing cast his eyes thereon, witnessed his grieve and sorrow which remained, to haue giuen so brutish a contentment to his eyes. Whereby it appeares, that desire and anger are two diuerse faculties, seeing that one power is not carried at one instant to contrary desires. And we finde in our selues, that often times wee are inclined to angry passions, & are not much moued with those of the concupiscible, or to the contrary.

trary. In like manner there are creatures which haue desires, but no motions of choler: as for example, Sheepe, Pigeons, and Turtles, make shew to haue impressions of desires, and yet there appeareth in them no signe of anger. So as to obserue their dispositions well, we may call in question that which *Aristotle* saith, that *there is no creature but hath some touch of choler*: finally wee may obserue, that sometimes the irascible makes vs to pursue things which are absolutely contrary to the concupiscible, as when with the hazzard of life (which is so deere and precious to all creatures) we seeke to reuenge our selues of a powerfull enemy which hath wronged vs. For this

revenge which puts our life in danger, cannot proceede from the same power which desires passionately to preserve it: and so the irascible and concupiscible, are two different powers. And there is no part of passion properly taken, but in these two sensitive faculties, which is one of the things wee gather from the definition wee haue giuen.

It appears also by the same definition, that the passions of our soule should alwayes bee followed with a sensible alteration in the body, by the impression of the sensitive appetite, touched with the imaginatiō of good or euill, which presents it selfe. And here first we must not wonder if the soule doth impart

impart her motions, and causeth such great alteration in the body, seeing that the body doth impart his paines, when as it suffers any violence. For if it be laid on the racke, broken on a wheele, or cast into the fire, the soule grones vnder the burden of his torments: the which happens, for that beeing vnited as forme and matter, and making but one body which growes from their vnion; of necessity all things must bee common vnto them, except those things which repugne, and cannot agree with their particular natures; and therefore by a certaine contagion they communicate their passions one vnto another. But in this subiect there is a stronger reason for the which  
the

the soule excites these alterations in the body by her passions, that is to say, for that the soule doth not onely reside in the body as the forme, but doth preside there in quality of the moouing cause, by meanes whereof, she doth change and alter it at her will. For as the intellectuall power, which mooues a heauen, applying her vertue to mooue it, makes it to change place, and drawes it from East to West, or from West to East, euen so the soule which hath a moouing power commanding ouer the body, changeth his naturall disposition, and by her agitation puls him from his rest, wherein hee was before shee troubled him; in this manner.

More

Moreouer, wee must not wonder if the sensitiue appetite in particular, make so great an impression in the body. This proceeds from the sympathy which is found in those powers, which are gouerned by the same soule which imployes them: so as the sensitiue appetite, coming to play her part, shee doth stirre vp the mouing faculty of the heart, the which dilates it selfe, or shrinkes vp, according to the nature of the objects which haue made impression vpon the sensitiue appetite, whence grow al the alterations which are made in the body of man. And here we must remember, that nature hath fashioned the heart in such sort, as it is in perpetual motion, according  
vnto



vnto which it sometimes extends it selfe, and sometime retires of it selfe, with a certaine measure and proportion; the which continuing within the bounds which nature hath prescribed it, as conformable vnto the condition of the creature, this motion is wholly naturall: but if it once come to breake this law, and shew it selfe more violent, or more slow, then the nature of the creature requires, the naturall harmony is broken, and there followes a great alteration in the body of the creature.

Of all the powers of the soule, those of the sensitiue appetite onely cause the alteration of this motion, whose actions alone may make it more violent, or more slowe,  
then

then the lawes of nature doe allow. And hence it comes, that none but the actions of the sensitiue appetite are made with a visible change of the body, and with a sensible alteration of the naturall constitution. Yet as in this change the heart receiues an alteration, so the spirits, the blood, and other humours, are agitated and mooued beyond ordinary, the which doth wholly trouble the naturall constitution of the creature. The which happens after this manner: The obiects of the senses strike first vpon the imagination, and then this power hauing taken knowledge of the, conceiues them as good or bad, as pleasing or troublesome, and importune: then  
after-

afterwards propounds them as clothed with those qualities to the creature, which apprehending them vnder this last cōsideration excites the concupiscible, or irascible power of the soule, and induceth them to imbrace or flye them, and by the impression of its motion, agitates the spirits which we cal Vitall, the which going from the heart, disperse themselves throughout the whole body, and at the same instant the blood which deriues frō the liuer, participating in this agitatiō, flowes throughout the veynes, and casts it selfe ouer all the other parts of the body: So as the heart and liuer beeing thus troubled in their naturail dispositions, the whole body feelles  
it

it selfe mooued, not onely inwardly, but also outwardly, according to the nature of that passiō which doth trouble it. For in motions of ioy and desire, the heart melts with gladnesse. In those of sorrow and trouble, it shrinks vp and freezeth with griefe. In those of choler and resolution, it is inflamed and all on fire. In those of feare, it growes pale and trembling. A Louers words are sweete and pleasing, and those of a cholerick man are sharpe and rough: Finally, there riseth no passion in the soule, which leaueth not some visible trace of her agitation, vpon the body of man.

Lastly, wee may gather from the definition of passion that this alteration which hap-

happeneth in the body, is contrary to the lawes of nature, for that (as we haue said) it transports the heart beyond the bounds, which nature hath prescribed it, and doth agitate it extraordinarily.

Hence it growes, that among al the motiōs of the sensitive appetite, those only are properly called passiōs, which are accompanied with some notable defect. For as we call passions of the body diseases, wounds, paines, inflammations, incisions, and all other violent accidents which happen extraordinarily: So we properly call passions of the soule, those infirmities where-with she is afflicted and troubled; as pittie, feare, bashfulness, or shame, loue, hatred,  
de-

desires, Choler, and the rest.

For, in this subiect the word *Passion*, is not taken in that sense, whereas wee say that a subiect suffers, when as it receiues some new forme, bee it that at the comming of this forme, it lose any thing of its owne or not, as when the ayre is enlightned with the Sunne beams, without losing any thing of her first constitution: nor in that sense, wherein we say, that a subiect suffers, when as it receiues a new quality which doth expell another, whether it bee concurrent to its nature, or contrary vnto it, as when water growes cold, or is made hot.

But

But the word Passion is taken here for a change, which is made in man, contrary to his naturall constitution and disposition, from the which hee is as it were wrested by this change. In which sense the Philosophers say, that things suffer, when as they are drawne from their naturall disposition, to a course that is contrary to their nature.

In the meantime you must not wonder, if we ground the irregularity of the change, which these passions breed, vpon the disorder which the sensitive appetite (stirred vp by the sensible objects) casts into the heart, being a thing which wee must constantly beleue, that this power of the soule, bee it the irascible  
or



or cōcupiscible, hath its seat  
and mansion in the heart :  
The which cannot be denied  
in the subiect of feare, for that  
such as are transported ther-  
with, call back the blood and  
heate vnto the heart, as to  
the place where feare doth  
exercise her tyranny, there-  
with to defend themselues:  
considering also that those  
creatures which haue the  
greatest and largest hearts,  
are most fearefull, for that  
their heate is more dispersed,  
and consequently lesse able  
to resist the assaults of feare.  
Some haue not beleueed,  
that it was so of other passi-  
ons, but haue appointed the  
their seates else-where, and  
haue maintained, that some  
did reside in the liuer, others  
in the spleene, and some in  
the

the gall; & as for anger, they haue lodged it in the gall, whereas choler resides, which doth inflame it. But they haue giuen loue his quarter in the liuer, for that the sāguine cōplexion is inclined to loue: & for ioy, they haue seated it in the Spleen, for that melancholy proceeds from the distemperature of this part. But notwithstanding this, it is most certaine, that both the powers of the sensitiue appetitē, I mean the Irascible, and Concupiscible, reside in the heart; the which beeing the fountaine of life, & of all vital operations, must also bee a lodge & retraite to those appetites which nature hath giuē the creature to preserue his life, & to chase away those perils which may threaten it.

Wher-

Wherby we see, that the passions of desire or anger, are felt presently in the heart, & trouble the natural constitution as soon as they rise; wherby followeth a strange alteration throughout the whole body, for the springs cannot be troubled but the streams will feel of it. And therefore the passions being too vehement, and making a violent impressiō vpon the hart, they cause strange accidents in man. As for example, a furious anger drawing the heate violently from the heart, to those parts which are most remote from the Center of life, and by the same meanes inflaming choler, which by her naturall lightnes mounts vp to the braine, may depriue mā of the vse of reason, & make him furious and mad. In

In like manner an extraordinary feare, drawing the spirits and heate forcibly to the heart, whereas she meanes to fortifie her selfe against her enemy, may quench the natural heate, and suffocate the man: shame may doe the like, whereof we haue prodigious examples in histories, which testifie, that great personages haue died with shame and griefe, for that they could not find the knot, or expound certaine riddles or difficult questions, which had beene propounded vnto them: yea, they say, that great ornament and Gemme of Phylosophy *Aristotle*, died with griefe, for that he could not finde the cause of the flowing and ebbing of *Eurypus*. Whereby it appeares, that

that the heart which is thus oppressed by *Passions*, when they are violent, is the seate of both the powers of the sensitiue appetite, that is to say, of the *Irascible*, and *Concupiscible*. And whereas they obiect to the contrary, that *Choller* resides in the *Gall*, inferring thereby that the *Irascible* power should reside there also: It is easily answered, for that the *Choller* which remains in the *Gall*, is not the reason for the which *Anger* is inflamed, but for that it is a hot and dry humor, the which are fit qualities to produce that effect. The like may be sayd of *Loue*, and that the abundance of blood doth not make men more inclined to the *Passions* of *loue*, for that the *Concupiscible*

C ble

ble power resides in the liuer, which is the place where the blood takes his forme; but for that they which are of a sanguine complexion, haue a hot and moist temperature, which is proper to that *passion*. And as for ioy wee cannot conclude that it resides in the *Spleene*, for that it being infirme, many are oppressed with melancholly; for the reason why melancholly doth torment them which are troubled with the *Spleene*, is not for that ioy resides there, but for that adust *choller* preuailing, causeth a troublesome and importune heauines.

Yet we will not so restraine these two powers, within the bounds and extent of the heart, but wee will confesse, that

that although they haue their chiefe residence there, yet they disperse themselues through the whole creature; whereof wee haue good prooffe in *Lizards*, which being cut in peeces, feelee paine in all the parts where they are offended. For the last of our obseruations vpon the subiect of *passions*, it remaines to shew, whether of the *concupiscible* and *irascible* powers, bee the more noble and excellent: some giue the preheminence to the *concupiscible*, for that it is destined to serue the soule, and to make it enioy the obiects of her *passions*. The which made *Aristotle* to say, that beasts put themselues into *choller*, and fight for their desires. But this reason doth nothing



abase the *Iraſcible* power, but contrariwiſe it ſhewes how much it is more excellent then the *Concupiſcible*.

For as thoſe ſouldiers are moſt valiant which maintaine the ſhocke of a battaile, and defend the weaker; euen ſo by conſequence, the *Iraſcible* power muſt haue more generoſity then the *concupiſcible*, ſeeing ſhe is ordained by nature for her defence. And as the nobleſt vertues, are formed in the moſt excellent powers, ſo we ſee that force or valour, which reſides in the *Iraſcible*, is a more worthy and more commendable vertue then temperance which hath her ſeat in the *Concupiſcible*. We finde alſo that it is more ſhamefull not to bridle the motions

motions of the *Concupiscible*, then those of the *Iraſcible*, for that theſe are leſſe offenſiue to reaſon. In regard whereof we blame them more which abandon themſelues to pleaſure and voluptuousnes, then thoſe which are ſubiect to motions of *choller*.

## Of the Number of *Paſſions.*

### CHAP. 2.



As they that haue treated of the Nature of the Winds haue written diuerſly, ſome ſetting foure, others eight, ſome eleauen, and ſome two and

C 3 thirty

thirty, to the which they assigne diuers points in the horizon: So the *Philosophers* which discourse of the *Passions* of the *Soule*, agree not of the number, some naming more, some lesse. Yea there was an Ancient affirmed, that as there are many *Passions*, whereof we know the names, so there are an infinite number which we know not.

Wherefore hee compared man to one of the monsters of antiquity, which they represent vnto vs, composed of the members, and formes of diuers creatures: for that his *Cupidities* and *Passions* are so prodigious, and so many in number, as they are able to amaze any one, that shall iudiciously consider of the multitude and diuersity.

First

First of all, there were some which haue beleueed, that as there were foure chiefe winds which excite diuers stormes, be it at land or sea; so there are foure principall *Passions* which trouble our *Soules*, and which stir vp diuers tempests by their irregular motions, that is to say *Pleasure, Paine, Hope, & Feare*: and in truth these foure haue as it were the Empiry ouer all the rest, which propound themselves as the objects of their motions; for whatsoever men do, either they feare or desire, or afflict themselves, or are contented; which be the effects of these *Passions*. Others will haue onely two, that is to say, *Pleasure and Paine*; and some assigne but one, and that is

*Loue*, to the which they refer all the rest as to their *center* and *roote*. Others haue multiplied them, and haue made twelue, and some eleauen. Amidst this diuersity of opinions, that is the truest which is receiued at this day, and imbraced by all those that make an exact profession of *Philosophy*: that is to say, that there are eleauen primitiue and generall *Passions*, whereof all the rest are but as it were budds and branches. These generall *Passions* are, *Loue*, *Hatred*, *Desire*, *Flight*, *Pleasure*, *Paine*, *Feare*, *Courage*, *Hope*, *Despaire* and *Choller*. And thus the *Philosophers* finde out the number. Of *Passions*, say they, some regard the good or euill absolutely and simply considered.

considered. And these belong to the *Concupiscible power*. Others regard the good or euill accompanied with some difficulty, and they appertaine vnto the *irascible*: those of the *Concupiscible power*, are six in number, whereof three haue for their obiects the good, that is to say, *Loue*, *Desire*, and *Pleasure*; and the other three haue for their obiect the euil, that is to say, *Hatred*, *Flight*, and *Paine*: for presently, that the obiect which hath the forme of good, offers it selfe vnto the *Concupiscible power*, shee presently feeles herselfe surprized, and *Loue* is framed. If this obiect bee present, she receiues *Pleasure* and *Delight*: if it bee absent, she is toucht with a *Desire* to enioy it. And in like man-

ner as soone as the object presents it selfe vnto the selfe same power, vnder the shew of *euill*, it doth presently stirre vp a *hated* contrary to *loue*: and if during this *horror* it bee absent, then *Flight* or *Auersion*, contrary to *desire* discovers it selfe: but if it bee present, she then conceiues *griefe*. In this manner we finde out the number of the *passions* which reside in the *concupiscible* power: those of the *irascible* are but five, as *feare*, *courage*, *hope*, *despaire*, and *choller*: for if the object which hath some shew of good, presents it selfe being accompanied with *difficultie*, and that man conceiues with himselfe that notwithstanding all that, it is in his power to obtaine



it, then hope is framed ; but if there bee no likelyhood, *despaire* pulls him back and diuerts him. And touching that which regards the *good* wee enioy, there is no *passion* in the *irascible* that concerns it, seeing that which is in our power is not accompanied with any *difficulty*, neither is it needfull the *irascible* shoulde mooue or worke for this subiect. But if the euill which presents it selfe, be full of *horror* and *difficulty*, it must either be present or absent; if it be absent, it excites *courage* or *feare*; *Courage*, if wee striue to surmount it; and *feare*, if we apprehend it as too doubtfull. If it bee present, it inflames *choller* which carries vs to reuenge, to repell the iniurie  
that

that is done vs. And thus wee finde out the number of the *Passions* of the *irascible power*, the which with the six of the *Concupiscible*, make eleauen in a l. But wee must remember, that notwithstanding this determined number, yet wee finde as it were a swarme of others, which notwithstanding take their beginning, and spring from these, as we haue obserued. In this number the *Philosophers* put *Bitternes*, *Envy*, *Emulation*, *Shamefastnes*, *Impudency*, *Mercy*, *Humanity*, and a thousand others which were too long to relate. But for that there are some, without the knowledge whereof this treaty were imperfect, wee will speake of them according the exigence

gence of the subiect, when occasion shalbe offered: here it shall suffice to obserue, that as the generall *Passions*, regard their objects without any restriction; but that of good or euill, which presents it selfe; so the more particular *Passions*, contained vnder these generall, regard the same objects limited to some speciall condition: as for example, *Desire* taken absolutely is a generall *Passion*, which regards the object of good, without any other limitation then vnder the apparance of good: but if wee come to prescribe bounds to this good, and that wee consider it vnder the forme of some particular good, be it of *Honor*, of *Riches*, of *Beauty*, or of any other thing; the *desire* must

must also bee limited, and then it shall bee a desire of honor, which is called ambition; or a desire of riches, which we call *conetousnes*, or a desire of beauty, the which attributes vnto it selfe, the name of the gender, and is called *loue*. And the like may bee sayd of the other limitations of this obiect: so as these *Passion* of *Loue*, *Riches*, and *Honor*, are more particular *Passions* then the desire, which is as it were their gender and spring. So griefe taken absolutely is a *Passion*, which regards the obiect of euill in its generall extent, without any other limitation then that of euill. By reason whereof if this obiect come to bee restrained by vs to some speciall condition, as

to the misery or prosperity of another man, or to our owne infamy; then this griefe shall also be limited and restrained, and shall become a griefe for another mans misfortunes, and then it shall be a compassion; or it shall be a griefe for another mans prosperity, and then it shall be called an *indignation* or an *enuie* and *despight*: or else it will become a griefe for our owne infamy, and then it is a shame, and so of the rest. These *Passions* may be infinite vnder the diuers limitations of objects which are infinite, and therefore they can hardly be ranked vnder a certaine science: neither haue they particular names, but borrow them from the limi-

tation

tation which the object gives them; yet there are some which haue their proper names, as *Envy*, *Jealousie*, *Compassion*, *Shame*: but the rest many times carry the name of their *Gender*s.

In the meane time a question is heere propounded, whence it comes that considering the object of the *Concupiscible appetite*, which contains the good and *euill* simply taken, that is to say, without shew of any difficulty added vnto it; wee haue put ioy as a *Passion*, which ariseth from the presence and enioying of the good, and griefe as a *Passion* which growes from the present *euill* which cannot be auoided; and yet considering the object of the *Irascible power*, which comprehends

prehends the good which cannot be obtained but with difficulty, and the *euill* which cannot be auoyded but with *paine*, wee haue not set any *Passion* that riseth from the enioying of that good, or from the presence of that *euill* which cannot bee eschued. Whereunto we answere, that this difficulty were allowable, if these two appetits had their actions separated one from another; but they are alwayes vnited, and march ioynedly to the pursuit and enioying of good, and to the flight and auoyding of euill. So as the *Irascible appetite* neuer stirres but ioynedly with the *Concupiscible*, for that it is ordained to succor and assist it, whensoever there appears any difficulty in the obiect,



object which he is to pursue or auoyd. In regard whereof, notwithstanding any difficulty that may be incountered in the fight or pursuite of this object, yet when it is obtained or auoyded, all the paine or difficulty which did enuiron it, vanissheth away, and is dispersed. It is not therefore necessary to ascribe any other *Passions*, which grow from the enioying or flight of this object, then the same which arise from the enioying or flight; when as there is no apparent difficultie which doth crosse the possession or make the auoyding difficult: and to the end wee may the better know what order these two appetites obserue in the execution of their offices, wee may thus

thus represent their motions, and the order of the *Passions* which are framed in the one, and the other. As soone as any object presents it selfe vnto the sensible power, vnder the forme of an apparent good: as for example, the beauty of a faire *Hellen*, whether that the acquisition be accompanied with any difficulty or not, this beauty doth first of all stirre vp a passion of loue, from the which presently doth grow a desire which makes him seeke to enioy her; and if in this pursuite there appeare no difficulty, the possession will be obtained without the assistance of the *irascible appetite*, whence will arise ioy or pleasure. But if during the heate of *desire*, there appears any

any difficulty to obtaine it, then if the *Concupiscible appetite* were not assisted, it would be danted with the least difficulty that should present it selfe, and would cease to desire the thing, or striue to enjoy it: for this reason the *Iras-cible* to preuent this, causeth hope to arise to succour the *concupiscible*, which supports desire and makes him striue to attaine vnto it; and in this case it breedes no other ioy then that which had succeeded if it had bin obtained without any difficulty, considering that the enjoying makes him forget all the precedent paines. But from the beginning and breeding of desire, or during the whole continuance thereof, bee it with hope, or without expectance

tance of the enioying of the obiect, if it appeares to bee a thing absolutely impossible to enioy, then not to suffer *desire* to consume it selfe in a vaine pursuite, the *Irascible* stirres vp *despaire*, to the end the *Concupiscible power* may not spend it selfe in a designe which cannot succeed. And in like manner if an obiect presents it selfe vnto the *appetitive power*, vnder the forme of *euill*, as for example, a powerfull enemy prepares himselfe to wrong vs, then first of all *hatred* riseth in vs, and makes vs apprehend the *euill* which doth threaten vs apparantly, and then inclines vs to seeke the meanes to auoyd it, bee it in putting our selues in defence, or in retiring our selues and seeking some

some shelter for this storme,  
or else in auoyding it by  
some other meanes, the  
which breeds in vs the *Passion*  
of *flight*, by the which wee vn-  
derstand no other thing here  
then our striuing to flie the  
*euill*. But in case that in this  
seeking of meanes to auoyde  
it there appeare not any dif-  
ficulty, then the *irascible pow-*  
*er* doth not trouble it selfe to  
assist the *concupiscible*. And  
for that to escape a danger  
and to auoyd a mischiefe is a  
kind of good, this happening  
it begets ioy. As on the o-  
ther side if we fall into a mis-  
fortune which threatens vs,  
although there appeare not  
any difficulty in the auoy-  
ding, it will cause *griefe*. But  
if whilst I seeke meanes to a-  
uoyd the storme which  
threatens

threatens me, I finde that I cannot doe it without *paine* and difficulty; then for that the least obstacles amaze and hinder the *concupiscible power* which neuer striues to surmount them, the *irascible* excites *courage* which goes to succour it, and supports the motion of this *Passion*, which wee terme flight or auersion from the thing, vntill the *euill* bee wholly auoyded and dispersed; and then ariseth the same ioy which had happened if it had not incountered any of these difficulties. And if amidst this resistance and striuing of *courage*, the *euill* doth notwithstanding ariue, then *griefe* is framed after the same manner as if this accident had happened without any incounter or difficulty

ficulty. But if whilest wee seeke the meanes to auoyde the *euill*, wee discouer much difficulty to preserue our selues, and that there approacheth an eminent danger to our persons, then the *irascible* doth succour vs with feare, which makes man discreet and aduised, to the end that his too great hardines may not precipitate him into the danger which hee would auoyd. Besides al this, when as the obiect which presents it selfe vnder the forme of good, seemes at the same instant impossible to be attained vnto, then not onely hope dies, but euen *desire* is banisht, so as the first *Passion* which then springs vp in vs is despaire, which the *irascible* stirres vp, to the end there should grow



grow no vaine *desire*, for that naturally no man desires things which are impossible, and vaine and vnprofitable actions are enemies to nature.

As for the contrariety which may bee found betwixt some of these *Passions*, we must vnderstand that this contrariety may be considered after two manners, that is to say, either by reason of the diuers motions of the *appetite* which is inflamed; as for example, wee say that *hope* and *despaire* are contrary *Passions*, not in respect of their obiects, seeing they both regard the apparant good, vnder the condition of difficult obtaining, but by reason of the diuers motions they excite by their nature

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in the *appetite*, for that *hope* strives to seeke and enjoy the object, and *despaire* to flie from it and auoid it. Whence it growes that if we compare *hope* and *courage*, we shall find them contrary *Passions*, not in regard of the motion of the *appetite*, seeing that both agitate and stirre vp the spirit, and serue it as a spur to make it more ready in the pursuit of their object, but in respect of the object, for that *hope* looks to the apparent good, and *courage* to the *euill*.

In like manner *fear* and *despaire* are contraries, by reason of their objects, and not in regard of their motions, for that both serue rather to retire and stay the stirring of the *appetite*, then  
to

to excite and stirre it vp. Next, *desire* and *flight* are contrary *Passions*, by both reasons together, considering that the one hath the *good* for object, and the other the *euill*. And moreouer *desire* stirres vp the *appetite* to seeke the object, whereas *flight* makes it retire to auoyd it. We may make the same comparisons of the rest of the *Passions*. But this will appeare more plainely when wee shall treat of them in particular.

Of the quality of *Passions*, whether they be good or bad.

CHAP. 3.



Mongst the questions which haue beene seriously disputed

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in the Schooles of ancient *Philosophers*, there is not any one hath bene more famous, nor whose subiect hath beene argued with greater contention, then that which concerns the quality of the *Passions* of the *Soule*, that is to say, whether they be good or bad, and if they bee compatible with any eminent vertue, or can subsist with it. The *Stoicks* seuere *Philosophers*, & dissenting from the common opinions of the world, haue maintained, that a *Soule* in which vertue hath taken deepe roote, and which enioyes all the ornaments of true wisdom, should haue gotten such a power ouer all her motions, as it should neuer be transported with any perturbations. The reason  
which

which moued them to this opinion, was, for that they held it an vnworthy thing for a wise and vertuous man to see himselfe subiect to the infirmities of the soule, which is the name they giue to *Passions*. But the *Peripatitians* haue held the contrary opinion, and did beleue that it could not bee denied, but that the greatest *Spirits*, and most accomplished in vertue and wisedome, had sometimes a feeling of these *Passions*, the heate whereof wisemen knew how to bridle and restraints. And they ground their reason, for that they rise not in vs by our election, but are as it were fiences of *Nature*, which spring out of themselues. This controuersie hath see-

med to many great Personages to be more verbal then materiall. But whatsoeuer it bee, it is certaine that the wisest cannot exempt themselves from the motions of naturall *Passions*, and yet their vertue is nothing diminished or made lesse perfect. We must then remēber that these kinds of *Passions* may be considered in two manners, first in their particular extent, that is to say, as motions of the *sensuine appetite*, which of it selfe is not indowed with any reason, and which is common to vs with beasts; and in this consideration they are neither commendable, nor blame worthy, seeing that the weight and merit of that which parts from our soule, depends  
of

of reason: secondly, they may be considered in as much as reason may subiect them to her command and prescribe them a *Law*. And in this consideration they may bee good or bad, according to the quality of the will that gouernes them. So wee see both good and bad, feare, desire, and reioyce alike. But the wicked haue bad feares, wicked desires, & bad ioyes, whereas the good haue none but good feares, good desires, and good ioyes, for that the branches do alwaies participate of the nature of the roote. For although the *sensitive appetite* of her owne quality be destitute of liberty, yet by reason of the strict vnion that it hath with the intellectuall and reasonable, it



doth participate as it were with a beame, and some kind of borrowed liberty, in regard whereof some haue maintained that it is capable of vertues, as of temperance and fortitude, which reside in this part of the soule.

If the *Stoicks* had well obserued this consideration, they should haue seene that a wise man by the guide of reason may so moderate his *Passions*, as they may be commendable and worthy the profession hee makes of vertue. The which is nothing doubted of by Christian *Philosophers*, seeing that he who was neuer subiect to sinne, and whose soule was aduanced to the height of graces and vertues, had *Passions* and humane affections, the which could

could neuer command ouer reason, or transport it, but receiue a law from it. But on the other side wee want no reasons to conuince and ouerthrow the opinions of the *Stoickes*. For first of all, vertue (how eminent soeuer) neuer ruines that which is wholly conformable to reason. But what is more reasonable then to see a man moued with pittie and compassion of his like, of his friends, or of his kinsman? what inhumanity were it for a mother to see her child in the throat of wild beastes, or exposed to shipwracke, or broken vpon a wheele, or torne in peeces by tortures, or only sicke of some violent infirmity, and not to haue her soule sensible of *griefe*?  
Would

would wee that a vertuous man should not bee touch-  
ed with indignation to see  
crimes honored, and the wic-  
ked aduanced to the height  
of dignities? Shall we con-  
demne the spurres of an ho-  
nest emulation, wherewith  
he is toucht that reades the  
glorious exploits and vertu-  
ous actions of great Perso-  
nages which haue gon before  
him? will you haue him that  
owes his life, and honor, and  
whatsoeuer hee enioyeth, to  
his friend, intensible of the  
offices of his friendship?  
would they that the teares of  
an honest wife should haue  
no power, ouer an husband  
that were ready to abandon  
her? All these motions be-  
ing so iust, were it not a great  
cruelty to seeke to suppress  
them

them, as it were in despite of *nature*? But who knowes not that these *Passions* are exercises of vertue? To apprehend euill, to feare punishments, to attend recompences with ioy, to long after promises, are they not so many encouragements to piety, temperance, and other vertuous actions? who is it then that will blame so commendable a thing? Nay, is it not to quench the fruits of vertue; and to deny it the content which is due vnto it, in cutting off thus generally all *Passions*? For who knoweth not, that shee doth vsually plant in the soules of men an ardent *loue* of the goodly fruits which she produceth? What iust man but fees a certaine pleasure and sweet-

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nes in the effects of Iustice? what sober man but receiues content in the actions of sobriety? what valiant man but suffers himselfe to bee transported with the *loue* of braue exploits, and a desire to seeke glorious death in combats? And who will beleue that euer vertue (like vnto *Polipus* which eates his owne armes) will euer ruine her proper objects? Who doth not know but the *Passions* of our soules are the objects of many excellent vertues, which doe moderate them, and reduce them vnto reason when they seeke to flie out? Fortitude is nothing but a mediocrity betwixt feare & hardines: That is to say, it is nothing but a vertue by meanes whereof we do moderate

derate our exceeding feare,  
and our immoderate bold-  
nesse. Take then feare and  
hardines from fortitude, and  
it is no more a vertue. And  
by the same reason you ouer-  
throw all *courage* and mag-  
nanimity, whereof the one  
makes vs to vndertake the  
most terrible and difficult  
things with resolution, and  
the other giues vs a lustre in  
our greatest actions. You  
shall in like manner ouer-  
throw all patience, and per-  
seuerance, whereof the one  
makes vs constantly and  
willingly to endure all the  
miseries of this life; and the  
other confirms vs against all  
the crosses of this world, so  
as wee remaine inseparably  
tied to that which wee hold  
conformable to reason; for  
all

all these vertues haue for their obiect the *Passions* of the *Irafcible appetite*. Temperance is no other thing, but a mediocrity which wee keepe in the pleasures of tast and feeling, and in the griefes and sorrowes which befall vs. That is to say, it is a vertue by meanes whereof wee gouerne our pleasures and paines. If then you take all *pleasure* and *Paine* from temperance, you giue it the name of vertue in vaine. And withall you put *modesty* and *honesty* out of the number of the vertues, whereof the one makes vs apprehend infamies and reproches; that is to say, induceth vs to flie whatsoeuer hath any shew of dissolution. And the other filling our soules with goodly



ly things done with a certaine grace, makes vs to flie whatsoeuer is filthy and worthy of reproch. You shall also put out of the same number of vertues, *abstinency*, *Sobriety*, *chastity*, and *pudicity*, whereof the two first moderate the delights of the mouth, and the other the pleasures of generation: For that all these verueues haue for their object the *Passions* of the *concupiscible appetite*.

Alter all this the *sensitiue appetite* is a present of nature, which God (who is the Author) hath freely bestowed vpon vs; but vertue neuer destroys nature, but addes vnto it the perfection which it wants. It must then suffer the *sensitiue appetite* to act according to his inclination,  
yet

yet moderating his motions and restrayning them vnder the lawes of reason. And without doubt it seemes the *Stoicks* haue not obserued in man any other composition then that of the body and the soule, and that they were ignorant of the diuersity of the intellectuall and sensitiue powers of reason, and of sensuality. For otherwise they would neuer haue suffered the *sensitiue appetite* to haue bene idle in man, as it must of necessity remaine, if it bee once freed from all motions of *Passions*. And as for those wonderfull praises they giue to a wise man, whom they imagine to bee freed from *Passions*, they are like vnto the stately titles which are giuen to great *shipps*, and to all

all that rich equipage, and furniture wherewith it is adorned, and yet it is subiect to the fury of stormes, and suffers shipwracke as well as the smallest vessells. Wee haue alwayes scene those which haue made profession of this sect, grow pale and wanne, as well as other men in dangers at sea or land; they are alwayes scene subiect to the common desires of men, and they haue in that regard more vanity then constancy. So as they haue bene forced to excuse these first motions, and to confesse that it was not in the power of man to suppress them, but they would sometimes breake forth. What remains then but to confesse that reason must gouerne them, and reduce

duce them to a mediocrity which is found in vertue? For as health doth not consist in the ruine of contrary qualities which are found in man, but in the temperature which a good constitution giues them: And as to make a perfect musique, wee must not take away the diuersity of tunes, but reduce them to a good accord to make the harmony perfect; so the striuings of vertue consistes not wholly to roote all naturall *Passions* out of the soule, but to moderate and gouerne them by the rule of reason. It is true, there are some *Passions* full of offense, and which wee detest to heare named, as *Impudency*, *Enuy*, *Hatred*; and these wee make no question but they ought

ought to bee suppress'd. But there are others whose very names are pleasing, as *Pitty*, *Modesty*, *Honest Love*, and the like; and these need not any thing, but to receive a tincture from reason and vertue, to make them altogether commendable.

But to prescribe vs a man that is not moued with any *Passion*, were to deprivie him of all humanity, and to make him a *stone* or a *god*. They that make profession of this proud and arrogant *Philosophie*, cannot but laugh when as they read in the writings of *Poets*, that there hath bene men of that constitution, and as we may say, of that temper, that no swords, lances, or other armes, could pierce them or wound their bodies.

And

And they that haue had most credit among them, haue derided those *Philosophers* which beleeued that there were certaine Ilands and Countries in the world, as *Delos* and *Egypt*, which had neuer felt the violence of earthquakes, and which had continued for euer immouable, amidst the motions of all the other parts of the world. And these people paint vs out a wise man so perfect, so eminent, and so fortified with vertue, as all the stormes of Fortune, yea the most violent, *Shipwrackes* *tortures*, and infamies cannot make any impression in his soule; so as he continues immouable in the midst of *flames*, *wheelles*, *gibbets* and all the fearefull horrors of death and

and shame. What is hee that will not laugh at this strange vanity? But the *Stoicks* say, that it is a thing vn-worthy of a wiseman adorned with perfect vertue, to see himselfe transported with passions, which are the diseases of the soule. Whereunto we answere, that *Passions* considered as they submit themselves vnto the lawes of reason, are no infirmities of the soule, but in that sence they are the instruments and objects of vertue, and as it were liuely sparkes which inflame desires in our soules; and as *Aristotle* speakes, they are the armes of reason. It is true that (as one saith) the flowers of *Egypt* being continually charged and watered with the vapors



Vapors of *Nilus* (which are grosse and earthly) yeild not such pleasant smells as they would do without this obstacle : euen so soules troubled with *Passions*, cannot produce the vertuous actions which they would do without this agitation : for that the motions and impressions which they make in our soules are like vnto the force of a violent *torrent*, which teares vp stones, overthrowes plants, and drawes after it whatsoeuer opposeth it selfe against his violence, for that they quench the reason, deprive vs of iudgement, smother the vnderstanding, and suffer not any image of vertue in a soule that is transported. But this happens to those which abandon themselves

selues wholly to *Passion*; and not vnto these who like vnto wise pilots prepare against a storme, and when it comes endeauour to auoid it, not loosing his iudgement in an accident which terrifies others. Wee tame *Elephants*, *Tigers*, *Lyons*, *Panthers*, and other sauage beasts, and are not moued: and will they not allow vs a power to suppress the brutishnesse of the sensitive appetite, and to moderate the *Passions* when as they aduance themselves against *reason*, without great perturbation?

Finally, when as these motions of *Passions* preuent the *reason* and anticipate all the resolutions of man, wee cannot hold them bad, seeing they are meere motions of nature

nature without any shew of liberty. And it is most certaine that not onely an ordinary wisdom is subiect thereunto, but euen the most excellent soules, (I speake not of those which haue speciall gifts from God) yea those that are indued with Heroicall vertues, feele agitation; seeing that vertue how eminent soeuer, cannot so subiect the *sensitive appetite*, (ouer which she doth not command as a slaue, but as a Cittizen) but it will anticipate the Empire of reason. And this the *Stoickes* are forced to confesse, seeing they affirme that it is not in the power of a wise man to free himselfe from perturbation, when as some fearefull formes presents themselves suddenly

suddenly to his eyes, so as whatsoeuer he doth in those accidents, hee will grow *pale*, he will be amazed, and his heart will shrinke vp. Yet, say they, all this will happen without consenting to these motions, for that it is in his power not to consent. They adde, that there is this difference betwixt a wiseman and one that is distracted: for that an vnreasonable man yeilds to passions and obayes them wholly; whereas the wiseman although he suffers the motions, yet hee resists them still, and generously preserues in his soule the lawes and loue of vertue; heerein truely they approach neere to the doctrine which we teach. But we must still remember that the office of

E reason

reason is not to pull out of the soule of man, all the rootes of *Passions*, neither were it expedient or necessary she should do it: But her duty is to prescribe them their bounds, and to reduce them to a mediocrity as vertue requires. As for example, let vs presuppose a brother which hath lost his brother whom hee loued passionately, and they coniure him not to lament for this losse, not to afflict himselfe, nor to shew any signe of mourning, to preserue the reputation of a wiseman and absolutely vertuous. Is it not rather a meere stupidity then a true constancy? They that make these discourses shew that either they haue no naturall disposition, or  
else

else they neuer fell into these calamities: otherwise so sensible a grieve wold haue pulled out of their spirits this arrogant *Philosophie*; and had forced them to confesse that humanity cannot suffer them to remaine insensible at such cruell accidents. In the meane time as these *Passions* preuenting reason, cannot be held good nor bad, so when as they suffer themselues to be moderated and gouerned by reason, they get vs great commendations; whereas when they flie out and exceed the bounds of vertue, they procure vs nothing but blame and infamy. To conclude, *Passions* are in the soule, as the sinnewes in the body; for as by meanes of sinnewes we extend or bend

the *members*: so by the operations of *Passions*, wee carry our selues to good or euill, and if wee will imploy them to good, they are as it were spurres and obiects: But if wee turne them to euill, our sensuality makes vse of them; like vnto him that keepes a slaue, who makes vse of his chaine to draw him where he pleaseth. So as the triumph of vertue consists not in pulling away or rooting out the *Passions*, as monsters; but in ruling and reforming them like vnto insolent and disobedient children: for they grow in vs and are as the fruits & buds of our sensuality, which haue onely need to be made subiect vnto *reason*. Finally, they that haue any other opinion must remember,



ber, that wee cannot wholly pull away the defects which proceed from *nature*: And that may by our industry correct and moderate that which is borne with vs, but not vanquish it and suppress it wholly; wherefore wisdom may not promise vnto it selfe any thing in this subiect, seeing she hath no power. The *Passions* are absolute and depend not on the Empire of vertue. They present themselves vn-called.

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## Of Loue.

### The Preface.



*N Ancient sayd,  
that to expell  
youth out of our  
townes, were to  
cut off the Spring  
time of the yeare. But we may  
maintaine with no lesse truth,  
that to banish Loue from a  
ciuill life, and the conuersation  
of men, were not only to deprive  
the yeare of her goodliest sea-  
son, but also as it were to pull  
the Sunne out of the firmament,  
and to fill the whole world with  
horror and confusion. For  
what*

*what is there in this life, bee it amidst honors and glory, in riches and treasures, yea in delights and pleasures, that can giue a full and sound content vnto man, without the communication of the sweetenes thereof to friends? wherefore an excellent Philosopher said, that if any one were raised aboue the beauen, from whence he might behold all the wonders of nature and of the world, and see with amazement the reuolutions, periods, order, diuersity, & beauty of the Planets and Stars, and had no friend to whom hee might impart this admiration; all these things in steed of fulnesse of ioy, would become displeasing and importune to his thoughts. For as colours which are the most exquisite ornaments of nature, how liuely and*

glistring so euer they be, wil notwithstanding be darkned & giue no pleasure to our eies, if they were not enlightned, and as it were inspired by the light which discouers vnto vs the singularities, and perfectiones: so what wealth or honor soeuer we enioy in this life, we cannot tast the sweetnes therof but in representing vnto our selues the contentment which comes to thē we loue, and whom we thinke haue an equal Passion on our behalfe. Epaminondas gloried to haue won 2 battels, his Father & mother being yet liuing, as if the way that those persons conceiued which were so neere to him, had made his victories more stately, & increased the glory & pompe of his triumphs. In like manner there is no man liuing, which in the cours of his prosperities doth  
not

not feel as it were an increase of happinesse, when as he imagines that his friends are spectators & partakers of his felicity. And moreover what can be sweeter to our thoughts then the image of a true & constant loue, which we are assured our friend doth beare vs? What happinesse to haue a friend to whom we may safely open our hart, and trust him with our most important secrets, without apprehension of his conscience, or any doubt of his fidelity? What content to haue a friend whose discourse sweetens our cares? whose counsells disperse our feares? whose conuersation charmes our griefs? whose circumspection assures our fortunes, & whose only presence fills vs with ioy and content? Seeing then loue is a Passion which doth produce such sweete and plei-

## The Preface.

*ſing contents in the ſociety of  
men, we will endeavour to ſhew  
what his beginning is, wherein  
his eſſence conſiſts, to what  
Persons it extends,  
and what the ef-  
fects bee.*

Of



Of the beginning of  
*Loue.*

CHAP. I.



Si it is the custome of men to refer the noblest effects to the most excellent causes; many considering the dignity of *loue*, haue imagined that this *Passion* came from a particular impression, which God makes in our *Soules*, inspiring into them with the *nature*, the affections which transport them, and which makes them seeke the obiects



objects which are pleasing vnto them. The which they striue to proue by the example of the naturall inclinations which he hath giuen to other Creatures. Wee see, say they, that God as the Author of *nature*, hath ingrafted into light things an inclination to rise vppward, to seeke the place of their rest, by reason whereof the fire doth alway send his flame towards *heauen*. And in like manner hee hath imprinted in heauy things a naturall inclination which makes them tend to the *center*: so as stones, marbles, and such like, do alwayes bend downeward, & do not hang in the aire, but with violence and contrary to their inclination. In the same manner,  
say

say they, God hath ingrafted in man a certain inclination to those things which haue some beames of beauty or bounty, so as when these objects come to incounter his eyes or minde, he is rauished, and then presently there is framed in his heart an ardent desire to seeke and pursue them. They confirme this opinion by the diuerse inclinations which shine in the life of men from their birth. For wee see some loue painting naturally, others take delight in Geometry, some are passionatly affected to the Liberall Arts, others imbrace the Mechanicks; some loue Hunting, others burne with a desire of Play; some are borne to War; & others are inclined to Mildnes and Peace,

peace; some haue no contentment but in solitarinesse; and others cannot liue without the mannaging of affaires. And whence, say they, proceed these so different inclinations, but from the author of *nature*? The which they confirme againe by the example of things which happen often in the loue which men beare one vnto another; for that it will sometimes fall out, that by a certaine sympathy of mindes, wee shall loue at the first incounter a man whom we haue neuer before seene nor knowne. So as it seemes, this affection doth not then disclose it selfe in our soules, taking forme so suddenly and sweetly, but it is rather quickned and awaked by the presence of the object,

iect, which makes vs to see that which we loue instantly without delay, for that wee knew him not, finding him so conformable to our humors and inclination. The which hath made some presuppose, that the beames of their eyes, which loue incountering with the beames which proceed from the obiect which inflames them, makes so sweete a mixture, as their vni-on is as it were the fulnesse of al the delights which may be tasted in this life: And contrariwise at the first incoun-ter wee shall haue a distast of some other person whom we had neuer scene before: Doth not this proue (say they) that it is nature which frames in vs this *Passion*? and so they conclude, that it cannot proceed

ceed but from the Author of nature: others prefer the cause of loue to the *Planets*, *Starres*, and constellations, and presuppose that the reason why *Achilles* loued *Patroclus*, *Alexander* *Hephestion*, and the Queene of the *Amazons*, *Alexander*; And to come to moderne examples, that *Charles* the ninth loued the Marshall of *Rais*, that *Henry* the third loued the Dukes of *Joyeuse*, and *Espernon*, and *Monfieur de Termes*; that *Henry* the fourth loued the Duke of *Suilly*; and that the King now gloriously reigning loues the Duke of *Luines* and his brethren; are all effects of the aspects of the *Planets*, which encountered at the natiuities of these Princes and Noblemen. Others seeke the cause in

in the Parents, as if they which bring vs into the world, with our being did transfer and infuse into vs their *Passions*. Others refer it to the good or bad education we receiue, according to which wee frame our desires and affections. The *Platonicians* imagine that wee must seeke it in the degrees of the harmony which is found in *Soules*, which they beleue are compounded as of a consort and proportion of numbers, the which incountring equally in two persons, incites them to loue one another. But this is very mystical, and requires a spirit accustomed to the imaginations of *Plato*.

To come then to the point, it is certaine that God hath infused into our soules the seedes

seedes of loue, seeing that he hath giuen vs the powers which are capable. It is also certaine that the influence of the Planets may cōtribute to this *Passion*; for that it resides in the *concupiscible appetite*, the which is a sensitiue power, and depends of the body, ouer whose motions the Planets haue a kind of power. It is also visible, that nurture & education, & sometimes the inclinations which our Parents haue ingrafted in vs, may haue a share in the motions of our affections. But to speake according to the rules of *Philosophy*, wee must say precisely and absolutely, that the bounty of things, whether they bee found in them, or that wee imagine them to be, is the Spring, beginning



ginning, and mouing cause of the loue wee beare them. For God the Author of nature, who hath created all things in number, weight, & measure, hath also imparted to all Creatures, inclinations and motions necessary to attaine vnto their ends. So hee hath infused into his vnderstanding an inclination which makes him passionately to seeke the truth, and to imbrace it when hee hath found it. And in like manner hee hath ingrafted in the wil a desire and loue of good, which is the only obiect which may moue it and enflame it to pursue it. And as colours are the obiect of the sight, which drawe it by a certaine attraction, which growes from a naturall sympathy

pathy which is betwixt them, like vnto that which is betwixt our vnderstanding and truth; betwixt the eye and colours; and betwixt the hearing and sounds. Hence it growes that there is so strict a cōnexion betwixt the will and the good, as the will cannot loue any thing which hath not a shew of good. So as if it bee at any time deceiued, and imbraceth the *euill*, it is vnder a veile and shew of *good*, which is imployed to abuse it; and the like may bee sayd of the *sensitiue appetite*, which in its motions follows the same instincts that the will doth. But when as wee say, that the good is the obiect of our *will* and *loue*, vnder this *good* wee comprehend that which is faire, for that

that goodly things haue an  
equall power with those  
things that bee good, to in-  
flame our *wills*: as also beau-  
ty and bounty in effect are  
all one, and differ not but on-  
ly in our imagination. The  
which the *Platonicians* de-  
monstrate by excellent rea-  
sons, calling *loue* simply a de-  
sire of beauty. Yea to shew  
that beauty is louely of it  
selfe, as well as bounty,  
they adde that beauty which  
shines in the body, is as it  
were a beame or image of the  
infinite beauty which is in  
God; wherefore we admire it  
and loue it passionately, when  
it presents it selfe vnto our  
eyes; and then, say they, the  
beauty of the body is also an  
image of the beauty of the  
mind: for that the internall  
perfections

perfections ingender the external, as the lustre of pretious stones & pearles growes from the perfect mixture of the foure Elements which are found in their constitution, as flowers and leaues of trees borrow their beauty from the roote; and as in beasts the good interior constitution is the cause of the beauty which appears in the countenance. So then wee conceiue that the external beauty of the body proceeds from the internal bounty of the mind, so as bounty seemes to bee the roote of beauty, and beauty the flower of that bounty which shines in creatures. And therefore hee that containes himselfe within his bounds and in the innocency of *lowe*, seeing the beauty of the

the body, imagines (as it is true) that this pleasing object is a beame of the infinit and immense beauty, whereof the essence of God is as it were the center, from whence shee deriues and takes her beginning: and consequently, that it is as it were a sience of the interior beauty which shines in the soule, from whence the body hath taken life. Thus the *Platonicians* proue that beauty as well as bounty makes an impression in our wills, and proportionably inflames our desires, & begets affections and *Passions*, which makes vs to seeke it. But leauing all other reasons to proue this assertion, wee will content our selues with the saying of *Aristotle*: That to demandaund why wee loue

loue beautifull things, were a question fit for a blind man, for that the eyes feele and know how powerfull the charmes are to make an impression in the *Soule*. By this which wee haue spoken it is easie to bee gathered, that loue hath for obiect and moving cause the bounty and beauty of things, which by the sweetnes of the beames they cast forth, make so powerfull an impression in our soules, as they remaine as it were rauished or rather charmed with so pleasant a lustre; so as to ascend vnto the Spring & fountaine, we must eleuate our selues to that great and immortal Essence, which is as it were a notion of all the graces, of all the beauties and of all the bounties

ties which are infused into all the creatures. We must, I say, raise vp our selues to that infinite and most happy Essence, which is as it were the center, from whence all the perfections which represent themselves so goodly vnto our eyes, and so pleasing vnto our sense, borrow their lustre and take their beginning. And in this manner wee shall tie our affections to an object worthy of the generosity of their motions, which should alwayes imitate the nature of fire, which remains vnwillingly in the earth, and striues continually to mount towards heauen.

Finally, wee must remember that *Love* is deuided into five branches, and that there are five kinds which differ

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much



much one from another : for there is a loue of naturall things, there is a loue of creatures; there is a loue of men; there is a loue of Angells; and there is a loue of God. The *Loue* of naturall things is nothing else but the inclination which things destitute of knowledge haue to vnite themselues vnto their ends, and to attaine the perfectiones of their nature; to which sence an Ancient sayd, that the loue of the bodies was nothing else but the weight wherewith they are ballanced, bee it that the weight keepes them downe, or that the lightnes raiseth them vp on high: for God hath ingrafted these inclinations into all naturall things, to the end they may attaine to their

their perfections, and preserve them when they haue once gotten them. The loue of creatures is nothing else but a vehement impression made in their senses, surprized with things which they conceiue to be pleasing. This *Passion* is many times blind, importune, obstinate, and insolent, and is common to men, & brute beastes, which suffers themselves to be transported with the motions of a dishonest pleasure.

Humaine *Loue* is a *Passion* which should follow the motions of *reason*, and which being guided by the light of the soule should only imbrace the true good, to make it perfect: for containing himselfe within these bounds, it should no more be a violent

& furious passion, which fillles the world daily with so many miseries by her exorbitant and strang disorders. The *Loue* of Angells flies yet higher, for that those happy spirits enlightned with a more excellent light, and illuminated with a more pure & perfect splendour, loue the soueraigne Good more ardently then all the creatures, and by a reflux of this great *Loue* take an incredible care of the affaires of men; and being neuer wearied in the seruice they do them by the cōmandement of God, assist them, & procure their safety, with constancy, and ioy full of amazement and wonder. The *Loue* of God enters not into comparison with any other, for that as there is no proportion

portion betwixt things finite, and infinite, his motions being infinite, they appeare with another lustre, and shew themselves with a greater endeauor towards that he loues, then the creatures can doe. From this spring flow the admirable beauties which shine in the heauens, in the Starres, Planets, Elements, in bodies both simple and compound, and in great, meane, and small things; all which do feeble the effects of his bounty, and the perfect assistance of his prouidence. From this spring proceedes the care which hee hath of men, the graces which he imparts vnto them, the good desires wherewith hee doth inspire them, and the meanes which

hee offers them to raise them vp to the height of his glory, and to make them enioy the felicity of Angells. But we will not treat of this kind of *loue*, whereof wee had rather feele the flames then describe the perfection. Neither will wee discourse of that of Angells, which wee may better admire then set forth: wee will not in like sort busie our selfe with that of naturall things or of creatures, which is too base for our subiect, but wee will represent the *Loue* which is a humane *Passion*, whereof morall *Philosophy* teacheth vs to discourse, and whose essence we meane now to set downe.

Wherein

Wherein the Essence of  
Loue *doth consist.*

CHAP. 2.



**A**S in other subjects we do usually ascend vnto the knowledge of the cause by the search of the effects, so in this matter to attaine vnto an exact knowledge of the nature of *Loue*, we must first vnderstand what it is to *loue*, to the end the branch may discouer the nature of the roote. *Loue* then is no other thing, but, *To will good to some one, not for our owne priuate interest, but for the loue of himselfe; procuring with all our*

power what we thinke may bee profitable for him, or may giue him content. Whereby it appeares, there are foure things to be considered in *Loue*. The first is, that wee be carefull of his good whom we *Loue*; the which growes, for that *loue* vnites the *wills* perfectly, and makes vs esteeme the good which befall s him we loue, as our owne particular: wherefore the Ancients sayd, that *Loue* was one soule in two bodies. The which it seems that *Alexander* would giue *Darius* mother to vnderstand, when he sayd that *Hephestion* was another *Alexāder*: For he vsed this speech in regard of the great affection hee bare him, the which was such as he held him another himself, so as he would haue him a partaker of  
all



all his honors & glory. After this manner then wee should desire to our friends the same honors, the same glory, and all other felicities which we wish for our own proper contentment. And when they succeed, wee must reioyce as if wee our selues enioyed them, seeing that all things are common among friends.

But secondly we must wish al this good to those we loue for their owne sakes, and not for any priuate interest of our owne, or for any profite wee expect to reape by them for the *Epicures* opinion (who wil haue men loue for profit, or pleasure) is infamous, and makes *Loue* either mercenary or of finall continuance. Wee must then remember that there are three kinds of

friendship; that is to say, *honest, profitable, and pleasing*. Betwixt the which there is this difference, that the two last kinds are no true affections; but rather shadowes of *Loue*; whereas the first, that is to say, *honest friendship*, which hath vertue for her obiekt, is solid and true, and moreover it is constant and of long continuance; whereas the profitable and the pleasing last little, and are dissolved vpon the first alteration which happens in the subiect whereunto they are tied. As for example, they that loue only for profit, continue no longer in this affection, then they whom they loue, may be beneficiall vnto them; the which ceasing, they renounce the duties of friendship which

which they had formerly shewed; for that the cause ceasing, the effect of necessity must cease. Hence it growes that the friendships of Court are so inconstant and variable, for that Courtiers commonly tie their affections to those which are in fauour, & haue some kind of credit, to the end it may bee an entry, for them to offices in the Estate. But if there happen any alteration in their fortune by a disgrace with the Prince, and that they see them vnable, and incapable to assist them, they presently abandon them, and make no more account of them then of an image ouerthrowne; yea they would haue men thinke that they neuer obserued them. So in *Tiberius* time,

time, *Seianus* possessing his maister absolutely, & receiving the fauor of this Prince with full sailes, so as all the honors, all the dignities, and all the offices of the Estate, depended of the inclination he had to those that courted him; all the world adored him, the people and Senate erected statues vnto him, hee was publicquely praised, his house was neuer empty, all the Orders went to consult with him as with an oracle, or rather as the soule of the Empire. But as soone as his fauour began to shake, presently hee saw the affections of such as had so shamefully flattered him, decay and die; and when it was wholly false, there followed so prodigious a change in the affections

affections of the Court and people, as after they had vnworthily massacred him, they drew his body through the streete into the riuer of *Tiber*, his statues were beaten downe, all his kinssfolkes persecuted, his memory detested, and the name of *Seianus* was held in execration to all the world. But this is the ordinary course in Court, whereas Fortune is alwayes adored.

As the affections which depend vpon profite decay as soone as the profite ceaseth, in like manner that friendship which is supported only by pleasure, continues no longer then the subiect of pleasure indureth. For they that loue in consideration of beauty, when as age or infirmities

infirmities makes it to wither and decay, their affection is gone, and they esteeme no more that which they had formerly honored. So as there is no true nor solid friendship but that which is grounded vpon vertue and honesty. The rest hauing inconstant and wandring objects, are also inconstant and mutable, and the interest and pleasures ceasing, they die: whereas honest loue propounding vnto it selfe a constant and durable object, knowes no change. They that Loue in this sort wish all good to him they loue, for his owne sake, and not for their priuate interest. The third thing wee must consider in *Loue* is, that wee are bound to imploy all our  
meanes

meanes to procure good to them wee loue. For as the Sunne should not deserue the name of Sunne if it gaue not light to the whole world, so wee cannot esteeme him a true friend which doth not imploy himselfe with all his power and meanes to bind him whom he makes profession to loue. And this admits no limitation nor bounds, for there is not any thing which *Loue* will not make him do that loues perfectly, euen to contemne his owne life for the safety of him hee loues. It is true, that a perfect friend should wish that he to whom he hath ingaged his affection, should haue all things happy and prosperous in the course of his life, that hee be neuer shaken with any storme,



storme, and that hee neuer  
feele any crosses of fortune;  
but as the condition of man  
is fraile and exposed to a  
thousand calamities, if it  
chance that hee fall into any  
infirmity, he must participate  
of his paine: If a tempest  
carries him through the  
waues of the sea, hee must  
hoist saile to follow him; yea  
if the billowes ouerset his  
ship, he must seeke him in this  
shipwracke. If Tyrants seaze  
vpon him, if they cast  
him into prison & load him  
with chaines, hee must offer  
his owne body to free his  
bonds; and if they send him  
to execution, he must present  
his head to redeeme his  
friends. If hee see him assaul-  
ted by his enemies, who seeke  
to murther him, he must pre-  
sent

sent himselfe to beare their blowes. And if he see him in the throat of lions, exposed to the rage of wild beasts, hee must hazard himselfe to free him from danger; and if he die, he must in like manner abhorre life. *Hee that loues perfectly, sayd Plato by the mouth of Phedro, will rather abandon himselfe to death, then expose that he loues to dangers. And there is no man so faint hearted, whom Loue doth not fill with courage and inflame with a force, to make him in this subject equall to the most generous soules. For that which Homer saith, that the Worthies are inspired with a diuine force and furie, is more truely verified in those that loue, whō loue hath often inspired with a diuine fury, which hath made them to contemne*

*temne death, to preſerue the life  
of thoſe they haue loued.*

The laſt thing that is to be  
conſidered in *Loue*, is that we  
wiſh vnto our friends the  
things which we thinke true-  
ly are good for them, that is  
to ſay, that we deſire for them  
the things that are iuſt, and  
that are adorned with all the  
circumſtances of vertue. In  
regard whereof hee ſpake  
wiſely, which answered his  
friend, who would haue him  
forſweare himſelfe, that hee  
was a friend euen vnto the  
altars, hauing no intent to  
ſerue his friend againſt his  
conſcience. In this caſe then  
*Loue* admits bounds & limi-  
tations, and it were to abuſe  
the name, to bind him that  
loues, to commit vniuſt  
things in fauour of them to  
whom

whom he wisheth well. So when as *Charles of Burbon* (to reuēge his priuate discōtent) abandoned *France* and his King, and imbraced the party of *Spaine* & the Emperour, the Princes & Noblemen his friends, (whereof he had many in Court) did not hold themselves bound to follow him, and to make themselves confederates of his despight and rebellion. So as these words which are at this day in the mouth of many, that they are ready to turne Turkes for their friends, yea and to follow them into hell, is the speech rather of a fury, then the discourse of men transported with true *Loue*: for *Loue* must cōtaine it selfe within the bounds of iustice, honesty, and vertue, and not make

make vs do any thing which may breed vs shame. And moreouer, they that make these impious protestations, haue them more in their mouthes then in their harts; and I know not how they can make them without blushing. By al this which we haue sayd, it is easie to gather wherein the essence of *Loue* doth properly consist, the which we may define in this manner.

*Loue is a wellwishing, which we testifie with all our power to those, to whom we haue an inclination, procuring them for their owne sakes, all the good we think may giue them content. According to which hee is a friend that loues, and is reciprocally beloued; for loue being as it were a torch which lightens*

lightens another, friends must belecue that affections are reciprocall, and that as they loue, so they are beloved; wherein they must not shew themselves vnpleasing or importune, to sound the hearts one of another, which will bewray a diffidence and distrust: But content themselves with the true signes of *loue*, which their friends shew them. These signes of true *Loue* are reduced to three principall heads. The first is, that friends reioyce & griene for the same things: wherfore *Homer* describing *Agamemnos* affliction, when as he was forced to sacrifice his daughter *Iybigenia*, he represents al his friends accompanying him to this sacrifice, with mournfull countenances & full

full of sorrow; and at *Rome*, when as any one was accused and brought in question for his life, al his friends changed their robes with him, to shew that they did participate with his affliction. The reason is, for that sorrow and ioy are the markes of our affections, and of that wee haue in the *soule*, which reioyceth or afflicts it selfe, as the objects which present themselues are pleasing or distastfull. And for this reason, sorrow and ioy discover the inclination we haue to any one.

The second is, that friends share equally betwixt them the *good* and *euill*. They say that there are images of wax, vpon the which inchanters deliuer such powerfull spells, as being made to represent any



any person, as soone as they are wronged, the body of him for whom they were fashioned, feeles paine. In this sort there is such a bond of affection betwixt friends as the harme which happens to the one, afflicts the other, and fills him with bitternesse, so as many times we haue seene true friends die with sorrow, for the losse of their friend. Yea, prophane histories are full of Persons which haue flaine themselves, for that they would not suruiue them whom they haue loued dearly. In like manner the prosperity of friends passeth from one to another, so as the tryumphs of *Alexander* are the cōtentments of *Ephesstion*, and the glory of *Ephesstion* is the ioy of *Alexander*.  
The

The third is, that they which loue should haue the same friends, and the same enemies. They say the Adamant or Loadstone doth not only make an impression vpon iron which it drawes, but doth also impart his vertue by his touching; so as the iron which it hath toucht, drawes other iron vnto it, and makes as it were a continued chaine. In the same manner, a friend brings his friends to him he loues, and he reciprocally imparts vnto him his friends; whereof there is framed a common bond, which makes them ready to succor one another, as if they were members of one body.

To

To what Persons *Love*  
*extends.*

CHAP. 3.



Although that  
*love* hath for his  
generall object  
the bounty and  
beauty which  
shines in those things which  
present them selues vnto  
our eyes and soules; yet there  
are diuerse particular con-  
siderations, and diuerse  
beames, which excite this  
*Passion* and fashion it in the  
hearts of men. *Aristotle* num-  
bers fifteene causes, the  
which are also diuided into  
other branches, whereof we  
will treat as briefly as wee

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may, taking only that which shall belong vnto our subiect. First, sayth he, men *loue* them which do them good, or whom they thinke haue a will to do it, or to their friends. In truth there is nothing that more bindes the hearts of men, and induceth them more to *loue* then benefits. For euen brute beasts feelee the good which they receiue from men, and there is no creature so wild, whom good vsage doth not make gentle and tame. They that gouerne Lyons feare not their rage, but play about them without any apprehension of their fury, for that this generous Creature knowes him that hath a care to feede him. By continuall feeding they bring Elephants

phants to do what seruice they desire. And wee must not obiekt against it, that it hath beene a common complaint in the mouth of men in all ages, that most of the benefits that are bestowed in the world are lost, for that they fall vpon vngratefull soules, who do not acknowledge themselves in any sort bound. For (as an Ancient hath obserued) this proceeds not from the nature of the benefits, which contrariwise haue a particular vertue to draw the affection and to charme the will: but most commonly the fault proceeds from our selues, for that wee either erre in our election, doing good to vnworthy persons: or we distribute it ill, if we take away the

grace. For wee must not think that our benefites bind a friend, if we suffer our selues to be too much courted, if we make him to languish in the pursuite, or if we do it with a kind of vnwillingnesse; for by these meanes wee take away all the merrit and bond of the benefit, for that no man will thinke himselfe beholding for that which hee hath purchased so dearely: wherefore an Ancient called benefites of that nature, a loase filled with stones, which no man can vse. Men therefore thinke themselves bound to those from whom they receiue benefites, whether they be great and worthy to be acknowledged, in regard of their greae shew and magnificence; or that they which  
are

are the authors, bestow them freely without importunity, and with a singular demonstration of *Loue*; or that such as giue, haue made a fit choice of time to bind them, assisting them when as they or their friends had extreame neede, and when as they thinke that for their owne sakes they haue bound them by these benefits.

They also *Loue* the friends of their friends, and such as haue any conformity with them in the subiect of their affection, and that *Loue* those whom they *Loue*, and who also make profession to be enemies to their enemy. The reason is, that reputing their friends good as their owne, they belecue, that the good which is done vnto their

G 3

friends



friends extends vnto themselves, and that they do participate wholly thereof. In regard whereof they *loue* the spring and fountaine. And contrariwise they beleue, that the auersion and distast they haue of their enemies is a token of the *loue* they beare them. They also *loue* those that succour them with their meanes, or bind them with the hazard of their liues. For first of all, men *loue* bountifull friends passionately, imagining that they are borne for the good of mankind. As for the second, men *loue* great courages, imagining that they are supporters of their liues; & that they will neuer suffer wrong to bee done vnto the weak and feeble. They also *loue* such

such as they hold to bee iust, and resemble not the *Harpeys* or rauening birds, which liue of spoyle, but content themselves with their owne fortunes, committing no outrage, nor offering violence to any. And in this rancke they put labourers and handicraftsmen, to whom all the world seemes to beare an affection, in regard of the innocency of their profession. They also put in the same rancke, temperate persons, in whom they see some great modesty to shine, which shew that their soules are not inclined to any kind of iniustice. They againe esteeme those that leade a peaceable life, which haue no curiosity, and which pry not into the liues of other men,

but content themselves to order, & gouerne those that are submitted to their care and charge, presupposing that such as containethem- selves within these bounds, thinke not of any iniustice or wickednesse. Men also *Loue* famous persons, who by their vertue haue attained to an eminent glory, and an extraordinary reputation, bee it generally in the world, or only among good men, or among such as they haue in admiration, or by whom they themselves are admired; and they especially make great shew of their affection, when as they presume, that these Persons in all their dignity and greatnes disdain them not, but are wel pleased with the testimonies of their *Pas- sion*;

*sion*; so wee haue seene people runne by whole troupes from all the corners of the world, to see conquerours & such as did triumph; men of holy life, and Persons indued with rare knowledge or wisdom, aboue the common sort of men. The reason is, for that vertue, generosity, sanctity, and eminent knowledge, are not only louely things of themselves, and which haue powerfull allurements to cause them to bee affected and admired in the subiects where they reside, but also men beleue there is a kind of glory to bee admitted into the fauour of such illustrious persons, whose glory seemes to communicate with those that haue the honor to come neere them. But men

*Loue* particularly these famous and vertuous Persons, when as they discover, that they disdain not the affection and *Loue* of those, which make shew to honor them with *Passions*; for it is a testimony of their moderatiō & of the bounty of their nature, not to be puffed vp with the glorious aduantages which they haue gotten aboue the ordinary sort of men. They also *Loue* such as are of a sweete conuersation, and that haue a milde and pleasing humor, that is to say, they *Loue* those that are not fantastical, and of a troublesome and importune behauiour. They also *Loue* such as reprove them not odiously of their faults, they loue those whom they see enemies of contention, and

and which make shew, that they haue not a desire to bee superior in al disputes which rise in companies; but accomodate themselues wisely and moderately to that which is contested. The reason is, for that these wayward spirits, they that are licentious in their answeres, and such as will alwayes in their arguments haue the vpper hand, seeme to bee borne to contradict and controule the opinions of the whole world: the which is a signe of the alienation of wills, and dissenting from others; which makes them to be hated: whereas contrariwise they *Loue* such as haue none of these bad humours, and which accomodate themselues in company, without making

making any shew to bee selfe conceited. Moreouer men haue as it were a naturall inclination to *Loue* those which haue a quicknes and grace in their incounters, or to iest pleasantly, but withall can indure to heare a witty returne: hence it comes that in Court, buffoones and iesters, which haue biting and *Satiricall* spirits, are so much esteemed; and yet many times these people, bire priuate Persons too sensibly and indiscreetly, and draw vpon them the iust wrath of those whom they haue licentiously offended. In the meane time the reasons why they *Loue* such as are sudden in their incounters and sharpe in their iests, is, for that it seemes this quicknesse, & wit-  
tinesse



tinesse to incounter, proceeds from the subtilty and force of their spirits. And then we are inclined to heare men euil spoken of; wherefore we *Loue* them that do it with a good grace. And for that we *Loue* particularly such as take liberty to iest at others, & are content to be iested withall; that proceedes, for that wee beleeue that such as will indure that which they themselues practise to others, haue no bad intent nor any bitternes in their hearts, but are carried to these incounteres, more through a quicknesse of wit, then by any spleene. Moreover they loue such, as seeme to make great esteeme of the good partes and qualities which they beleeue they enioy. Wherefore wee suffer  
our

our selues to be surprized by flatterers, who insinuate into our fauours, couer our defects, & seeme to admire our actions. This misery happēs particularly to such as distrust themselues, and who feare to want those vertues which they desire to attaine vnto. For this distrust being dispersed by the praises which they giue them, they thinke themselues bound to such as bring this support vnto their weaknes.

They also loue those persons which affect neatnesse in all things, who take delight to carry a pleasing countenance, and to attire themselues properly: for that this neatnesse and handsome-nesse is as it were a signe of the desire they haue to insinuate

nuate themselves into the hearts, and to gaine the affections of men, who for this cause think themselves bound to loue them: they in like manner loue them, that lay not their faults before them to shame them, nor reproche them with the benefits wherewith they haue bound them. The reason is, for that both the one and the other redounds to our disgrace; and it seemes, that such as enter into these reproaches, will make vs contemptible, either by discovering our defects, or in accusing vs of ingratitude. They also loue such as remember not iniuries past, which are not obstinately bent to reuenge, and who are alwaies ready to pardon such as haue offended them.

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Wherefore the *Romaines* did wōderfully admire the first of the *Cæsars*, for that he forgot nothing but iniuries, the remembrance whereof he held vnworthy the greátnesse of his courage. Wherefore when as this Prince had erected againe the statues of *Pompey*, *Cicero* (that great ornament of the *Romaine* Eloquence) pronounced to his commendatiō, that in erecting the statues of *Pompey*, he had assured his owne, as hauing wonne the *Loue* of the whole world, by this act of humanity, which hee shewed to his enemy oppressed with misery. The reason of this *Loue* which men beare to those which forget iniuries in this manner, is, for that they presume when they haue  
offen-

offended them, they will shew themselves in like manner to them, as they haue done to others.

They also loue such as are not ill tongued or detractors, which obserue not their imperfections, nor those of their friends, but only regard their vertues, either to admire them, or to frame themselves after their example. For that these things are the offices of good men, and of persons indued with singular integrity, and great probity. Moreover, they *loue* such as resist them not when they are in choler, or that importune them not in the midst of their most serious employments: for that they which take pleasure in these oppositions and importunities, seeme

seeme to *loue* contention, and to be enemies to all society. They also *loue* those that admire them, which haue an opinion that they are vertuous, and make shew that they take delight in their conuersation, and are officious vnto them: But principally, when they make shew of this affection and liking in those things wherein they would haue their industry admired. As for example, a man that loues *Philosophy*, takes delight to heare his profession praised: he that takes delight in Armes, hath a singulat content to heare his exercise commended: wherefore both the one and the other *loue* those thar giue glorious testimony of that which concerns their profession. A-  
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boue all, they haue an inclination to loue their like, being a thing which nature teacheth vs dayly, that resemblance ingenders *Loue*, not onely among men, but also among other creatures: for euery creature loues his like: *Tygers & Panthers* troop together with beasts of their owne kind: And birds of one fether fly willingly together; such power hath resemblāce to vnite affectiōs: the which we must beleue is more powerful in man, who can haue no sweeter conuerlatiō thē with his like. The reasō why euery man loues his like, is, for that mā louing passionatly aboue other things, loues consequently any thing that hath any corresponcy with him; so as respecting him whom he



he loves as another himselfe, hee cannot but bee inflamed with this consideration. The *Platonicians* had another reason, the which in my opinion concurreth with this. *Love*, say they, makes an impression in the soule of him that *loves*, of the Image and forme of the thing beloved. But man loveth not onely his being, and his true and reall forme, but also his imaginary forme; as appeares by pictures, and looking-glasses, in which we behold with content our portraicts & formes. Wherefore there is a certaine *Passion* for the thing beloved, in whose soule he doth contemplate his forme which *Love* hath ingrauen. After this manner, resemblance breedeth *Love*, and vnites the affections

fections of men. The truth hereof appeares, for that men do commonly *loue* those, that are allyed vnto them in nearnesse of blood, so as Kinsmen doe commonly loue one another: or by some conformity of humours and complexions, which maketh melancholy men *loue* the company of their like, and Iouiall spirits delight in the company of them that are pleasant: Or by some commerce of profession, which maketh *Philosophers* to loue *Philosophers*; and *Painters* delight in *Painters*: Or some equality of age, which makes young men delight in the company of youth, and olde men to conuerse with them that are graue: Or some coherence of manners, which makes good men

men loue the vertuous, and the wicked seeke after such as are wickedly affected. But notwithstanding that which we haue said, that commonly men of one profession loue one another, must be vnderstood according to the true nature of things, for by occasion and accident, this cōformity of professions may ingender hatred and enuy, that is to say, when as they of one trade and profession, liuing of their art and labour, hinder one another: as for example, when as a tradesman hauing gotten some reputation, doth hinder the profit of his companions, then iealousie riseth amongst them, according to the saying of an Ancient, *The Potter enuies the Potter.* The *Philosophers* giue an

an excellent reason hereof: He that loues, say they, loues himselfe more deerely then all other things besides: for that he is vnited to himselfe by Essence and Nature, whereas hee is not conioyned to him that he loues, but by some accidentall and externall forme. And therefore if this conformity crosseth his priuate good, and be preiudiciall vnto him, hee findes himselfe more strictly tied vnto himselfe, then to his like: wherefore seeing his losse concurring with his *passion*, he whom hee loued, being an obstacle to his desire, he growes odious vnto him, as opposite to his good.

Men doe also loue those that aspire to the same honors and dignities, at the least when

when they may attaine vnto them, and enioy them together, without any obstacle or wrong one vnto another. For competency causing an hinderance, as it did in the pursuit of the Consulate at *Rome*, it happeneth (as wee haue said of men of the same profession) that it excites enuy and hatred: Wherefore in the *loue* of women they can endure no corriuals, for that with honesty they cannot be enioyed by two. They also loue those with whom they haue any familiarity, which is not scrupulous, hauing free liberty without apprehension of disdaine, to doe and say things in their presence which they would not act or speake before the world. As for example, they affect those  
before

before whom they may freely discourse of their *loues*, of their pursuites, and of their other *Passions*. But wee must remēber that there are some things which are dishonest of themselues, the which a good man may neither do, or speak before the world, or before his friends. But there are others which are shameful only in the opiniō of the world, and not according to the truth of things: and these a good man, vsing an honest familiarity with his friends, may doe and speake in their presence, although he would not doe it in publike before the world: like vnto King *Ageseilus*, being in priuate with his children, playd with them with a fatherly liberty, but beeing surprized by one

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who knew not how farre the *loue* of a father might extend, he was discontented.

Men also testifie, that they loue those before whom they are ashamed to doe or say those things which are of themselves shamefull or dishonest; wherein wee may say, that the *Persians* gaue good testimony of their *loue* to their wiues, when as they caused them to retire from their banquets, being vnwilling that their eies shold be spectators of their excesse, & admitting none but their Concubines. For this respect and reuerence which they gaue them, was a signe of true *Loue*, for that wee are ashamed to commit any vnworthy Act before them wee affect. They also willingly embrace



imbrace such as they haue  
seene faithfull, and constant  
in their affections, and who  
loue equally both present &  
absent. For which conside-  
ration they desire to insinu-  
ate themselves into their  
friendship which testifie  
their *loue* vnto the dead, who  
adorne their Tombes, erect  
Statues, and make other mo-  
numents for them, to pre-  
serue their memory among  
men. They also affect such  
as abandon not their friends  
in the crosses and iniuries of  
fortune, whereof wee haue a  
worthy example in the sub-  
iect of *Damon* and *Pithias*,  
whereof the one being con-  
demned to die, by the tyrant  
*Dionisius*, and desiring some  
respite, to goe and settle the  
affaires of his house, his com-

panion yeelded himselfe a pledge for his returne, with this condition, that if hee returned not backe within the prefixed time, hee should vndergo the rigour of the same sentence : but the condemned man presenting himselfe at the day appointed, the tyrant was so rapt with admiration, to see the faith which he had vnto his friend, in a matter of that importance, and of so great danger, that in stead of putting him to death, he coniured these two perfect friends, to accept of him as a third man in their friendship. Behold how the most sauage and vntamed spirits are forced to loue those, that shew an vniolable constancy in their affectiōs. Men doe also loue such as they see full

full of freedome, and without dissimulation towards them. In which ranke they nūber such as make no scruple to discouer their errors vnto them, and who entertaine them freely with their priuate *passions*: For, as wee haue shewed before, we blush not to say or doe in priuate with our friends, that which we would not doe publickely before the world. Wherefore, as he that is ashamed to doe any thing before another, shewes that hee loues him not perfectly; so he that hath not this apprehension, giues a manifest testimony that he hath a full confidence in his friendship: wherefore, wee loue such as make shewe to rely vpon vs, euen discouering their imperfections

vnto vs. Againe, they affect those whose authority is not fearefull vnto them, & whose power they thinke they shall haue no cause to apprehend: for no man euer loued him whom he feared seruilely; and herein Tyrants abuse themselves, thinking to settle their Authority by the terror of Armes, and the terror of punishment: yea, they haue alwayes detested the furious words of him that said, I care not to be hated, so I may bee feared. It were good among bruit beasts, but men must be managed and gouerned by mildenesse. And they willingly embrace such as they may trust; and whose power is not fearefull vnto them. Behold the persons to whom the *Loue* of men doth commonly


monly extend.

In the meane time the true means to purchase *Loue*, is to bind those whose friendship we affect, by all sorts of benefites and good offices. And to this end they must do good before it be demanded, or that they bee forced to discouer their wants vnto vs: for that were to put them on the racke, to make them confesse our magnificence & bounty. Moreouer he must be carefull neuer to reproach the fauours which hee hath done them, nor proclaime them to others, with a vanity which seems to turne to their contempt. He that obserues this mean in the benefites and fauours which hee bestowes, seemes to haue propounded vnto himselfe, the onely good

of him whom he hath bound, without any other particular interest: In regard whereof he is also bound to acknowledge and *Loue* his freedom, and bounty.

## Of the Effects of *Loue*.

### CHAP. 4.

S the Ancient *Romanes* observing of the one side, the conquests, victories, triumphes, and glory, which *Cesar* by his valour had purchased to their Empire; and on the other side weighing the ruines, miseries, massacres, and slaughters, which he had caused in their Estate, they

they were wont to say, that it was difficult to iudge whether his birth had bene more fortunate or fatall to their Common wealth. Euen so it is hard to say, whether that *Loue* causeth more good or euill in the world. It is true, when as this *Passion* contains it selfe within the bounds of honesty, it is a liuely spring and fountaine, of all good things in the life of men. It is also true, that the author of nature hath ingrafted in vs the first motions and beames; and it is true, that it is borne with vs, that it increaseth with vs, & that it doth alwayes accompany vs, so as it cannot subsist without vs, nor we *Loue* without it. It is an immutable law, which men haue not

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found out, *lawgiuers* haue not prescribed; neither doth it depend vpon the examples or customes of nations, but was grauen, as we may say, by the hands of nature in our *Soules*. But when like a wild and vntamed beast it exceeds the bounds of reason, there is no misery which it brings not into the world, nor any disorder which it causeth not in our lines. It is as it were a fatall source, from whence flow all kinds of horror, vncleanenes, adulteries, incests, sacriledges, quarrells, warres, treasons, murders, parricides, cruelties, and violences; besides the particular torments it giues vnto the *soules* of such as giue themselues to be surprized, filling them with en-  
mities,

uies, iealousies, cares, melancholies, terrors, yea and madnesse; drawing them many times to despaire, and to do things whereat heauen and earth blush and are ashamed: wherein it is the more to be feared, for that as the first heauen by his motion doth violently draw whatsoever is beneath it, so *Love* prescribes a law to our other desires, & to all our other *Passions*; so as we may tearme it the key and beginning of our thoughts, of our words, of our actions, and of whatsoever wee do in this life: So it makes the first impression in our soules, where it excites the desire of that which we resolute to pursue; & then it fortifies this desire by hope, which inflames vs to the pursuite of that we

we desire; and if there appeare any obstacle, it imbraceth *Choller*, and hath no rest vntill it hath vanquished and surmounted all lets, wherein she settles her contentment & rest. And as the thunder breakes whatsoeuer resists it, so this furious *Passion*, being once inflamed, striues to overthrow whatsoeuer opposes it selfe against her rage and violence. Yet as the winds fill the sailes of Pyrats. shippes, but are not the cause of the murthers and thefts which they commit at sea; But all these miseries proceed from the bad inclination and couetousnesse of these infamous Pyrats : So although that *Loue* bee an assistant in many villanies which men commit, yet it proceedes not from

from the malice of this *Passion*, which contrariwise is framed to bring all good to the society of men; but it growes from the liberty and excesse of men, who peruert the vse of all things, and conuert the causes of their felicity, into instruments of their misery. Let vs then see what bee the proper effects of *Love*, not staying at those which rise from the meere malice of men: We will reduce them to three or foure heads, the explanation whereof will giue sufficient light to the rest of the subject.

The first effect they attribute to *Love*, is, that it hath an vniting vertue, by meanes whereof it causeth him that loueth to aspire to vnite himselfe

selfe to the thing beloued: whereunto we may refer the fable of *Androgenes*, whereof *Plato* doth so much triumph; but we must swallow so many fopperies, before wee shall come to the mysteries of this fiction, as it were better to passe it ouer in silence, then to spend time to explicate it. So it is that prophane and vnchast *Loue* seekes the vnion of bodies, which is found euen among brute beasts, and for this reason may be called brutish, if it bee not sought with an honest intent by a lawfull marriage. But chaste and honest *Loue* seekes the vnion of affections and wills, and exceeds not that which is decent and vertuous. They which loue, sayd *Aristophanes*, would passionately desire to be

be trāssformed, & chāged one into another, & of twobodies to become one. But for that this transformation cannot be without the destruction of their being, they strīue to recompence this defect, by a ciuil and honest vnion, which tēds not to the ruine of their nature, but contents their affections; that is to say, they conuerse continually together, entertaine their *Passions*, and are as little absent as may bee one from another. Moreouer they haue the same *thoughts*, the same desires, the same affections, the same wils, the same delights, & the same distastes, & seeme to be but one soule in two bodies. So as that which is pleasing to him that loueth, is in like manner to the party beloved,

ued, what he affects the other imbraceth; and what hee rejects the other flies, and doth abhorre. So as their willes being thus strictly vnited, all their actions and carriages conspire to the same end, and propound vnto themselues the same obiect. For when as we haue graft the sience of one tree vpon another stocke, the fruits which grow follow the nature of the graft, and fauor nothing of the stocke: so the will of the loue, being transported into that of the party beloued, takes the tincture, and doth not any thing but what is conformable to his desires and intentions. But whence comes the power which this *Passion* hath, thus to vnite the subjects where it worketh? This cannot



cannot well bee explicated without the aide of *Philosophy*. First of all, *Love*, say the *Philosophers*, is a desire to enjoy the good wee propound vnto our selues, as proper for our content, and capable to make vs in some sort better by the fruition. But this enjoying & participation cannot bee effected but by vni-ting the obiect to our affection, which is the same good we propound vnto our selues; wherefore it is of the Essence of *Love* that it produceth this vnion. Hence it proceeds, that the presence of the party beloued is so deare and pretious vnto vs, and that we feele our selues filled with content, when as we may enjoy him to entertaine our thoughts, to taste the sweetnesses

nesse of his company, and to discover our *Passions*: whereas his absence and separation giues vs a thousand torments, and afflicts vs with a thousand sorrowes and discontentes, which wee would redeeme with our liues. Wherefore when as death doth take violently from vs those whom wee loue dearly, and by this meanes hath condemned vs as it were to a perpetuall absence, we strue to ease our griefe, and sweeten our losse, by transporting our selues often to the places where we were accustomed to see thē, representing vnto our selues their portraicts and images, reading ouer their letters, & stil handling al the gages and monuments they left vs of their affection.

Sometimes

Sometimes the same gages  
and the same monuments  
of their affection displease vs,  
and wee do so abhorre them,  
as wee cannot indure to see  
them, nor handle them; but  
this growes from the griete  
of their absence, for that we  
then represent them as infal-  
lible signes of our losse,  
which they figure vnto vs as  
irreparable; by reason where-  
of their pictures fill vs with  
bitternes. But on the other  
side when as the same things  
seeme vnto vs to supply the  
presence, wee *Loue* them  
dearely, and cannot bee wea-  
ry to entertaine our selues  
with those thoughts. And if  
amidst all this we can inuent  
any thing that may serue to  
preserue the memory more  
liuely in our soules, wee im-  
brace

brace the inuention, and are wonderfully pleased with this art. Wherein doubtlesse *Artimesia* Queene of *Caria*, shewed an act of wonderfull *Passion* towards her husband *Mausolus*. For death hauing taken him away, this desolate Princessle not knowing how to pull the thornes of her sorrow out of her soule, she caused his body to be reduced to ashes, and mingled them in her drinke, meaning to make her body a liuing tombe, whereas the reliques of her deare husband might rest, from whom shee could not endure to liue separated.

The most subtile *Philosophers* giue a second reason of this vnion which ariseth frō *Loue*. *Loue* (say they) hath her seate  
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in the *will* (they doe not consider it as a *Passion* onely, which riseth in the sences, but also as a quality which in the end becomes spirituall; ) but there is this difference betwixt the vnderstanding and *will*: the vnderstanding goes not out of it selfe to ioyne with his obiect, but rather he drawes the obiect vnto him, whereof the Image is framed to produce his action, like vnto a seale which prints its forme in the waxe. But the *will* being toucht with the *Loue* of her obiect, suffers it selfe to bee drawne to his Image; and going out of it selfe, vnites it selfe vnto him to take his forme; like vnto the waxe which receiues impressions of the seale. So as by this reason, *Loue* is thought to

to cause the vnion of him that loueth with the party beloued; for that his will ravished by his *loue*, hath no other *Passion* but to see her self vnited vnto her. But these meditations are too nice for our subiect.

The second effect they attribute to *Loue*, and which is as it were, a branch and bud of the first, is, that it causeth the soule of him that loues, to bee more where it loues, then where it liues, and that reciprocally the soule of the party beloued, is more with the louer then with his owne body. The reason is; for that the soules of such as loue, are perpetually attentive to contemplate the image of that they loue, and haue no other thought nor greater pleasure, then

then that they receiue by this sweete entertainment: By reason whereof the soule making shew of a more exact presence, where it doth most frequently worke, it followes thereby that it is more with the party beloued, then in its owne body.

But let vs heare the opinion of the *Platonicians* vpon this point: The soule, say they, which is toucht to the quicke with *Love*, dying in its owne body, findes life in that it loues. And when this *Love* is reciprocall, it dies but once, whereas it reuiues twice. For he that loues dyes truly, when as *Love* makes him neglect and forget the causes of his life, to thinke wholly vpon the party beloued; but hee recouers his life doubly when



when as he sees himselfe embraced and entertained by the party beloued; and that he finds in his armes his dear Image; which hee preserues more carefully then his own life. Who will not then, say they, hold this death happy, which is recompenced by two such sweete liues? But this discourse of the *Platonians* presupposeth an equall correspondency in *Love*, without the which they maintaine that this *Passion* is full of despaire, & leaues nothing in our soules but importune and troublesome thornes. Wherefore the Ancients said, that to make *Love* grow, shee had neede of a brother. But wee haue treated sufficiently of this Subiect.

They attribute other effects

fects to *Loue*, that is to say, languishings, extasies, and amazements; but that *Loue* must bee very violent which doth produce them. And moreouer wee may consider these extasies, and rauishments which may happen in a violent *Loue*, after two sorts. First, we may obserue them as a true alienation of the senses, which ariseth, for that the spirit and will of him that loueth, being wholly imployed in the contemplation and enioying of the thing beloued, suffereth himselfe to bee so transported with this content, as the soule remaines as it were quencht and without motion. The which may also proceed from a more powerfull cause, that is to say, either

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from

from God or from euill spirits, which sometimes stirre vp these rauishments and extraordinary extasies. Secondly we may consider these extasies & rauishments, as a kind of madnes, which transports them that *Loue*, and makes them to commit many follies; wherefore an Ancient sayd, that *Iupiter* himselfe could not be wise and loue at one instant. These extasies and rauishments produce sometimes prodigious effects in their soules that are afflicted with this *Passion*. For that his soule that loues intirely, is perpetually imployed in the contemplation of the patty beloued, and hath no other thoughts but of his merit, the heate abandoning the parts, and retiring into the

the braine, leaues the whole body in great distemperature, which corrupting and consuming the whole bloud, makes the face grow pale & wanne, causeth the trembling of the heart, breeds strange convulsions, and retires the spirits in such sort, as he seemes rather an image of death, then a liuing creature. These accidents are followed with passionate and heart-breaking sighes; as it appeared in young *Antiochus* at the sight of *Stratonice*: Or when as they only make mention of her, as if the spirit were eased and free from a heauy burthen, and receiued content by this thought or presence. Teares in like manner fly to succor this afflicted soule, for that the heate

which is mounted vp to the  
braine, causeth the humor to  
dissolue and discharge it selfe  
by the eyes. But this poore  
soule thus agitated, hath no  
certaine consistence, but flo-  
ting betwixt hope and feare,  
she sometimes giues signes of  
ioy, sometimes markes of  
sorrow; she is sometime fro-  
zen and congealed, some-  
times all on fire: she goes,  
she comes, without any stay  
or rest, and doth many things  
which shew that shee is as it  
were incensed. For she pro-  
clames the merit and glory  
of that she loues, and giues  
extraordinary commendati-  
ons, which are the signes of  
her raiishment. Suddenly  
changing her humor, shee  
makes her griefe and discon-  
tent ascend vp into heauen,  
she

shee accuseth the innocent  
Starres, she complaines of  
destiny and fortune, and  
blames that which she loues;  
and suddenly returning to  
herselfe, shee condemnes her-  
selfe of wrong. Then she  
powres forth her spleene a-  
gainst such as she thinks haue  
crost her rest and hindred her  
content, so as she suffers cruel  
tormēts in this agitatiō. Ma-  
ny times euen in the heat of  
his *Passion*, the party toucht  
with *loue* can indure no lōger  
discourse; his words are short  
& scarce intelligible, for that  
the soule being thus tied to  
the obiekt which it loues, it  
cannot giue it self the leasure  
to speake of any other thing.  
And that which is full of ad-  
miratiō, this *Passion* doth so  
chāge & trāssform men, as it

makes the wisest to commit great follies; it humbles the grauest to seruices vnworthy of their rancke, it makes the most glorious to become humble and meeke, the courteous to be profuse and prodigall, and cowards to shew themselues hardy and valiant. But for that some of these effects exceed the ordinary of a morall *Passion*, we will leaue them to discourse particularly of *Iealousie*, vpon which subiects there are great controuerfies and disputes, that is to say, whether it bee one of the effects of *Loue*, as the *Vulgar* sort imagine; or whether it be rather the poyson of *Loue*, as others presuppose; but we will referre the discourse to the following Chapter.

Of





Of *Iealousie*, whether it  
be an *Effect* and *signe*  
of *Loue*.

CHAP. 5.

**T**HE *Vulgar* sort  
thinke, that as  
the Sun runnes  
not his course  
without light,  
so *Loue* cannot bee without  
*Iealousie*; and they adde, that  
as lightning is an infallible  
signe of Thunder, which  
breakes forth, so *Iealousie* is a  
certaine signe of *Loue*, which  
desires to shew it selfe power-  
fully. But they that haue a  
more exact and particular  
I 4 knowledge

knowledge of *Humane Passions*, maintaine, that as the Sunne beeing come to the South (which is the point of the perfection of his light) casts no shadow, but spreads his beames all pure vpon the earth; so a true and perfect loue is not subiect to the inclinations of *Iealousie*.

And they say moreouer, that this vniust *Passion* is no more a signe of *Loue*, then stormes and tempests are shewes of faire weather; this opinion is more probable: for to begin with the proofs, how can Iealousie subsist and remaine with *Loue*, vnlesse we will ouerthrow the Lawes of Nature, which suffer not two contraries to subsist in one subiect? Is there any thing more contrary to *Loue* then *Iealousie*?

*Iealousie*? Can the world see a greater Antipathy, then that which is obserued in these two qualities, whereof the one doth participate with the condition of monsters, and the other is the very *Idea* of perfection? *Loue* vnites the *wills*, and makes that the desires of them that loue, striue to take, as it were, the same tincture, to the end they may resemble one another. And contrariwise, what doth so much distract the *wills*, and diuide the hearts, as *Iealousie*? *Loue* binds vs to interpret fauourably of all the actions of the party beloved, and to take in good part that which we ought to beleeue she hath done with reason: whereas *Iealousie* makes bad interpretations, not one-

ly of her actions, but euen of her very thoughts? Is there any innocency that can bee ſheltred from the outrages of this inhumane fury? If the party beloued hath any ioy, it then preſuppoſeth a riual; if ſhe be penſiue, they are ſuſpitions of contempt: if ſhee ſpeakes to another, it is Infidelity; if ſhe haue wit, they apprehend practiſes; if ſhee be aduiſed, they imagine ſubtilties; if ſhe be plaine, they call it ſimplicity; if ſhee bee well ſpoken, it is affectedneſſe; if ſhe be courteous, it is with a deſigne. So as *Iealouſie* is like vnto thoſe counterſeit glaſſes, which neuer represent the true proportion of the face: and what more ſiniſter iudgements could the moſt cruell enemy  
in

in the world giue of the party beloued? But not content thus to blemish the particular perfections of that shee seemes to loue, she seekes to depriue it of the sweetest content in this life, which is by communicatiō with men of honor and merit, who doe not visite her but for the esteeme they make of her vertues: So as many times to please an importune, who is himselfe a great burthen to them that suffer him, shee must forbear all good company. What iustice can force a soule well bred, to indure this brutish rigot? *Loue* is a liuely fountaine of ioy and contentment, which banisheth all cares and melancholy; but *Iealousie*, what is it else but a nursery of griefe  
and

and waywardnesse, whereas wee see thornes of despaire and rage, to grow vp among the sweetest and most pleasing flowers that Nature can produce? How then can any man belecue that these two contrary *Passions* can subsist in one subiect? If they oppose heereunto experience, and the testimony of many persons worthy of credite, which protest that they have loued sincerely, and yet were neuer without *Jealousie*; and will thereby inferre, that at the least, *Jealousie* is a signe of loue; which is the second thing we must incounter, to satisfie that which hath bene formerly propounded: it sufficeth to answer, that although for respect we yeelde to those personages what they

they publish of their *Passions*: yet as one Swallow makes no Spring, so that which happens to particulars, cannot prescribe a law to the generall. But to containe our selues within the bounds of our first proposition, we say, that these persons are much deceiued in this subiect: and their error growes, for that they cannot giue proper names to things, for that of a respectiue feare competible with loue, whereof it is full, they make an vniust *Iealousie*, with the which *Loue* can no more subsist, then water with fire. They that loue intirely, are in truth, full of respect to the party beloued; honor her with all the passions of their soules, fight for her honor, and hold it a punishment




nishment to offend her. But these are not the effects of *Iealousie*, which contrariwise violates the honour which is due to the party beloued, and by a prodigious manner to blind the world, will haue her fauour by wronging her, treading her merits vnder foote. We must then put a difference betwixt a respectiue feare, which always doth accompany those that loue perfectly, and *Iealousie* which is neuer found but with an imperfect *passion*, which cannot iudge of the perfections of the party beloued. They which know that these things are diuerse, and as remote one from another, as the earth is from heauen, will easily passe on this side, and yeelde, that *Iealousie* is neither

ther competible with *Loue*, nor is any signe thereof. Yet if wee shall yeelde any thing to the opinion of the *Vulgar*, we may freely confesse, that *Iealousie*, in truth is a signe of *Loue*, but as the feuer is an argument of life. It is vnquestionable, that a feuer is a signe of life, seeing the dead are not susceptible of this bad quality. But as a feuer shewing that there are some reliques of life in the patient that is tormented, accompanieth him to his graue; so *Iealousie* is I know not what signe of *Loue*; seeing they which loue not, cannot haue any *Iealousie*. But it is certaine, that if wee expell it not, it will in the end ruine *Loue*, like vnto a thicke smoake which smothers the  
brightest

brightest flame. This is all we can yeelde vnto the *Vulgar*, so as according to this opinion which we haue held the most probable, *Jealousie* is to *Loue* as thicke mists are to flowers, haile to haruest, stormes to fruites, and poison to our liues.

## Of Hatred or Enmity.

### CHAP. I.

S the Lawes of *Loue* and *Hatred* are directly contrary; by that which wee haue spoken of *Loue*, it will be easie to iudge, wherein *Hatred* consists, and how farre her effects extends. *Hatred* then is  
An

*An auersion and horror which man hath of all that seemes contrary to his good, or preiudiciall to his contentment: Or else Hatred is an horror which the appetite hath of that which seemes pernicious vnto it, so as the sheepe hate the wolfe, as the enemy and persecuter of his life.*

But wee must heere obserue, that as all that is besitting Nature is put in the rancke of good, so on the other side, whatsoeuer is opposite vnto it, must be placed in the rancke of euill. Wherefore as the good is the object of *Loue*, so the euill is the object of *Hatred*. To vnderstand this, we must remember, that whether it be in the minde or in the body, there is a besitting estate, and as it were a naturall

naturall harmony, which makes vs to abhorre that which may dissolue this comfort. This harmony considered in the body, is no other thing then the good constitution, by meanes whereof, we enioy a perfect health; the which being impayred, our nature receiues pain, as when we indure great hunger and thirst, or when as wee receiue any hurt or wound. As for the soule, this same harmony may bee considered: first in the senses, as well externall as internall, & consist in the proportion they haue with their objects; which is such, as they hate whatsoever puls them away, or which diuerts them by any kinde of violence. As for example, the eyes hate darkenesse and obscurity,  
and

and our imagination is terrified and troubled by the fearefull apprehensions of dreames, which it frameth during our rest. This same harmony considered in reason, either it regards the simple knowledge of the truth, which our vnderstanding conceiues with pleasure; or the vse and execution of things which depend on wisdom, which wee doe with content. In regard of the first, our spirit is enemy to lying, although at some times it takes delight in the art wherewith they colour a thing to giue it some shewe of truth: So as the wisest are delighted in the reading and report of fables, when as the intention hath any grace. And as for the second, there  
is

is such diuersity of iudgements in humaine actions which are as it were the Element of prudence, as it is a thing in a manner incredible: for hardly shall you see two persons which haue the same feeling and apprehension of affaires, in regard whereof this life is full of *Hatred* and factions which grow from these diuerse opinions.

As for that which concerns the will, her harmony consists in the proportion & *Loue* which she beares to the good, which makes her detest and abhorre whatsoeuer presents it selfe vnto her, vnder the shew of euill, as pernicious and hurtfull to her content and rest. And therefore the harmony of the *sensitive appetite* consisting in the fami-



familiarity and concurrence  
it hath with the good of the  
sences, it doth abhorre and  
beares an irreconcilable ha-  
tred, to whatsoeuer shall of-  
fend them; hence it comes  
that wee so much abhorre  
whippes, tortures, punish-  
mēts, hunger, thirst, wounds,  
& such like which tend to the  
destruction of our being. This  
*passion* was ingraft in vs by  
nature, to the end that at the  
first approach, at the first taste  
and imagination of euill, wee  
may retire our selues and flie  
it, lest wee runne into ruine.  
This kind of *hatred* then is  
proper to the *concupiscible*  
which is offended at diuerse  
things, yea at small things,  
and many times at those  
which haue no subiect of of-  
fence, for you shall see some  
which

which cannot suffer the presence of certaine creatures, & others cannot endure the sight of certaine fruites, though otherwise they be exceeding pleasant. Finally there is no creature so fantastick in his *Appetite*, nor so sudden in the motions of *Hatred* and distastes of things which present themselves vnto his senses, as man, who not able to endure any thing, makes himselfe insupportable in a like manner to all creatures: but principally to his like.

But to giue more light to this discourse, we wil obserue that there are diuerse sorts of *Hatred* and *Enmities*, which may bee referred to foure chiefe heads: for there is a natural *Hatred*, and a brutish *Hatred*,

*Hatred*, a melancholy *Hatred*, and a humane *Hatred*. The naturall *Hatred* takes her beginning from a certaine antipathy, and contrariety of nature which is found in creatures, the which as it were abhorre one another, and cannot frequent or conuerse together, although the subject of this *Hatred* appeare not, and that shewes it selfe more in the effect then in the cause; whereof wee haue prodigious examples in nature, in plants, in beasts, and in men. Brutish *Hatred* is rather a rage then a *Passion*, for that it seekes a furious destruction of that it hates, and to see the last reliques consumed; so as it is more fitting for rauening wolues, or for monsters then for men. Such is the  
*Hatred*

*Hatred* of those who not satisfied to haue slaine their enemies, make their bodies to feelee their fury, practizing a thousand cruelties vpon their carcasses, and making them to suffer after death, all the indignities their rage can deuise. This detestable *Hatred* sometimes passeth to such a furious transport, and so full of excesse, as they eate the flesh of their enemies, & haue a brutish delight in the fume of their members being cast into the fire: This onely befits Canniballs and those monsters which haue layd aside all humanity. Melancholly *Hatred* growes from the great aboundance of adust choller, the which doth so torment and agitate those miserable wretches which are affli-

afflicted therewith, as they abhorre all the honest pleasures of life, fly the light of men, and wish euill vnto themselves, so as they cannot indure to bee seene, neither will they speake to any man, but seeke desarts & solitary places, where they confine themselves, and consume themselves with the discontent and *Hatred* they beare to mankind: like vnto that cursed *Athenian*, who had conceiued such a mortal *Hatred* against all men, as he imagined it was not in his power to binde his fellow Cittizens vnto him more strictly, but in planting of trees which might serue them as Gibbets to hang themselves.

Some among the Idolaters

K

would

would haue tied this aspersiō  
& infamy to the profession of  
religious men amōg Christi-  
ans, comparing these holy  
soules, to birds which fly the  
light, and neuer shew them  
selues but in the darknes. But  
these reproaches are the  
fruites of impiety, which is  
not capable nor can compre-  
hend the motions, nor force  
of the inspirations of the spi-  
rit of God, who drawing his  
elect from the vanities and  
pleasures of the world, leades  
them into these holy soli-  
tudes, where being far from  
the conuersation of men,  
they approach neere the  
company of Angells; or ra-  
ther vnite themselues to him  
who is the sole ioy and so-  
ueraigne good of Angels. If  
they which haue thus sought  
to

to blemish and defame this holy profession, which be-  
ginnes his paradise on earth,  
would haue taken the paines  
to search into and found the  
condition, the manners, and  
the life, of those which re-  
nounce the world, & the plea-  
sure thereof; they shold haue  
found, that the *Sun* in the  
whole world doth not be-  
hold soules more contented  
then those, in whom there  
appeares no signe of sadnesse,  
nor any shew of melancholy:  
But a perpetuall ioy which  
no troubles interrupt, nor a-  
ny discontents do' crosse. But  
this belongs not to our sub-  
iect.

It rests that wee speake  
of that *Hatred* which plants  
her rootes simply in the harts  
of men. This is an infirmity



of the soule as wee haue described it, which hath humane causes, and to the which also they bring humane remedies to seeke to cure it, of the which we now treat. In the meane time there is great difference betwixt *Choller*, *Hatred*, and *Envy*. And first of all there is this difference betwixt *Choller*, and *Hatred*, that *Choller* growes from iniuries which we haue receiued, and which offend vs in our owne particular; whereas *Hatred* may spring from things which concerne not vs in particular; but which touch the Publique. As for example, we may hate and detest those which kindle a fire of discord in the remotest parts of the Estate. We may hate such  
as

as commit villanies a hundred leagues from vs; but to inflame our *Choller*, the iniury must touch vs and offend vs, either in our owne person, or in that of our friends. And *Choller* doth alwayes presuppose particular men; but *Hatred* may extend it selfe to all mankind, there being no man but doth detest and generally abhorre all theeues, al murderers, and all slanderers. Moreouer *Choller* may bee cured with time, for that it is a short fury which may bee pacified with patience. But *Hatred* is in a manner incurable, and growes more bitter with time and remedies. Wherefore the Poets describe *Etrocles* and *Pollinices*, continuing the effects of their *Hatred*. euen in their

K 3 tombes:

tombes: For when as their sister *Antigona* had cast their bodies into the fire, to performe their ordinary obsequies, they could not remain together, but the flame diuiding it selfe cast their bodies one from another; whereupon miserable *Antigona* cried out, that their *Hatred* furnished their death.

Moreouer, he that is transported with *Choller*, not onely desires to be reuenged of the party that hath wronged him in making him to feele the effects of his wrath: But withall will haue him know that hee is the author of this reuenge, and of the paine hee feeles. But he that is possesst with *Hatred*, desires onely to see his enemy ruined, and doth not care to haue him know

know that hee is the Author thereof, so as he may behold his destruction. Besides, *Choller* is accompanied with paine, by reason of her vehemency: But *Hatred* is without paine, neuer filling her subiect with this extreame ardor, but suffers him coldly to attend the ruine of his enemy. Finally, *Choller* hath bounds, for if hee that is incensed against any one, sees any great calamity befall him, which exceeds the limits of a common reuenge, he hath pittie, and doth wish that his misery had not mounted to that height. But the man that is full of *Hatred*, neuer sees his bad inclinations satisfied; and how great soeuer the calamity be which befallles his enemy, hee hath

no feeling nor pittie: the reason of this difference is, for that he which is in *cholter*, desires only that the party against whom he is incensed should know, that it is in his power to reuenge the wrong he hath done him. But he that meerly hates, seeks absolutely the ruine of his enemy, and is not satisfied vntil he see him vtterly lost: let vs now observe wherein *Hatred* differs from *Envy*. The diuersity appears first, in that *hatred* hath for object the euill which wee conceiue of the party whom wee hate, presupposing him to be wicked, either in our owne respects, or generally toward all men. For we finde it daily by experience, that men are disposed to hate those, from whom they thinke they haue receiued some iniury,

or

or whō they know are accustomed to outrage all the world: whereas *Enuy* hath for object the felicities and prosperities of another: the which is most apparent, for that wee neuer enuy the miserable. And *Hatred* also extends euen to bruit beasts, for as we haue said before, there are some which naturally hate certaine creatures; yea, we haue seene a great Prince who could not endure the singing nor sight of a Cocke. But *Enuy* powres forth his poyson only among men: for wee doe not enuy birds for their goodly fethers, nor Lyons for the greatnesse of their courage; nor Stags for their swiftnesse; nor Elephants for their greatnesse and force: but we onely enuy the glory

of our like. Moreouer, enuy is alwayes vniust; for what shew of reason can be found in a passion which doth afflict vs for the prosperities of another man, as if hee did vs some iniury in being happy? But there may be *Hatred* full of iustice. as those which make vs abhorre the publike plague, and troublers of the peace of the State, the enemies of the Countrey, men desperately wicked and vicious, and the enemies of God and religion: yea, this *Hatred* of the wicked is a signe of a good soule, as the enuy wee beare to them that are fortunate, discouers a wicked dispositiō: whertore we dissemble not the *Hatred* we beare to such as wee know are wicked, whereas wee disguise all  
we



we can the enuy we conceiue  
against them that are hap-  
py. Againe, *Enuy* kindling in  
our hearts by the great pro-  
perity of another, when as  
they decline, and that we see  
them ouerthrowne by some  
notable accident of misfor-  
tune, it relents, and is by little  
and little quenched: yea, it  
is most certaine, that enui-  
ous men are glad to haue  
some cause of pittie; whereas  
*Hatred* and enmities neuer  
ceasse for all the calamities  
which befall their enemies;  
but when they are once fra-  
med and fixed to any one,  
they neuer abandon him nei-  
ther in good nor bad for-  
tune. Moreouer, *Hatreds* and  
enmities are sometimes cu-  
red and quenched, by letting  
the party (that is tormented  
with

with this passiō know, that he to whō he wisheth euill, hath not done him any wrong, or that he hath changed his inclinatio, & is become a good & vertuous mā; & moreouer, that he hath done him some kind of pleasure, in occasions which haue bin offered to oblige him. But although you perswade a man, that hee hath not receiued any wrong from him that is happy and fortunate, yet it doth not quench his enuy; and in stead of suppressing it with this consideration, that he is a good man and that hee hath indeauoured to doe him fauours, yet he will shew it the more, and let the world see, that he can neither indure his prosperity nor his benefits; for that the one proceeds from the good  
for-

fortune which doth accompany him, and the other is an effect of his vertue, which are two recommendable things; & cōsequently subiect to Enuy. Lastly, these two *Passions* differ, in regard of the diuerse ends which they propound vnto themselves: for Enuy hath that in particular, that shee doth not alwayes cause vs to wish great miseries to those we enuy: for wee see it daily by experience, that there are some which enuy their own kinsmē or friends, yet they would be loth to see any great misery befall them, or an affliction which might tend to their ruine; contenting themselves to crosse their prosperities, and to hinder the lustre and glory of their fortunes. But *Hatred* passeth

passeth further, still watching for an occasion to ruine his enemy, and is neuer satisfied with his miseries vntill they haue brought him to the period of his downefall: So as shee induceth vs to procure irremediable mischiefs, and extreame calamities to those whom shee pursues with obstinacy.

Wee must now seeke the source and fountaine of *Hatred*, and shew what the causes be that frames it. As she consists in the auersion of things which are contrary to our senses, it may spring from three causes principally; that is to say, from choler, from reproches, or slanders, and from the crosses or discomforts which wee receiue. As for the first, an Ancient had

had reason to say, that *hatred* is an inueterate or rooted choler; not that time doth change one of these passions into another: for the *Philosophers* will neuer confesse, that one kinde may passe into the nature of another: but for that choler hauing exasperated our courage, if wee entertaine long the forme of an offence which doth gall vs, in the end wee lay aside choler, and beginne to hate him against whom our wrath was kindled: So as choler is not of the Essence of *hatred*, but many times the cause.

As for the second, it is certain, that nothing doth more excite our *Hatred* then slanders & reproches, the which may euen trouble the wisest and most vertuous; for wee  
haue

haue seene great Personages, who had, as it were, renounced all feeling of the other *Passions*; ycelde o the griefe of detraction, and haue suffered themselues to haue beene so caried away with griefe of minde, as they haue fallen into a generall disdaine of all the world, and to abhorre all Mankind; by reason of the fury of such as had defamed them. So as slander is like to a huge waue which wrests the helme out of the Marriners hand: for that she troubles the most vertuous, and makes thē to giue way to the griefs of *Hatred*. Besides, if they which slander vs, giue vs o-ther crosses, and are the cause of some notable preiudice; as if they accuse vs before the Magistrate, if they bring vs  
in

in questiō of our liues, if they cause vs to lose our goods, if they persecute our kinsmen, if they torment our friends; all these causes together frame a deepe *Hatred* in our soules, the which retaine for euer the forme of these bloody iniuries, vnlesse they make some great and solemne satisfaction.

Finally, the reasons why choler, detraction, and crosses, or discommodities, ingender *Hatred*, is, for that all these things tending to the destruction of the being, or honour of men, they are so many subiects and spurres of *Hatred* against those that procure them those displeasures. Yet *Hatred* is not framed in our hearts by these causes onely, but there are



are other particular motives from whence it may proceed, as when we see our selues deceiued in our trust, and of the good opinion we had of men to whom we were tied by affection. Wherefore an Ancient had reason to say, that *Hatred* is commonly framed in our soules, by our bad elections, for that wee loue before we know, and before wee haue tried the merit and fidelity of those to whom we will trust so rich a treasure as friendship. We are too easily perswaded that they are vertuous, and worthy of all fauour and confidence, and in the meane time wee finde them treacherous and unworthy: so as wee fall into such a disdaine, and do so abhorre them, as we cannot endure

indure to heare them spoken of. Finally, to draw to a head the causes of this *Passion*; wee hate vgly and deformed things, as the monsters and scornors of nature and arte, and those which are filthy, troublesome, and impertune: for that wee esteeme them as enemies to our senses and content. As for those which are subiect to the motions of this *Passion*, wee obserue, that faint and base mindes, are sooner mooued then generous spirits: The reason is, for that Cowards feare euery thing, so as their hatred is inflamed against all such as they thinke may hurt them, bee it in their person, in their goods or in regard of their friends. Hence it growes, that great men  
which

which haue no courage are commonly cruell, as we haue monstrous examples in *Nero*, *Caligula*, and other effeminate Princes, whose rage no murthers could satisfie. And for the same reason they that haue offended a great Personage, who hath meanes to reuenge himselfe, hate him irreconciliably; which makes them to desire his death, to see themselues freed from feare. Whence groweth that famous saying, He that offends neuer pardons. The proud and enuious are also subiect to the motions of *Hatred*. The first, for that they thinke they are not honored as they should be; and the last, for that all the prosperities of their equalls offend them.

They

They that loue themselues too much, are wonderfull apt to the same motions, for that they take euery thing as an iniury, and are so nice as they cannot endure any man. But as *Loue* springs from a feeling of good, and *Hatred* from an apprehension of, *E-uill*, it happens that for that the good things we enioy in this life are neuer pure, nor much durable, they make no great impression, neither do they leaue any great remembrance nor *Loue* of them in our soules: But contrariwise euill things being very sensible & long, take deepe rooting in our hearts, where by reason of our corruption, they are are as it were in their proper Element, so as we do more easily preserue the seeds of

of *Hatred* then of *Loue*: Wherefore an Ancient sayd, that he which is afflicted with griefe, remembers it; but hee that enioyes pleasure, forgets. Finally if wee would make good vse of our *Hatred*, wee must imploy it against vice, and against those objects, the *Loue* and pursuite whereof may pollute our hearts, and blemish the Image of God which shines in our soules. This *Hatred* must take her course from causes contrary to those, which we haue formerly said, are proper to induce *Loue*. As for example, to roote out of the soule a dishonest *Loue*, we must leaue to thinke of it, and diuert our minds and senses from the continuall contemplation of the image which

which beginnes to make vs  
to feele her power, lest that  
the beames of so pernicious  
an object, kindle and nourish  
in our hearts bad desires  
and moreouer, to fortifie our  
*Hatred*, we must iudiciously  
weigh the defects which may  
incounter in the subiect  
which we *Loue*. And of this  
sort, from the most perfect  
creature in the world, being  
subiect to great imperfection,  
we may easily if wee will,  
finde occasion to separate  
our selues.

Wee must in like manner  
represent the miseries which  
do commonly accompany  
the pursuities of *Loue*; we must  
also set before our eyes the  
shipwracke of so many famous  
personages, which  
haue lost themselues vpon  
this

this shelve: We must represent the infidelities, cares, crosses, paine, and torments, which this wretched *Passion* doth cause. And aboue all, a Christian should apprehend the wrath of God, and the horror of his iudgements which hee powres out vpon vncleanenesse. But this belongs to another Discourse.

Of *Desire* or *Cupidity*:  
and of the flight and horror  
we haue of things.

CHAP. I.



S NATVRALL  
things being  
farre from their  
center, haue no  
rest vntill they  
at-



attaine vnto it; so man ha-  
uing a particular inclination  
to good, as soone as he pro-  
pounds vnto himselfe the  
object, and ties it to his ima-  
gination; if the enjoying bee  
denied him, he feeles himselfe  
surprized with a certaine ve-  
hemency, which makes him  
to seeke it passionately. And  
if it bee a good of the mind,  
his will is inflamed; and if  
this good concernes the  
contentment of the body,  
his senses receiue the im-  
pression and long to enioy it.  
According to this last moti-  
on, *Philosophers* affirme that  
there is *Passion* in man which  
they call *Cupidity* or *Desire*,  
which concerneth those  
things which we possesse not,  
and which we thinke are fit  
and proper to giue vs con-  
L tent

tent. This *Cupidity* or *Desire* is no other thing, but a *Passion* wee haue to attaine vnto a good which we enioy not, & which we imagine is fitting for vs. It differs from *Loue* and *Pleasure*, for that *Loue* is the first inclination, the first taste, or (as we may say) the first sweetnesse we feele of good things, or of those which are goodly or faire: which rauish our senses, and breed in vs this desire and longing to enioy them; after which, hope doth arise, the which succeding, the effect filles vs with ioy, and contentment, which is properly the pleasure wee conceiue when the thing hath succeeded. Or to deliuer it more plainely, *Desire*, differs from *Loue*, and *Pleasure*, for that *Loue* is the first motion

motion, and the first *Passion* we haue of any good thing, without respect whether it be present or absent; *Desire* is a *Passion* for a good that is absent, and pleasure a contentment wee haue to enioy when wee haue gotten it. Whereby it followes, that *Desire* as we say, is a particular *Passion*, for that it regards a sensible good, vnder a sensitive consideration, that is to say, vnder this consideration that it is absent, and that in this absence it drawes vnto it the affection of man to pursue it. For the *sensible good* which is the obiekt of the *sensuall appetite*, moues otherwise when it is present, then when it is absent.

For when it is present, the *Appetite* is at rest by the pre-

L 2      sence

sence of the thing beloued, whereas being absent, the *Appetite* is moued and agitated with a desire and longing to pursue it and get it. But there are two kinds of *Desires* and *Cupidities*, which may make impressiō in our senses, the one is naturall, the other rise from our choice; the naturall are those which agree with the nature of the creature, as drinking, eating, sleeping; and these are common to men & brute beasts, for that both the one and the other, haue objects besitting their nature. Those which arise from our election, are such as regard the things which are not altogether necessary for the creature, but man hath inuented them for his greater ease and  
com.

commodity, as the delights of drinking, & eating, baths, play, sights, riches, honor, reputation, and such like. As for naturall desires they are not infinite, but haue their bounds; for that as nature contents it selfe with a little, so shee prescribes vnto her selfe certaine limitts, within the which she containes herselfe, tying herselfe to the object which is fitting, without any diuersion.

But those which follow our election haue no bounds, so they grow infinite. For as they depend of the imagination of man, as this power represents the formes and images of infinit objects; so these desires multiply infinitely to pursue all those good things which the imagination hath

propounded. Whereby it happens that representing at one instant any thing that seems pleasing or profitable, we desire it passionately, and then changing opinion wee wish another, and after it a third.

So as we feele as it were a swarme of desires disclose themselves in our thoughts, which draw vs to diuerse objects, without rule or measure. For as no abundance of water can satisfie them that are sicke of the dropsie, so there is no kind of goodnesse or pleasure that may content our desires. The ancient *Philosophers* compared the first matter to an infamous strumpet, who is neuer glutted with present pleasure, but doth still meditate  
vpon

vpon new imbracings; for that the first matter is neuer content with the formes which she enioyes, but still desires new, not caring whether they be more noble then that wherewith she is adorned. But we haue more reason to apply this comparison to our *Cupidities* and *Desires*, which shew themselves insatiable in all they pursue, with what kind of *Passion* soeuer. And herein appeares the great misery of man, who hauing meanes to passe with few things necessary for the entertainment of his life, plungeth himselfe in superfluities as into a gulph, whereas hee findes neither bottome nor bancke, and afflicts himselfe with a thousand torments in the pursuite



of his vaine desires, making his condition much more miserable then that of other creatures. For they hauing quencht their desires by the enioying, remaine fully satisfied, and torment themselves no more, vntill that nature quickens againe their *appetites*.

When as the Lyon hath pursued a Bull or a Goate, he deuoures what is necessary to satisfie his hunger; but he hides not the remainder in the ground. The Bore drinckes vntill hee hath satisfied his thirst, and then leaues the water. The Wolfe (though a rauening beast) runs after his prey, when hunger driues him; but being satisfied hee leaues his chace. Leopards and Tygers being  
preft

prest by necessity, kill their prey, but hauing fedde they are quiet. Bulles hauing taken their pasture, retorne content. But there is nothing able to satisfie the desires of man, his imagination being alwayes fertile and intentiue to furnish him with new toyles and cares to seeke for new, by the distaste hee hath of those which hee enioyeth,

So as to comprehend them all together, there is not glory enough, nor wealth sufficient, nor objects of pleasure and delight in the whole world, that can make him absolutely content. Whereby we may see a man growne from a base estate to a glorious fortune, complaine of his estate; neuer looking to

them that are inferiour vnto him, but onely to such as exceed him. Let him be aduanced to the first office of estate, yet this glory will be a spurre vnto him to aspire vnto a greater. He would play the prince, he wold contemne his King, and would enioy the glory of his Diademe.

Finally, he would see how high fortune can raise him, and doth not consider that she growes weary, and that her consistence is as bricke as glasse, and that her lustre is like vnto those false lights, which deceiue Seafaring men, and guide them vpon Rocks and Shelves, whereon their ships are broken, and they suffer shipwracke. Ambition hath no bounds, if she hath surmounted the earth,  
she

ſhe wil deſie heauen. So thoſe proud Princes of Antiquity, not ſatiſfied with the glory of their Crownes, and hauing nothing more on earth to be deſired, wold counterſeit the thunder and lightning, to haue themſelues held powerfull in heauen. But if euer Prince made ſhew that Ambition is inſatiable, it was *Alexander*; for that after ſo many battels, after ſo many glorious conqueſts, hauing paſt from *Macedonia* through *Aſia*, euē vnto the red ſea, yet he ſent forth his Lieutenants to diſcouer new worlds, there to finde out a new harueſt of triumphs: the *Scythians* though *Barbarians*, could wel reproach him with this inſatiable paſſion of glory. *If the gods (ſay they) had giuen thee*

a body equall to thy courage, the whole world would bee too little for thee. with the one hand thou wouldst touch the East, and with the other the West: and after all this, thou wouldst yet know where the brightnesse of that great Divinity were hidden. But wee must not imagine, that this passion is proper onely to Alexander, for there was neuer great Monarch whose abundance of treasure, and extent of Empire could limit his Ambition. There was neuer any one whom death hath not found plotting of new designs, and making of new projects for conquests. The cupidities and desires of riches are no lesse insatiable: the more we enioy, the more wee desire, and the *Passion* growes more violent by abundance.

bundance; like vnto the flame of a great fire, which increaseth whē they cast wood into it. Giue mee a man in whose house (to speake with the world) fortune hath heaped vp all the treasures of *Peron*, to whom shee hath imparted so much gold, siluer, and pretious stones, as he not onely enioyeth it, but also treads vnder his feet Pearles, Rubies, and Diamonds; yet amidst al this riches and glory, I dare boldly affirme, that his soule is not content, but in this abundance hee represents vnto himselfe other riches, which he imagineth are more exquisite, & more pretious then those which hee enioyes. So as in being rich, we doe not learne to leaue to be passionate for the loue of riches,

riches, nor by enioying many superfluous things, we do not get the contentment not to desire more. And when will mighty men cease to extend the bounds of their possessions? The lands, the houses of their neighbors, do they not stand in their light? & do not their *Desires* enflame them to buy thē, or take thē away by violence? If there be a branch of a riuer that may fit their buildings, must they not haue it either by loue or force? Doe they not cut down moūtaines & Rocks, diuert the course of riuers, make valleis euen; yea, & remoue the very foundations of the earth to satisfie their desires? Poore men, which hauing but so little a body to lodge, build such ample Pallaces.

And



And for al this are their *desires* satisfied? nay rather, the end of one is the beginning of another. This is a miserable *Passion*, seeing that shee her selfe fights against her owne satisfying and content: and seeing that by a prodigious violence shee enflames vs to the pursuit of riches to inioy them; and when wee haue gotten them, she forbids vs the vse: she begets a longing in vs, and denies vs the pleasure And as we more abhorre the *Cantharides* and *Tarantules*, then Lyons, Tigers, and Beares; for that they kill men and reape no fruite of their death, whereas sauage beasts doe feede themselves, and satisfie their hunger: so of all the Cupidities and *Desires*, there is not any one that we should

should so much detest, as that of Couetousnesse: for that this monstrous *Passion* draws no contentment from that it gathers together, nor suffers him that is posselt with it, to take any pleasure: whereas other desires, at the least, aspire to the enioying and content which may grow by the possession of their objects. Interdicting thus the enioying, shee stirres vp new *Desires*, to get newe treasure; and hauing gotten it, wee finde, that the paine we haue taken to enioy it, is nothing in regard of the torment it giues vs after that we are owners. And yet wee stay not there, but plunging our selues still in this gulph, wee finde sooner an end of our liues, then of our Couetousnesse.

These

These are the thornes which spring from riches, which are gotten with paine, preserved with care, and lost with griefe. Pleasures and delights are also infinite, not onely for that they cannot giue a full contentment to our desires, but also for that the number is so great, as we can hardly reckon them, or at least giue them names. There are *Desires* of the eyes, which represent sensible beauties, of which we finde a thousand fashions, the search whereof should be innocent if it had any bounds; but the excesse of our *Desire* doth blemish the pursuit. As for example, Pictures, Images, Statues, Porphyrie, Marble, Amber, CRYSTAL, Iuory, Flowers, tapistries, Diamonds, Rubies, & all

all other things, where the eye discovers the wonders of nature and the Art of man, are the objects of an innocent pleasure, if we could use them moderately. But we suffer our selves to be transported with so furious a *Desire*, and we seeke them with such an enraged heate, as it is rather a madnesse then a *Desire*. An Ancient said, That nothing had more distasted him from loue, and the *Passion* of all those things, then to see the stately Triumphs of *Rome* where they exposed to the sight all the gold and silver of that great City, to serue for an ornament; and carried the Pictures, Images, Armes, plate, pretious stones, Treasure, Tapistry, and the Mooneables of vanquished Kings,

Kings, & the spoyles of their rich Prouinces, to encrease their glory. And his reason was, for that (said he) all this pompe, all this lustre, all this glory, and this abundance of treasure, was seen in one day, and then vanished: So as in a short time our eyes might behold all the pride not only of *Rome*, but of the world. This was to make a man wise by sights, whereas others become mad.

There are other pleasures of the eyes, which pollute by the excesse of our cupidities, and by the disorder of our *desires*: as when our eyes not content to behold the beauty of a woman, conceiue an vnchaste *desire*. Besides these diuers pleasures of the eyes, there are others of smelling, hearing

hearing and feeling; where-  
in wee obserue as little mea-  
sure as in the rest. Perfumes  
are exquisite presents of Na-  
ture; but our effeminate de-  
licacy hath made the vse in-  
famous and shamefull. Mu-  
sick, consorts, and the sweet-  
nesse of Instruments, were  
things which wee might vse  
honestly without offence; but  
we haue conuerted all into  
*Luxury*, which prophanes the  
vse. And amidst all this a-  
bundance, neither doe our  
eyes satisfie their *Desires*, by  
so many obiects which they  
behold; neither doe our eares  
finde their heate quenched,  
nor our other senses their *pas-  
sions*, by whatsoeuer offers it  
selfe to their desires. The o-  
ther pleasures wherunto man  
is addicted, as play, combats,  
hunting

huntings, exercises, companies, and whatsoeuer he doth to ease the cares of this life, cannot satisfie nor giue any full contentment to man: but amidst all these roses hee stil meets with some thornes, and seekes dayly after newe contentment; so insatiable are his *Desires*.

The same Cupidities also vary according to the ages, complexions, and humours of those which are toucht with this *Passion*. Yong men are passionate after play and women, and exceede in these pleasures. The sicke wish for health, as the souereigne good of his life; old men desire good wine, and good fare, which seemes to make them liue againe, & to adde new vigor to their bodies.



bodies. Princes and 'generous spirits breath nothing but glory, tryumphs, and trophies, which serue to aduance them beyond the ordinary of men.

They which are of a sanguine and hot complexion, haue a *Passion* fit for all things, and they pursue them with great heate; but it lasts not long, and is like a fire of straw, inconstancy & change accompanying them still in their pursuities. Whereas they that are of a cold constitution, haue no great desires, by reason of the heauinesse of their humors: But they are obstinate in their pursuits, and can hardly bee diuerted from the object, whereunto they are tied. They which haue the least feeling

feeling of the motions of *De-  
fire*, are such as haue no ap-  
prehensio of the discōmodi-  
ties and miseries of this life,  
as they that are young; great  
spirits; men ouertaken with  
wine; and finally all such as  
haue much blood and heate  
gathered together about the  
heart. As in like manner,  
they are not much transpor-  
ted, which haue neuer felt a-  
ny vrgent necessity. For as  
feare and distrustes increase  
*Desire*, to provide all things  
necessary for the preseruati-  
on of this life, they which  
haue tasted of crosses, appre-  
hending to fall into their first  
miseries, do *Desire* infinite  
things, to fortifie themselves  
against all accidents; suppo-  
sing still that nothing can  
secure them sufficiently.

They

They also which haue little blood about their hearts, & that but luke-warme, haue naturally cares and ardent desires to gather; for that they feare to see themselves fall into want and pouerty; and the importune care they haue to preuent this misery, afflicts their soules, and tortures their minds. Hence it comes, that we often see men who haue bene prodigall and very profuse in their youth, so change their inclinations, as when they come to age, there can be nothing noted in them but base couetousnes in all their actions: whereas on the other side wee commonly see that wine and *Loue* make couetous men bountifull.

Finally when we haue gotten

ten with much paine the goods which we enioy, wee shew more vehemency to keepe them. The which may arise from two causes, either for that we feare to fall againe into the necessity in which we haue bene, and apprehend to see our selues forced to take new paines, and to vndergo new toyles to recouer our estates. Or else for that the things which we haue gotten with sweat and danger, are more deare vnto vs, then those which come without labour and paine. So we see a young Heire, which comes to a great Estate by the death of his father, will bountifully bestow his gold and siluer, and dissipate within few dayes, what his miserable father had bene long a

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gathering, and which he had not gotten but with infinite torments both of body and mind. Whereas a Merchant, who hath tried the dangers of traffique; who hath grown pale a thousand times at Sea during his voyages; who hath seene himselfe often neere death, and ready to fall into the hands of Pyrates or theeues, will not thrust his hand rashly into his coffers, nor distribute his mony but with great stayednesse, and wonderfull discretion, which may make him to bee held base and couetous. Doubtlesse wee haue seene in our times the most generous Prince of the world, who shewed no such magnificence in the bestowing of his excessive treasures, as the glory

glory of his birch and the splendor of his other actions seemed to require. So as many had a conceite that he feared to fall into his first necessities; but doubtlesse his good husbandry was far better then our profusions.

Wee haue spoken sufficiently of this *Passion* of *Desire*, the which hauing in a manner all things common with *Loue*, it shall not need any longer Treaty, nor more words to explaine it. As for the *Passion* which is contrary vnto it, as it hath no name, (although it bee the same which makes vs abhorre and fly that which wee thinke is hurtfull to our nature,) so it is not needfull to seeke out the conditions and particularities, seeing they

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are in a manner the same which we haue obserued vpon the subiect of *Hatred*. Moreouer, that from the nature of *Desire*, we may gather what that of horror is, seeing that one contrary deciphers another.

### Of *Pleasure* or *Delight*.

#### CHAP. I.



**A**S this great *Fabricke* of the heauens makes his motion vpon the two Poles of the world, which are as it were the two points where it beginnes and ends: So it seemes that all the *Passions* of our soules depend vpon



on *Pleasure* and *Paine*, which grow from the contentment or distaste which we receive from the diuerse objects which present themselves vnto vs in the course of this life. If we loue, it is for that wee finde a sweetnes in the subiect that doth rauish vs. And if we hate, it is in regard that wee imagine the object which presents it selfe vnto our imagination, is full of griefe, contrary to our apprehension. The pleasure wee take in the Idea of a good thing, which we enioy not, and yet promise to our selues the possession in pursuing it constantly, begets hope: as contrariwise, when we think it is not in our power to obtaine it, the griefe wee haue afflicts vs, and leades vs to

despaire. Desires in like manner are framed in vs by the imagination we haue of a benefit which may giue vs content; and the distaste wee haue of things which we flie, is, for that we imagine they may cause our discontent and vexation. So as in all the other *Passions* wee still finde *Pleasure* and griefe intermixt, in regard whereof, wee may rightly tearme them the two springs and fountaines, from whence deriue and flow all the other *Passions*. Yet they haue their particular reasons and considerations, which giue them their rancke, and put them in the number of other *Passions* duly & exactly considered. Wherefore *Pleasure* or *Delight* is a *Passion & motion, which is framed in our soules*

*soules with a certaine sweetnes which filles our senses with contentment and ioy, when as they receiue the impression, by the enioying of a good which is pleasing vnto them: Or else, Pleasure is a Passion which proceedes from the sweetnesse which our senses receiue from the objects which delight them. Or to vse Aristotles definition; Pleasure is a motion of the soule, which putteth it suddenly and sensibly in an estate fit for the nature of man. Whereupon wee must first obserue, that as things meereley naturall tend to their perfecti-  
ons, by those meanes which nature hath prescribed; so all creatures strue to attaine vnto those which are proper vnto them, by the meanes which the same nature hath*

made subiect to their power. But there is this difference betwixt insensible creatures & those which haue sense, that the insensible hauing attained to the height of their perfection, feele no ioy. So as it seemes, the Sun is vnhappy in that respect, that being indued with such a shining brightnesse, and such perfect beauty, yet it hath no feeling nor knowledge of his glory; whereas creatures haue a feeling of their good when they haue gotten it. So as this feeling filles their senses with ioy, and causeth pleasure, which makes their nature content: let vs now see what conditions are necessary to frame this delight, & to beget in vs the pleasure of things which touch our senses.

First

First of all, the good must be vnited to our senses, be it really & in effect, or in thought and imagination. For wee must remember in all this Treaty of *Humaine Passions*, that it imports not for to stir them vp, that the obieſt which incites the motions be really in the nature of things, or simply in the imagination: for that there are some men which suffer themselves to be more transported with the images which Fancy frames in their braines, then by the true obieſts of things which subsist really. As we reade in Histories, that a certaine *Athenian* called *Thrasillus* had a certaine foolish conceite, that all the shippes with their loading, which came into the Port

of *Pyrea* were his. But when as his friends had caused his braine to be purged, and had brought him to his right senses; he complained of them, and blamed them for that they had depriued him of an infinite content.

Moreouer it is requisite in *Pleasure*, that the obiekt of good which makes an impression in our senses, should be agreeable to our nature.

The which cannot be, if it be not in some sort agreeable vnto their capacity. Wherefore there must bee such an agreement and proportion betwixt the senses and obiekt, as there may bee betwixt them a certaine resemblance and affinity, so as that which caused the *Pleasure* must neither bee too strong

strong nor too weake, to make his impression. Wherefore a moderate light is more pleasing to our eyes then that which is more glistering. And in like manner a sweete sound cōtents the eare more then that which is loud.

And we take more delight in a speech which we vnderstand, then when wee vnderstand not the words; for that this intelligence wee haue of the words, frames a kind of conformity betwixt them and vs, whereby the speech doth insinuate sweetly into our eares, and makes a more pleasing impression in our soule.

Thirdly, it is requisite to breed delight in our senses, that wee haue knowledge of the good which breeds the im-



impression, and that we find it is fit for vs., & that we enioy it either in effect, or by imagination. For that we cannot receiue any ioy of a thing vnknowne, or which we find not that it is good for vs, or are ignorant that it is in our power. So a hidden friendship doth nothing touch vs, and yet if we had any perfect knowledge, we should be rauished with ioy, and burne with desire to imbrace it. Finally, it is requisite to beget *Pleasure* in our soules, that our Appetite (from whence desires do arise) should receiue an alteration or change by a sweet impression, which the obiect (being the cause) makes in our senses. For this sweetnesse is of the Essence of *Pleasure*,  
which

which cannot subsist without her: wherefore shee consists rather in the end of the motion then in all the rest of her progresse; therefore *Aristotle* tearmes it, not onely a motion, but also a rest of the soule. In the mean time there are two kinds of appetites in man, that is to say, the intellectuall, which is the reasonable will, and the sensitiue, which is diuided into the *Irrascible* and *Concupiscible*, as we haue said: the intellectuall reioyceth at good things which are conformable to reason, whereof the vnderstanding is iudge.

And the *Sensitiue* takes delight in things which concerne the senses. We also observe this difference, that those things which delight the  
the

the senses, cause a *sensible* alteration in the body. As in ioy wee feele our heart open and dilate it selfe; especially if this ioy proceede from an vnexpected thing which concernes vs much, it may be so mooued and agitated, as death may follow. As it happened in those women of *Carthage*, who hauing newes that their sonnes had beene slaine in battaile, when as they saw them living before their eyes: this ioy happening contrary to their hopes, they dyed suddainely. But the pleasures of reason cause no other thing then a simple motion of the will, which reioyceth the minde without any alteration of the body, vnlesse it extend vnto the senses. Wherefore some affirme

firme that this kinde of ioy is found in the Essence of God, and in the nature of Angels. And they are accustomed to propound a question vpon this subiect, which be the greatest pleasures, and delight most, whether those of reason, or those of the senses. But the answer is easie, for that vndoubtedly, the intellectuall and those of the minde (if we consider them in themselves) are more delightfull then those of the senses. And this made *Aristotle* to say, that the sweetest and most pleasing content, wee can haue in this life, is that which proceeds from the exercises and actions of wisdom, which is spent in the contemplation of the first causes. The reason why the

the pleasures of the minde haue an aduantage ouer those of the body, is, for that to cause pleasure or delight in vs, there must concur three things; that is to say, the object vnited to the power; the power to the which it is vnited; and the actuall vnion of the one with the other, which presupposeth knowledge of this good. As for example, to beget the pleasures of our taste, there must bee delicate meates, a taste well disposed, and moreouer the vnion of these two things must bee made by the naturall organs, with his knowledge, that must receiue the impression of this pleasure. For if the most exquisite meates were put into the mouth of a man that slept, hee should receiue  
no.

no pleasure, for that hee had  
no feeling nor knowledge.  
And first of all, the goods of  
the minde (in the enioying  
whereof consist the intellec-  
tuall pleasures) are more no-  
ble and more louely then all  
the goods of the senses and  
body: whereof we haue a no-  
table prooffe in that wee see  
men (yea, most abandoned  
to vice) depriue themselves  
of the sweetest pleasures of  
the body, to purchase glory,  
which is a good of the mind.  
So they sayd of *Cesar*, who in  
his great inclination to loue  
and women, renounced all  
his pleasures to get the ho-  
nor of a Triumph.

Moreouer, the power of  
the will, in which is made  
the impression of these kinde  
of *Pleasures*, being intellectu-  
all:

all: and much more excellent then the senses which are corporeall, the actions which she produceth and which are followed by these *Pleasures*, are also more noble then those which deriue from the senses. And by consequence, the vnion which is made of spirituall obiects with the will, is farre more strict; more worthy, and more durable, then that which happens betwixt the senses and the obiects, which they pursue. It is more strict, for that the senses regard onely the superficies of things, and doe not busie themselves but to consider the accidents which inuiron them: as colours, smelling, noyse, sweetness, and the like; whereas the vnderstanding pierceth  
into



into the Essence and substance of the objects. It is more worthy, for that it is made without any alteration or corporeall change: whereas the object pleasing to the senses, cannot be vnited with them, but it will cause some kinde of change which is full of imperfection.

It is more durable, for that the objects of the senses are of perishable goods which soon faile, whereas the objects of the minde are of eternall felicity which continues for euer. Yet it is true, that the objects of the senses make a more violent impression in our soules, and that the pleasure which we receiue, toucheth vs much more then that which the spirits gather from the objects which  
are

are pleasing vnto it. The which happens first, for that the goods of the body are borne with vs, encrease with vs, and are preserved with vs. So as handling them daily and houely, we haue a more exact knowledge then of the goods of the vnderstanding, which are remoued from vs.

We haue said, that knowledge is necessary for the enioying of pleasures: wherefore, where this knowledge hath least power, there the pleasures are least sensible. This also happens, for that we vse pleasures as remedies and cures against the crosses, troubles, and cares of this life, which are sweetned, and as it were charmed by their presence. But most men be-  
ing

ing either indisposed, or not capable to raise themselves vp to spiritual consolations, seeke and tye themselves to pleasing objects, which present themselves easily to their senses. The which is fortified, for that the sweetnesse of objects which delight our senses, are suddainely tasted, and doe not much trouble vs to seeke them. It is an infallible *Maxime* in *Philosophy*, that the objects by their presence, make a more powerfull impression in our soules, then when they are absent. And those things which giue vs least paine, are most sweete in their acquisition: so as for all these considerations, the *Pleasures* of the body seeme vnto vs greater then those of the minde. We may say in

a word, that those of the senses are more sensible, but these more perfect, & more excellent. In the mean time, all the wise men of the world exhort vs to set a careful guard over the *Pleasures* of the senses, which they call the poison of the minde. For the which wee must the more carefully provide; for that these *Passions* are accompanied with a certaine sweetness which flatters vs at her first approach, and surprizeth our iudgement, and charmes it in such sort, as it helpe to deceiue it selfe. So as in this subiect wee must imitate those wise old men of *Troy*, who counselled *Priam* to send backe *Hellen* to the *Grecians*, and not suffer himselfe to be any longer abused with

with the charms of her great beauty : for that keeping her within their City, was to entertaine the siege of a fatall and dangerous warre, and to nourish a fire which would consume it to ashes.

The event did shew, that it was wisely fore-scene, and pronounced as an Oracle : for in the same manner wee should chafe from vs the objects of *Pleasures*, lest they be the cause of our ruine. To which purpose an Ancient said, That nature had engrafted no such pernicious Desires, as those of the *Pleasures* of the body : for that these desires growing vnbridled, doe so enflame the courages where they get possession, as they leaue nothing vndone to content their *Passion*.  
Whence

Whence spring treacheries and treasons, which make men to sell their friends and countrey: from thence proceedes ruines and desolation of Estates, & the conspiracies against Common weales. As it appeared in that of *Catiline*, who practized the ruine of *Rome*: from thence the murthers, violences, burnings, and all the miseries of this life, take their spring and beginning. The reason is, for that pleasures quench the Iudgement, and smother all the seedes of vertue and wisdom in man; the which they effect more powerfully, when they are most violent: as it appears in those which are transported with Loue, who are not maisters of themselves,

selues, but suffer themselves to be wholly guided by their *Passions*: wherefore a wise-man of the world was wont to say, that he had rather fall into frenzy, then suffer himselfe to bee surprized with *Pleasures*; for that, sayd hee, Physitians may cure madnes, by purging the braine with *Helleborum*, whereas *Pleasures* depriue man of his iudgement, without hope of remedy for his infirmity.

But for that there are *Pleasures* not only of the mind, but of the body and senses, which are meerely innocent, as the *Pleasure* we receiue by Pictures, Perfumes, honest exercises, and other things which bring a chaste content; it shall bee conuenient to know what the causes and

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objects



objects bee, to the end wee may of our selues iudge, which are lawfull, and which are interdicted, and to bee abhorred. First then, things necessary for preservation of our nature, as drinking, and eating, are pleasing vnto man, and the which he vseth with a delight, which moderation and temperance make innocent. Secondly, men take a singular delight in things to the which they haue beene long framed and accustomed, for that custome is as it were another nature, considering that the things whereunto wee haue bene accustomed, and whereof there is framed a long habite, by continuall exercise, haue a great affinity with those of nature. Thirdly, the things

things which are conformable to our nature and disposition, are pleasing; for that they force vs not in any sort, but insinuate sweetely into our senses: Whereas on the other side, whatsoeuer brings any constraint vexeth vs, as studies, serious affaires, disputations, and such like, are importune and troublesome; for that they constraine and force our inclinations, vnlesse that custome hath taken away the bitternes. Whereas their contrary please vs, as rest, sleepe, play, cessation from labour, sights, and such like, in which wee finde not any constraint. Fourthly, whatsoeuer flatters our desires, giues vs joy and *Pleasure*, for that these kinds of *Cupidities*, are properly the desires of

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things which we imagine are pleasing, and raviſh our ſenſes : For whatſoeuer flattens our ſenſes, and delights our imagination, cauſeth *Pleasure* and content. So euery kind of good, bee it that which is preſent, or paſt, or to come, doth giue a content by the preſence or by the imagination; for that it delights our ſenſes, and is pleaſing to our fancy, which is a delicate power, & eaſily toucht with the ſweetneſſe of her obieſt, how ſmall ſoeuer. Wherefore they that remember the good things which they haue taſted, and thoſe which they hope for in future, hauing theſe things imprinted in their fancy, fee a ioy. Whereby it appeares plaine-ly, that all *Pleasure* and *De-  
light*

*light* consists either in the feeling of things present, or in the remembrance of things past, or in the hope of those which are to come. For we taste and feele the present, we remember those that are past, and we hope for the future. And doubtlesse the things which are grauen in our memory please vs much, not onely those which were sweete in the action, but euen those which we haue tasted with some bitternesse, especially when as the paines and toiles we haue indured are ended to our profite & honor : which made an Anciente say, that it was a sweete thing to remember trauailes past. So souldiers glory of their dangers past, and relate with singular content, the wounds

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they haue receiued in combatts.

They which haue escaped dangers at Sea, or made great and desperate voyages by land, haue the same content to relate the hazards and fortunes which they haue runne and surmounted. The reason of this ioy, and the cause of this content, is, for that it is a sweete thing to be freed from a mischiefe, especially when it hath giuen vs great afflictions and apprehensions.

But as for that which regards things which depend of hope, all those things whose presence and enioying we imagine will bee pleasing or profitable, and which will cause vs no kind of discontent, excite *Pleasure* in our senses,

senses, be it when we remember them, or when wee hope for them. So as whatsoever we imagine as a good which may befall vs, is pleasing vnto our thoughts: By reason whereof, (as wee will shew hereafter) we feele a content in choller, for that no man is angry, but with hope to bee reuenged, the which hee puts for a great good. Wherefore *Homer* made *Achilles* to say, that choller disperseth it selfe in a great courage, more sweetely then honny.

For as much then as what we remember or hope for, as a thing pleasing and sweete vnto our thoughts, excites ioy in our hearts, therefore most of the desires of men are accompanied with some Plea-

*sure* and delight: For when as they remember how they haue plaied, or when as they imagine after what manner they hope to play, they feele a sensible content and a new ioy, which represents vnto them the image of the true enioying. As it happens to those which haue drunke with delight during a burning Feuer, for they haue a certaine kind of ioy when as they remember to haue so drunke; or when as they promise vnto themselues to drinke againe after the same manner.

So they that are tormented with *Loue*, be it that they speake of the party beloued, bee it that they write or make verses of that subiect, they feele a wonderfull content,



tent, for that in all those things, they conceiue that whom they loue is before their eyes, as in their thoughts.

Wherefore they hold it for a certaine signe of *Loue*, when as any one afflicts himselfe for the absence of another, and when he takes *Pleasure* in the teares and complaints of their separation. And it is certaine, that euen in cares and vexation, there is also a content in the teares and sighes wee powre forth for the absence of that wee loue.

There is doubtlesse a griefe for that we see not the party wee *Loue*; but there is also a sweetnesse, for that her image presents it selfe vnto our thoughts, and sets before

vs all the motions, gestures, actions, speeches, smiles, grace, sport, and whatsoeuer wee haue obserued in her when shee was truely present.

Reuenge also, as wee haue formerly toucht, is a sweete thing, the which doth well appeare by her contrary; for if wee see that wee cannot reuenge the iniury which hath beene done vs, and which hath inflamed our *Choller*, wee feelee a wonderfull discontent: whereas wee are transported with ioy when as wee hope and see some appearance of reuenge.

Moreouer, it doth much content, and giue a singular pleasure, not onely to the ambitious, but indifferently

to al sorts of persons, to vanquish and surmount those, against whom they haue any contention or dispute: for in this concurrence it seemes they dispute of the excellency and superiority, and that it is as it were, adiudged to him that obtaines the victory: and all men liuing, bee they great, meane, or base, desire, (though some more ardently, and others with lesse *Passion*) to excell and surmount others. By this reason we finde there is pleasure in sports, in which there is any cōtention, as at *Chesse*, *Tennis*, *Cards*, and *Dice*; and likewise in more serious exercises where there is any dexterity to obtaine the victory; as in fighting at barriers, running at the Ring, and

and Tilt, or such like. Whereof some are pleasing as soone as they apply themselves vnto them, and others growe pleasing by custome: as for example, they that giue themselves to the exercise of hunting, although it bee somewhat violent; yet they receiue a singular content; for that they must fight against sauage beasts, and aspire to get the victory. And according to that which wee haue said, that victory breeds delight, it is easie to iudge why the exercises of schooles, disputations among learned men, and the pleading of Lawyers at the barre, giue a content to them that imploy themselves: the reason is, for that in these exercises, there is also an image of victory

tory which presents it selfe vnto our eyes.

Glory in like manner is in the rancke of those things, which causeth delight and *Pleasure*; for that it consists in a certaine opinion, to be more eminent, and more excellent then other men, by reason of the esteeme the world makes of vs: for euery man imagines himselfe to bee such as others esteeme him; especially, if they bee men which he holds to be full of truth. Wherein wee giue more credite to neighbours then to those which are remote, who can haue no exact knowledge of our merit. And wee referre more to our fellow Citizens, to our household seruants, and to our familiar friends, then vnto stran-

strangers : yea , wee yeelde more to them that liue, then to posterity : we esteem more the iudgement of wise men, then of them that want wit ; and we preferre the testimony of many , before the applause of some few particulars : for that it seemes they whom we preferre, for the aboue mentioned reasons, are better informed of the truth, and more to bee credited in their dispositions. Wherefore wee are better satisfied and contented, to bee in reputation with them, then with the rest of the world : for no man cares to be honored by such as are contemptible, and not regarded.

Wherefore if we hide our selues from Infants or beasts, it is not for any fear of shame  
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we haue of them, seeing wee know they are without iudgment, and cannot dishonor vs. It is also a sweete thing to haue a friend, seeing that the very action of Loue, what objects soeuer she propounds vnto her selfe, is wonderfully pleasing. For no man loues wine who takes not delight to drinke it. No man delights in Armes which takes no pleasure in the exercise; no man loues *Philosophy* which is not pleased to discourse thereof. In like manner no man loues another, but hee takes pleasure in his friendship.

And moreouer, it is a sweet thing to see himselfe beloved, for it is as it were a preface, that hee is indued with qualities which makes a man  
louely,



lously, and to be esteemed by such as haue any feeling of reason. Also euery man thinks he is beloued for the loue of himselfe: The which puffes him vp, and makes him more glorious, & by consequence, fuller of content. For the same reason it is a sweete thing to excite admiration of vs in the hearts of men, for that the honor they yeeld vs, maks vs to haue a good conceit of our selues, which fills vs with ioy and *Pleasure*: In regard whereof, flatterers charme our mindes, for that these kinde of people offer themselues vnder a shew of friendship, and admirers of our vertues. Moreouer, it is a sweete thing to doe an action often that pleaseth vs, for that custome makes things

things easie vnto vs, & consequently pleasing.

Change is also delightfull vnto vs; for that it is as it were, an imitation of nature, which is pleased in variety, & in the diuersity of things: for that which persists alwayes in one sort, frames an importune custome in its subiect, which continuing too long, comes to corrupt. Wherefore it was wisely said that alterations and changes make all things more sweete and pleasant to our senses. So as they also which come againe by interualls and respits, are more pleasing vnto vs: as the returne of the Spring after the sharpenesse of winter, and the arriual of our friend after a long voyage: for that these things  
are

are not onely done with a change which causeth delight, but also for that they happen rarely, and not at all times, nor in all seasons. Moreouer, it is a great content to behold things which giue vs a subiect of admiration: for the wonder which they stirre vp in our soules, inflames vs, and makes vs desire to know them, and the cause of our admiration. But wee cannot learne any thing of that wee desire to know, but with extreame *pleasure*; seeing it is as it were, to mount vp to the highest degree of our nature, and to eleuate it to her perfection: wherefore this admiration causeth ioy.

Againe, they be things full of sweetnesse and *Pleasure*, to impart

impart and to receiue benefits; for that in receiuing you obtaine that which men desire; and by giuing, you shew your selfe to haue that which others want, and that you exceede them therein; the which we see with delight as a marke of our excellency. And as to do good is a sweet thing, it followes, that it is pleasing to ease the misery of another, to draw him out of captiuitie, and to change the face of his fortune, by making him happy, who was formerly miserable.

And for that any thing that breedes admiration in our soules, and giues vs any subiect to learne, is followed with pleasure: it therefore happens, that whatsoeuer consists in imitation, brings con-

contentment, as painting, caruing, and Poesy, which are all professions whose exercises are pleasing, although the things which they imitate be not alwayes delightful. As for example, the painter leaues not to please himselfe in his Art, although he drawes the portraict of a Moore: Nor the Carueto content himselfe in his work, although he cut a *Chimera*, or that he fashio a monster: nor a Poet forbeares not to take delight in his verses, although they bee made vpon a Mushroom, a Sparrow, a flea, or some such ridiculous subiect: for that which stirres vp pleasure in the spirit of man, is not the obiect, which hath propounded it selfe, but the knowledge and iudgement  
he

hee makes to haue so well exprest this obiekt, as his industry approcheth neere the truth, and is a liuely Image: For that this perfect resemblance betwixt the Image and the Originall, teacheth him some thing which hee knew not before; and withall, it makes him see his industry, and his labour, whereby he enters into admiration of his worke, and pleaseth himselfe to beholde the perfection of his Arte.

For the same reason, the euent of things not hoped for, nor expected, and the care to bee freed from those wherein there are great dangers, are accompanied with ioy, for that they happen not without amazement.

In

In the meane time (for that we haue said, that what is cōformable to the inclinations of nature, is pleasing) we see, that the things which are tied by any bond of Nature, & that haue any affinity one with another, as those which are of one kinde, or which haue any other naturall conformity, are delighted in the company one of another: as Eagles loue Eagles, Lions take pleasure to bee among Lions; and men loue to see themselves among men: and for that euery thing loues that which resembles it. All men loue themselves, althogh some with more vehemency then others; and by consequence they commend their owne workes, they esteeme their discourses, they loue common-



commonly flatterers, who praise them, they are passionate for glory, for their friends, and for their children who are (as wee may say) their owne workes.

And by the same reason they are pleased to finish that which they haue begunne; which is to giue perfection to the labour of their hands.

Wisedome which consists in the knowledge of many excellent & admirable things, procures ioy to him that is adorned, for that it raiseth him aboue the ordinary of men, and giues him a kind of power ouer others, which man desires naturally; and for that men are naturally ambitious of honor, they take delight to shew their authority in commanding others,

thers, and in reprehending them, they make demonstration that they cannot allow of their actions.

Moreoue, rman hath a singular delight to praetize those things wherein he thinkes to excell; for he is neuer tired to shew his industry, & doth willingly spend dayes and nights to become more perfect and to exceed himselfe. The which we haue seene in *Apelles, Zeuxis, Protogenes*, and other excellent Painters of antiquity. Finally, for that the sports and recreations of the minde are pleasing, and that wee take delight to laugh, and to spend the time Iouially, it followes that all the things which may serue to that end, as iesters, their actions and words, giue vs  
con.

content, and procure delight to behold them.

These in some are the objects of *Pleasure*, which wee seele in this life; we must now see what kind of *Pleasures* are allowed, and which are iustly forbidden. For the explaining whereof, we must vnderstand that there haue beene *Philosophers*, who not knowing how to set a difference betwixt the vnderstanding and the senses, and imagining there were no other *Pleasures* but those of the body, haue condemned them generally as detestable and pernicious. But they had no reason for their assercion, seeing there is not any man that can liue without some kind of sensible and corporall *Pleasure*; seeing the author of nature

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hath vnited this kind of *Pleasure* and sweetenesse to the actions of this life, to the end wee might with more courage indure the toyles and paines, and that they might bee as salt which seasoneth meate, and which makes it more pleasing to our taste. Wee must then know that *Pleasure* being a rest of the soule which she hath gotten by some kind of operation, there are some which being conformable to the rules of reason, and to the eternall law which God hath established among his creatures, cannot be held bad, but are meerely innocent; as those which God hath tied to the procreation of children, when as they are tasted in a lawfull marriage, such as hee  
hath

hath ordained for the preservation of mankind. Yet we must confesse, that the discordes of men do commonly peruert the vse, not keeping theselues within the bounds of reason nor of the law of God; the which is visible in the excesse they commit in drinking, and eating, in women, perfumes, play, dancing, and other *Pleasures* of the body, which are seene at this day to be no other then subjects of offence: whereby we may see how infamous the opinion of the *Epicures* was, (from the which notwithstanding many great Personages did beleeue that *Epicurus* himselfe much dissented, affirming that hee made no account but of the *Pleasures* of the mind,) who with a visible

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sible reproach to humane nature, haue placed the soueraigne good of man in the *Pleasure* of the senses, which notwithstanding are common with brute beasts. In like manner wee may gather what wrong they did vnto vertue, who by a notable effeminacy, represented the image of *Pleasure* sitting in a throne like a great Queene, which had vnder her the virtues, as slaues to attend her commandements.

As if a man in the course of this life, should haue no other object in all his actions, yea in the most vertuous, then the satisfying of his *Pleasures*, and the contentment of his senses. Our resolution then is, that we must not imagine that all the *Pleasures*

*Pleasures* of the senses are to be rejected as pernicious, neither all to be embraced as beames of our soueraigne good.

But as *Pleasure* is a rest and contentment to the soule, which enioyeth some good whereof she tastes the sweetness; if it be an absolute good without exception, the *Pleasure* is innocent and allowable to man. But if it be a good pleasing only to the senses, and contrary to the rules of reason, and the law of God, as the *Pleasures* of the flesh out of a chaste marriage; the effect is pernicious, and the enioying damnable.

But for that we haue formerly sayd, that *Pleasures* regard either the remembrance



of that is past, or the enioying and feeling of a present good, or the hope of a future, it shal bee fit to shew which makes the most powerfull impression in our senses, and delights vs most. We must then know that *Pleasure* taking her beginning in our soules, by the presence of a good which incounters our senses, or which vnites it selfe vnto vs by some other meanes, this presence or imaginary good is framed by the simple knowledge, and the only Idea which wee haue of this good, so as the objects wherof we haue knowledge, make an impression of their formes in our soules: or else this presence consists in a real vnion of the good with our senses, whether that wee do  
actu-

actually enjoy it, or that we have a certaine hope to get it.

Wherefore as the reall vnion of the object with the power is greater and more strict then that which is but imaginary; and as the actual vnion is stronger then that which is but in power, we must necessarily conclude, that the sweetest *Pleasure* is that which proceeds from the feeling and actual enjoying of the good which is really present with our senses.

But the ioy which springs from hope is greater, and the *Pleasure* more sweete, for that in this kind of ioy, there is an vnion betwixt our soule, and the good which pleaseth vs; Not only according to

the imagination, which represents vnto vs the perfecti-  
ons, but also with this con-  
dition, that the possession  
is in our power, for that  
otherwise wee could not  
hope for it. Wee put in  
the last rancke the *Pleasure*  
wee feele of good things  
which are past as the least  
of all, for that those good  
things not being vnited to  
our senses, but by the imagi-  
nation and memory, which  
is the weakest vnion that  
can bee betwixt our senses  
and the objects which de-  
light them; the ioy which  
we receiue must also be lesse  
sensible.

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*Of the effects of Pleasure.*

CHAP. 2.

**T**He effects which arise from the *Pleasure* we conceiue of the objects which are delightfull to our sense, may be better vnderstood by experience, then expounded by words. First of all, there is not any man which doth not feele in the midst of the ioy which hee receiues, his heart to dilate it selfe and as it were open with gladnesse, from whence it sends the signes & tokens to the countenance, by the laughter which it cries vp in the mouth,

mouth, where it causeth a visible change. They that are tender hearted, are apt to receiue the impressions of ioy and heauines, like vnto soft wax, wherein they do easily imprint the formes which are laid vpon them. They that haue them firme and hot by reason of the heate, conceiue ioy easily, & by reason of their constancy preferue it longer.

Whereas contrariwise they that haue it cold and hard, are capable of heauinesse & melancholly, which makes an impression easily, by reason of the coldnesse, with the which she hath an affinity, & maintaines it selfe long by reason of the hardnesse, as we see happen vnto melancholly men. For sadnesse is an earth-  
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*Passion* cold and dry, whereas ioy is moist and hot. And therefore it is easily framed in the hearts of children, of young men, and of those which are of a good complexion: from this ioy which makes the heart to spread and dilate it selfe like vnto a flower, growes laughter, which is no *Passion*, but an exterior effect of an interior *Passion*.

For the sweetnesse of *Pleasure*, makes the heart to moue and open to receiue the forme, euen as when wee go to meete a friend, and open our armes when he presents himselfe vnto vs. And this his motion and interior ioy ascends vp vnto the countenance, but it appeares chiefly in the opening of the mouth,

mouth, whereas laughter is framed, and hath his seate, & from thence disperfeth it self to the eyes and the rest of the face, although that some hold it hath his seate within man, and about his heart. But to take away all kind of difficulty, wee must vnderstand that sometimes laughter comes meereley from a corporall motion, as that which proceeds from the tickling of the arme holes, so as there haue bin scene sword players die laughing, for that they haue beene wounded in that place.

Sometimes it riseth from indignation and despight, which we haue conceiued of any thing we behold vnwillingly; as we reade of *Hannibal*, who seeing the *Carthaginian*.



*ginians* lament their estates, for that the *Romaines* were maisters of their fortunes, beganne to laugh: whereat one being amaz'd, said vnto him, that it was an act of great inhumanity to laugh at the teares of his fellow Citizens; to whom he answered, that this laughter was no signe of his ioy, but a token of his despight, for that he scorned the fruitlesse teares of those, who lamented rather their particular losse, then the misery of their common weale. But when it is an effect of our passion, and a signe of pleasure which our heart receiueth from pleasing objects, which present themselves vnto our senses: it comes from a quicke and suddaine motion of the soule, which desiring

desiring to expresse her ioy, excites a great abundance of hot blood, and multiplies the vitall spirits, which agitate and stir vp the muscles which are about the heart, & those raise vp the muscles which are of either side of the mouth, which vpon this occasion opens with a visible change of the whole forme of the face. But it riseth from the pleasure and ioy which our soule conceiueth, by reason of the pleasing objects which present themselves vnto our sense.

It is certaine that as new things and not expected, prouoke most ioy in our hearts, so they stirre vs vp sooner to laughter. For proof whereof, hauing once accustomed our selues to see spectacles

tacles and sights, how pleasing soeuer they be, they doe not moue vs to laugh, as they did when wee first behelde them. And in like manner profound cogitations and meditations, hinder laughter: wherefore wise men doe not laugh so easily as others, as well for that they haue alwayes their spirits busied and imployed about some serious meditations, which will not suffer them to regard such triuiall things as commonly make the *Vulgar* to laugh: As also for that the great knowledge they haue of things, hinders them from esteeming many of those things newe or strange, which the common sort admire. And withall, their complexion doth contribute

tribute thereunto: for that most commonly it inclines to melancholy, which makes them pensive, and more difficult to moue to ioy.

The reason why many things please at the first approach, and afterwards lose this grace by custome and continuance, proceeds from nothing else, but that at the first sight our thought is tied vnto it with a certaine vehemency, which yeelding by little and little, makes the pleasure decay. The which is not onely seene in the objects of the sight, whereof our eyes growing weary by little, begin to slacke in their action, and to become more negligent in beholding them; but also in the objects of all the other senses, wherewith  
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our soule is loathed in the end after too long a continuance. The reason is, for that as in the action of the eyes, the vitall spirits consume by the vehemency of the attention: so in all other operations of the senses, the disposition of the Organs alter, and are changed by the motion, and by the impression which the objects that vnite themselves vnto our senses, make: so as it is impossible that the creature should long enioy one kinde of pleasure, or suffer the same grieffe.

And moreouer, as we haue sayd before, that diuersity, as an Image of the changes of Nature, is pleasing; hath also a place in this subiect: for that men are weary alwayes to enioy the same pleasures,  
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and see the same objects. Wherefore the continuance causeth distaste, how sweete soeuer the possession be. And therefore *Lucian* brings in a man, who beeing made a god, was weary of his diuinity, and desired to dye, that he might bee no more: and his reason was, that the life of men did not seeme tedious vnto him, but onely for that hee still beheld the same things, one Sunne, one, and the same Moone; the same Starres, the same meates, and the same *Pleasures*, which change not their face: wherefore, sayd he, tasting nothing but the same thing in this Diuinity where I am, I am weary, and thereupon would needes dye to change. Moreover, there are men who are  
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wonderfull sensible of ioy, which bee they to whom all things seem new, as children, and the ignorant multitude, whom any sights prouoke to laugh: whereas wise men are nothing mooued. The complexion doth also helpe much to ioy, as they which abound in blood, and haue it not cholericke and adust, but pure and sweete, are Iouiall by nature, and loue to laugh. Whereas mellancholy men are hardly mooued to ioy.

The delight or pleasure which wee conceiue of the objects, which are agreeable vnto vs, doth vsually stirre vp in vs an ardent desire, and as it were, a thirst of a new, or a more full enioying. The which proceedes either from  
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the condition of the thing which is not capable to satisfie our desire at one instant.

As we see in drinking and eating, to which we must returne diuerse times to entertaine life: Or from the imperfection of enioying, as they which haue but tasted the first sweetnes of friendship, desire to haue a fuller content: Like vnto those which loue Poësie, who hauing heard a peece of a goodly verse, such as *Vergil* wrote, wish to heare the rest to make their pleasure perfect; Or else it growes from the nature it selfe of *Pleasure*, which is so sweete as it inflames the soule to desire the continuance: The which is seldome scene in the pleasures  
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of the senses and of the body, but which is felt with infinite delight by those which drink of that torrent of *Pleasure*, which the Scripture describes vnto vs in heauen; for they drinke eternally, and are neuer satisfied.

We must also remember, that there is great difference betwixt the *Pleasures* of the senses, and of the minde; for the delights of the senses charging and as it were importuning our naturall dispositions, becomes troublesome and tedious; as it falls out when we suffer our selues to be surprized with the excessse of eating and drinking. Whereas those of the mind neuer exceed the carriage nor capacity of the naturall disposition of the soule, but rather

ther adde perfectiō to her nature: wherefore when they are fully enjoyed they delight most. And if there be at any time a distaste, it is for that the actiō of the mind is accompanied with the action of the inferior powers, the which being corporeall, they are tired with the cōtinuance of so long an imployment. Wherefore they call backe the spirit that it may giue some rest vnto the body. And doubtlesse it is the onely reason why those happy soules are neuer weary to behold the diuine Essence, for that the contemplation of this pleasing obiect doth not ouercharge nor weaken the spirits, but doth ease and fortifie them. And moreouer, the doth not worke by the meanes of the senses, and corporeall

poreall Organs, which are subiect to grow slack in their actions.

I might adde, that this happy contemplation of the diuine Essence, is alwayes accompanied with new subjects of admiration, in regard wherof, it can neuer be troublesome: and moreouer, although the obiekt bee soueraignely simple, yet it comprehends all the good things which may fall into the thought or desire of man, so as it can neuer cause any distaste: But this belongs vnto another discourse.

The pleasure of the senses produceth a pernicious and dangerous effect in vs; it binds our reason and takes away the vse, the which happens by three occasions. The first,

first, for that imploying the soule wholly in the feeling and enioying of the sweetnesse which doth accompany it, she retires it from the consideration of all spirituall goodnesse, and makes it lesse capable of reason, in regard of the heate of the passion which doth agitate it. Secondly, for that most part of the pleasures of the body, at the least when they tend to excesse and disorder, are contrary to the motions of reason. And it is an vndoubted truth, That one contrary doth alwayes expell and destroy another; wherefore pleasure yeeldes no place to the motions of Reason. The which made *Aristotle* to say, that although that pleasure corrupts not the Theory and  
simple

simple knowledge wee haue of things; as for example, she doth not hinder vs from knowing, that a Triangle hath three corners, and that the whole is bigger then its parts distinctly comprized; yet shee depraues the iudgement, and hinders the esteeme wee should make by the lawes of wisdom, of that which is good; For that although we know well that temperance is a vertue, yet we flie it, for that it is cōtrary to the pleasures of our senses, which suffers vs not to esteeme it as we ought. The third is for that the pleasures of the senses cause a greater and a more violent alteration and change in our bodies, then that of the other *Passions*.

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The reason is, for that wee imbrace with more vehemency, and tie our selues more strictly to the objects which please vs, when they are present, then when they are absent. These changes and sensible alterations in the body, cause trouble to the soule: As it appeares in those which are surprized with wine, in whose actions there is no shew of reason; the excesse of wine hauing altered their braine, and made them incapable of the functions of the mind. But honest and moderate *Pleasure*, addes perfection to her actions, as beauty and a good grace giues the last ornament to youth; as well for that she is the end and scope which wee propound vnto  
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our selues when we meane to worke: as also for that shee makes her actions agreeable by the content she ingrafts in our senses: So as to entertaine this *Pleasure* shee causeth vs to imploy our selues with more heate and attention to accomplish them. Wherefore an Ancient sayd, that nature had ioyned *Pleasure* to actions necessary for the entertainment of the life of creatures, or for the preservation of their kinds, as eating, drinking, and generation, to the end it might bee as salt which seasoneth meate: That is to say, to the end it might make those actions delightfull, and that the creatures might not bee drawne vnto them with distaste. And touching that

which concerne the allurements and inticements of honest *Pleasures*, we must still remember the wise counsell of *Aristotle*, who perswades vs not to obserue them at their first approach, but at their parting; for that although the entry bee sweete and pleasant, the end is alwayes bitter and tragicall. They say that among the *Pagans* there was a Temple of *Diana*, whose image did shew a sadde and seuer countenance to those that entred to worship it, but at their departure it seemed more pleasant and smiling: But it is contrary in *Pleasures*, for at their first approach they present nothing but roses and sweete contents; and in the end they leave vs nothing  
but

but thornes and importune griefes; especially for that they diuert vs from the soueraigne Good, and from the loue of spirituall delights, without the which our soules can finde no solide nor soueraigne content.

Of Griefe and Heauinesse.

CHAP. I.



**A**S among all creatures there is not any one exposed vnto so many outrages of Fortune as man, whom we may rightly tearme an image of misery and weaknes: So it is most certaine, that there is not any *Passion* wherewith hee is more afflicted in this

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life, then with *Griefe* and *Sorrow*, whose objects present themselves continually to his sense and mind. Wherefore although that by the light which we finde in contrary things when they are opposed, and compared one with another, we may iudge of the condition of *Griefe* and *Sorrow*, by that which we haue spoken of *Pleasure* and *Delight*; yet for a more ample knowledge of a thing which is so common vnto vs, it shall be fit to treat more exactly vpon this subiect. *Griefe then is a violent Passion of the Soule, entertained by some sensible discontent: Or else, Griefe is a torment of the mind and body: Or againe, Griefe is a Passion of the mind afflicted by some kind of euill which presents it selfe:*

*selfe : Or to describe it more particularly; Griefe is a Passion of the Soule, which riseth from a discontent she receiveth from objects contrary to her inclinations, which present themselves unto the senses, and afflict them.*

But wee must obserue that there are two kinds of *Griefe*: The one which resides in the sensuall *Appetite*; and the other hath his seate in the rationall. This last which afflicts the minde, is properly called heauines, and differs from the other, for that a sensible *Griefe* is alwayes accompanied with a visible alteration and change of the body which is moued; whereas the *Griefe* of the mind hath not alwayes an agitation of the body, but

most commonly containes it selfe within the bounds of the power where it is framed; in regard whereof it is sometimes attributed to God and the Angells. These two kinds of *Griefe* differ also one from another, for that the cause of the sensible *Griefe* resides in the body, which suffers some violent impression that alters it. But the cause of the intellectuall *Griefe* resides in the ratiōnall part and in the mind, which represents vnto it selfe the euill which she receiues from the obiects which present themselves vnto her thought. They differ againe, for that the apprehension and knowledge which the exterior senses haue of things, they do only regard the present ob-  
iects

iects which make an actuall impression in them; but the vnderstanding not only conceiues things present, but euen those that are past, and which may happen, or fall vnder the imagination of man. Hence it comes that corporeall *Griefe* which followeth the apprehension, which present things make in the senses, growes onely from the presence of obiects contrary to their inclinations.

Whereas the *Griefe* of the mind following the knowledge of the vnderstanding, may grow from obiects that are present, past, or to come, and from those which man doth presuppose may succeed vnto him. So as the noblest powers of our soule,



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and those which are the richest ornaments of our nature, as the vnderstanding, imagination, and memory, helpe to increase our paines, and to augment our afflictions: As if the presence of heauen which giues vs some prerogatiue ouer beastes, should make vs more miserable. For the most sauage beastes flie dangers, when as they present themselues vnto their eyes: But being escaped they remaine quiet and assured; whereas we not only torment our selues for the euill which doth oppresse vs; but euen for which is not yet happened.

But you must vnderstand that to speake properly, *Griefe* which is one of the *Passions* of the soule, is that which

which is framed in the *sensitive appetite*, with a visible alteration of the body, which is agitated and moued exteriorly by the euill or paine which it suffers : So as the cause doth reside in the body which receiues some kind of outrage. But the motion of *Griefe* is alwayes framed in the soule, for that the body is not capable but by the presence of the soule. Wee must also remember, that as to excite *Pleasure* in our senses, the pleasing object must not only be vnited, but also knowne and perceiued by the senses, as we haue formerly obserued ; so to cause *Griefe*, the afflicting object must touch our senses, so as by the impression it makes, they must perceiue that it is paine-

full. For it is certaine that as there is no good but that which is sensibly present, can cause *Pleasure* to the senses, so there is not any but a present euill can procure a sensible *Griefe*. But vnder the object of *Griefe* we comprehend not only the euill which afflicts vs, but also the good which we haue lost. For euen as the weight of bodies causeth that not only they haue an inclination to rest in the center, but also is the cause that they are neuer farre remote without suffering a visible violence in their nature: So men are naturally carried not only to *Loue*, but with a sensible *Griefe* of their losse. So the couetous man torments himselfe for the losse of his wealth; The voluptuous is grieved

griued to see an end of the  
objects of his content; The  
mother afflicts her selfe for  
her only son: & we see many  
who after good cheare, great  
feasts, and dancings, hauing  
spent the time in all  
kind of *Pleasures*, suddenly  
grow heavy and pensue; and  
yet can giue no reason of  
this sudden change, which  
proceeds only from the dis-  
quietnesse of our minds,  
which grieues at content-  
ments past, and afflicts it  
selfe, the which makes him  
heavy; and this heauinesse  
conuerts into melancholy,  
which augments his anguish,  
and torments him without  
any other forme of euill, that  
presents it selfe vnto his sen-  
ses. As for the causes of *griefe*  
and *Heauinesse*, being consi-  
dered

sidered in regard of their subiects where they encounter, we obserue three. For first of all, our *Cupidities* and *Desires*, do many times cause great vexation and discontent, as when any one is surprized with the *Loue* of a pleasing obiect, if they hinder the enioying, or but only delay the possession, they are so many thornes of *Griefe* which pierce his soule. For as the hope to obtaine the possession causeth *Pleasure* and *Delight*; so the despaire to attaine vnto that we passionately desire, giues cruell afflictions and insupportable torments.

Moreouer, the *Loue* wee beare to the preservation of our being, doth oftentimes cause sorrow and heavinesse,  
for



for that we apprehend the destruction; euen as wee see all creatures afflict themselves for that which offends them, and are very carefull to shelter their bodies from all outrage. Wherefore we may say, that *Griefe* is no other thing, *but an apprehension and feeling of the destruction of our good, which makes vs impatient.* Thirdly, the soule helps to afflict herselfe, whether that melancholy workes this effect, or that the continuall afflictions oppresse her in such sort, as she doth nothing but sigh vnder the burthen of *sorrow*, and like vnto a bad *Pilot* which abandons his ship to the waues and storme, shee suffers herselfe to be so overcome with *Griefe*, as she augments her owne paine and increaseth

creaseth her misery. For we often see men who in the midst of their afflictions and discontents do nothing but sigh and powre forth teares, and will not yeeld themselves capable of any kind of consolation. But although wee shew our selues more sensible of the *Griefe* of the senses, then that of the mind, yet it is most certaine, that the interior *Griefes* which afflict the soule, are much greater then the exterior paines which torture the body. For that the apprehension of the mind and imagination, is much more powerfull, and more noble then that of the senses, and especially then that of feeling which hath the greatest share in corporeall paines. For  
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prooffe whereof, wee see great courages to auoyd inferior *Griefe*, expose themfelues voluntarily to the exterior paines of torments and punishments, which are in some fort pleasing vnto them, for that the interior ioy doth mollifie their paine: Whereof wee haue glorious examples in the constancy of our Martyres, who to auoyd the blame and aspersiō which had bene layd vpon them, to haue offended God in burning incense to Idolls, haue exposed themfelues to the fire, to tortures, to wheelles, and to the rage of wilde beasts, for that they would not bee subiect to that ignominious reproach.

Finally, heauines hath troublesome effects, for that  
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first of all, if it be excessiue, it quencheth the spirit, and takes from it all meanes to attend the search of truth. The reason is, for that all the powers of our soule, being tied vnto their essence, as the branches vnto the tree, it doth of necessity follow, that when shee is wholly busied in the functions of one of her powers, shee abandons the rest, and cannot assist them in their actions.

Wherefore when as any thing drawes the soule wholly vnto it, and imployes her whole action, shee cannot attend any thing else: by consequence whereof, an exceeding heauines seazing vpon her, it drawes her away; so as shee cannot thinke of any thing else, feeling her selfe oppressed

opprest with *Griefe* as with a heauy burthen, which beares her downe and hinders the liberry of her functions. It is therefore generally true, that there is no action of the soule whereunto heauines is not a hindrance and let. The which we find verified in our selues, for wee neuer do any thing so well being posselt by cares as when we are in ioy; whereof the reason is visible; for that the will is the cause which excites vs to act, the which hath the good for object, and makes the more powerfull effect, when it appeares pleasing and is accompanied with delight. It is true, that when there remains any hope to surmount the causes of our displeasure, then heauines may serue

serue to fortifie our action and to inflame our courage; for that the more we feel any *Griefe*, the more wee strue to bee freed from it. But if there be no hope remaining, we become as it were senselesse, and abandon our selues in prey to *Griefe*.

We flee the company of men, we hate the light, we find the comforts and consolations of our friends importune, and we haue no content but to feed our selues with bitternesse. Besides the torments which heauines giues vnto our spirits, she doth also produce fearefull effects vpon our bodies; for that it is a maligne, colde and dry *Passion*, which wasteth the radicall humor, and by little and little quenching the naturall

turall heate of the body, thrusts her poyson euen vnto the heart, whose vigor shee causeth to wither, and consumes the forces by her bad influence; whereof wee see the signes after death, when as they come to open those that haue beene smothered with melancholy. For instead of a heart, they find nothing but a drie skinne like to the leaues in Autumne. So as all things exactly considered, we may say, that there is not any thing that doth so much aduance our dayes as this cruell *Passion*, which thus consumes our forces, causeth our heart to languish, and makes our life short, but extremely miserable.

There are many remedies against this *Passion*, but most com-



commonly the *Griefe* is so obstinate, as all applications are vnprofitable. To cure it, we must first take away, or at the least diminish the opinion of the euill which afflicts vs: the which is easie to do, seeing it depends of our opinion.

For as dignities, honors, crownes, and triumphs, giue vs no content, but what wee take our selues when as they arriue; for that we haue seene many weepe euen in the midst of all this pompe: so the paines of this life, ignominies, banishment, the losse of goods and kinsfolkes, with all other miseries, afflict vs not extraordinarily, vnlesse wee our selues make them more bitter and violent by our owne weaknesse; for that  
wee

we haue seene many laugh in the midst of all these miseries : wee must then represent these things otherwise then the *Vulgar* esteeme them; for that the true cure of the euill must not bee expected from time, but by our reason, which must preuent it. Otherwise wee shall receiue this disgrace, that it will cause vs to do that we would not, although it were in our power. For there is no *Griefe* so bitter but time doth moderate, seeing that, as wee haue sayd, the greatest pleasures decrease by too long enioying, which causeth our soule to grow slacke; so it is most certaine that excessiue sorrow by little and little decays, by the continuance and custome which the soule takes  
of

of the *Griefe*. The which may also happen, for that time doth change the condition of things and giues them another face, and so doth mollifie or wholly take away the sorrow.

But not to yeeld to the euill when it comes to leaze vpon vs, we must foresee the accidents of this life, not as if they should happen infallibly, for that were to make vs miserable before the time; but as incident to all men, and that being of this number, if any crosse or misery shall fall vpon vs, we may bee the lesse amazed. For the crosses of Fortune which wee haue foreseene, strike vs more gently, and make a weaker impression in our soule: Wherefore a wiseman of the world

world, who had prepared himselfe for all the accidents of this life, receiuing the heavy newes of the death of his sonne, was no otherwise moued, but only sayd, *I knew I had begotten a mortall creature.* Doubtlesse it is the effect of an exact and singular wisdom, to haue this feeling of humane accidents, not to bee amazed at that which happens, nor to see any thing befall him, which he hath not foreseene. So as a wiseman must alwaies remember, that dangers, losses, banishment, infirmities, yea the death of his children, wife, and that which he holds most deare, are things which may happen dayly, and which threaten all men; and therefore if hee bee ex-

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empt, it is the benefite and  
guift of God; and if they be-  
fall him, that they are the mi-  
series of his nature. For ha-  
uing this confideration of  
the common miseries of  
men, he finds himfelfe bound  
to fuffer constantly and with  
patience, the neceffities and  
crosses of this life: Least he  
should feeme to fight againft  
God, who hath layd this  
yoake vpon him, to punifh  
his offences, or to keepe him  
in awe.

But to mollifie our sor-  
rowes, wee must remember  
that the miseries of this life  
giue vs a glorious fubieft to  
exerife our vertue, and to  
fhew our conftancy before  
the eyes of heauen and earth,  
which are wittneffes of our  
combatts. For as Pilots can-  
not

not shew their art and industry but in stormes, nor soldiers giue proofes of their valour but in the midst of dangers: So a vertuous man hath no meanes to make his vertues shine, but amidst the aduersities which befall him in this life; as for example, wee should haue knowne nothing of the great resolution of *Scuola*, if hee had not fallen into danger before the King of the *Tuscans*, who was raiisht with admiration, seeing with what constancy he burnt his own hand, & suffered without amazement the violence of the fire, into the which hee thrust it, for that he had faild of his enterprize. Neither should wee know the notable temperance of *Fabritius*, nor the mo-

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deration he shewed in refusing the gold and presents of *Pyrrhus* King of *Albania*, if pouerty had not bene familiar vnto him. So *Regulus* being pierced with nailes, and torne in pieces with punishments, seruing as a spectacle of the *Carthaginians* inhumanity, purchased an immortal name for his constancy. So *Socrates* seeing himselfe condemned to drinke poyson, and beholding the cup into the which the hangman powred that mortal draught without any palenesse or amazemēt, deserued to be admired by his enemies. After their example, then a wise-man will conceiue, that the afflictions of this life offer him a goodly occasion to shew his constancy, and to make



make his vertues shine; and therefore they shall not be able to afflict him immoderately, nor to torture his minde extraordinarily: But that which should most fortifie him in this thought, is, that God which doth cast him into the middest of these combatts, will crowne his constancy, and not suffer him to remaine without reward. Moreouer, we may also strive to diuert it by some pleasing imployment, which may cause vs to turne our eyes from the fearefull image of the euill which afflicts vs, representing vnto our selues obiects which are more sweet and delightfull, then those which torture vs so cruelly.

Finally, to draw together as it were into one body, all

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the meanes wee haue to charme our cares & griefes; heauines is disperst, ether for that wee see our selues freed from the euill which did persecute vs, or that wee recover the possession of the good which had beene wrested from vs, and wee had lost: or else for that the misery wherewith wee haue beene crost, is as it were recompenced by some other felicities which befall vs; as the sweetnesse of these last contents, takes away all the bitterness of our forepassed afflictions, as would befall him that should be drawne out of prison and from bonds, to be set in a royall throne, and to haue a scepter put into his hand, and a crowne vpon his head.

*Griefe*

*Griefe* is also dispersed by diuertifments, by affaires, by the entertainment of wifemen, by the difcourse of fuch as are learned and feare God, and by the force of our owne iudgement, conceiuing with our felues that we fhould not fuffer any misery to triumph ouer our conftancy; that to fuffer our felues to bee vanquifhed by *Griefe*, were to fhew the weakneffe of our courrage; and that to bee touche with afflictions, is a thing common to all men, but the glory of this conftant oppofitiō, belongs only to an eminent vertue. And laftly, that he who fends vs thefe afflictions, is a Father, and no executioner: That it is that great God, without whole decree there falls not a haire

from our heads, & whose will no man may conradict, vnllesse hee will shew himselfe desperately mad. After all this we must remember, that *Griefe* is neuer cured, but rather inflamed by *Griefe*. And therefore as in other infirmities of the soule, a greater euill makes the lesse to be forgotten, so wee may disperse a present heauinesse, either by shewing that it is not the present misery which we must lament, but others that are more cruell, which threaten vs : As if hee who is afflicted for the losse of his goods bee in danger to lose his life, by publicke iustice : Or else in fortifying our resolutions with a better hope, as in representing vnto himselfe the glory of paradise, after the  
miseries

miseries of this life, and the crownes of heauen after the combatts of the earth. All these things make great impressions in religious soules, capable of the feeling of pitty.

Besides all this, there are remedies which are taken from the objects of the senses, which recreate the mind and body in the midst of *Griefe*. For first, whatsoever delights and giues ioy vnto the senses, causeth ease to the heauinesse of the soule; for that ioy is to the soule that which rest is to the body. So as they which rest repaire their forces, mollifying the paine which hath tyred the; so they which begin to taste any sweete pleasures, feeble their *Griefe* to decay by

little and little, and their heavinessse to vanish away & go to sinoake. Wherefore it is fit to draw them that are afflicted; into the fields, to enjoy a free aire and the sight of heaven.

It is good to shew them haruest, riuers, meadows, and hills; for that these diuerse objects diuert the afflicted soule, and make it forget a part of its *Griefe*, so as all hideous shapes are defaced by the presence of these sweeter objects. Some haue thought that musique comforts and instruments, are fit to charme our melancholies, whereunto they referre that which the Scripture sayth, that *Dauid* by the sound of his harpe did pacifie the euill spirit which tormented *Saule*; but experience

ence hath taught vs, that all these things do many times rather entertaine melancholy! then disperse it. Wherefore in this subiect wee must obserue the nature of the infirmity, and the quality of the musique, which must be cheerefull to driue away heauinesse.

The vse of wine hath also a particular vertue to expell cares: And we haue seene in our time a great Prince desperately afflicted for the death of his only sonne, could finde no other remedy for his *Griefe*, then to vse the strongest wine that could be gotten. The reason is, for that wine being moist and hot, it doth at one instant both water sweetly, and heat that bilious humor, which is



as it were the center & roote whereunto melancholy doth fixe it selfe. Sleepe also and the vse of Bathes, are very be-hooouefull; for that both the one and the other reduce nature to her first habite, and restore her good constitution which *Griefe* had corrupted; the which disperseth heauinesse, and causeth ioy to enter into the afflicted soule.

Teares are also proper to disperse heauinesse: yea wee finde many times in our bitterest griefes, that teares diminish our paine, and mollifie our miseries how sharpe fouer.

The which happens for two reasons: The first, for that the things which are pernicious vnto vs and remaine inclosed within vs,  
hurt

hurt vs more then when they are without : But when wee powre forth teares, we cast out that which afflicts vs, & emptying the humor which oppresseth vs, and smotheres vs within, by this meanes we free our selues from a heavy burthen which lay vpon our hearts, by reason whereof our soule helping her selfe to cast out the enemy of our liuedi- uerts and frees her selfe from the importune thought of *Griefe*, and imployes her imaginatiō in this diuertisement, the which for this occasion is pleasing vnto her, and doth ease her in her afflictions.

The second reason is, for that it is a contentment to man, to do an act befitting the estate wherein hee finds himselfe. So as if amidst  
the

the mourning of our friends, we chance to laugh vnadvisedly, when wee enter into consideration with our selues, this lightnesse doth displease vs, for that laughter agrees not well with mourning; and there is nothing doth accord and concurre better with the condition of miserable men thē teares, wherefore they are pleasing vnto them, and by consequence sweeten their torments.

And not onely the teares which afflicted persons poure forth are sweete vnto thē, but euen those of their friends do comfort them: whereof wee may yeeld two reasons, the one, for that naturally they who grone vnder any burthē, feelee his hand sweete, which labours to discharge them, for  
which

which helpe to support them. So friends from whom pittie and compassion wrest teares in the midst of their friends misery, endeauoring as it were to ease him of the burthen which doth presse him downe, sweeten his paine, and make him endure his affliction with more constancy and resolution. The other, for that he that sees his friends participate with his *Griefe*, knowes thereby that their affections are sound, and that they loue him sincerely; which is the sweetest thing that may happen in this life: wherfore this thought makes his affliction more supportable; whereby hee comforts himselfe in his discontent.

But all these remedies are not so powerfull against *Griefe*,

*Griefe*, as the contemplation of the first truth, which dispersing her beames in our soules, fills them with so pleasing a splendour, as they remaine ravisht with ioy and content. For it is certaine that this kind of contemplation is so sweete and delightfull of it selfe, as it expells and disperseth all his cares and *Griefe* that applies himselfe vnto it. The which shee workes the more powerfully, if the soule be enflamed with the loue of true wisdom, which consists in the contemplation of the first cause, which is God. So as the soule reioyceth in the midst of the afflictions of this life, thinking still of the sweete Idea's of the glory of heauen.

In regard whereof some  
Martyres

Martyres haue giuen a thousand testimonies of ioy in the midst of their torments: And some marching bare-footed vpon burning coales, haue protested constantly and truely, that they thought they trod vpon Roses. But we haue spoken sufficiently of *Griefe* in generall, let vs now come vnto the buddees which she produceth, and to the species in particular, which are containd vnder the generall, as miserie, indignation, enuy, and emulation, without the exp laying whereof this treaty would be imperfect.

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Of

Of Mercy and Indig-  
nation.

## CHAP. 2.



Although there be some *Philosophers* who observing the impression and wound which the pittie wee haue of another mans miseries makes in our hearts, haue absolutely condemned al the motions of this *Passion*, as vnworthy the greatnesse of our courrages: Yet we must confesse, that amidst so many strange accidents which happen in the course of this life, amidst the great poverties and miseries of men, the



the cruel infirmities, banishments, tortures, punishments, shipwracks, burnings, slaughters, and all other calamities aswell priuate as publicke which makes them miserable; they must haue abandoned all feeling of humanity if they should not be toucht with *Griefe* when as these miseries offer theselues vnto their eyes. For notwithstanding the saying of these *Philosophers*, that great spirits in the which vertue hath taken deepe roote, see all things without perturbation, and wipe away the teares of those that weepe without any motion: that is to say, that men perfectly vertuous giue almes to the poore, stretch forth their hands vnto him that is in danger of ship.

shipwracke, vntie the bonds of those that are in seruitude, giue liberty to a sonne for the teares of his mother, interre the bloody carcasle of him who hath bene transpierced with wounds, and yet his heart is not toucht with any feeling of all these miseries; yea and in these accidents they retaine still the same countenance with the which they behold playes & shewes vpon a theater. These are words which haue more shew and pompe then solide truth: Let vs then leaue this inhumaine *Philosophy* which makes men rather stupid then constant, & to become insensible of the miseries of this life; and let vs consider more exactly of the true nature of this *Passion*, which  
giues

gives vs a commendable feeling.

*Mercy is a Griefe or feeling which we haue of another mans miseries, whom we hold worthy of a better fortune.* This feeling and Griefe is framed in our soules, for that we consider, that what hath befallen him may happen to all the world: And particularly for that wee imagine that the like misfortune may overtake vs, or some one of our friends: for it is most certaine that such as feelee their hearts toucht with pittie, must bee in that estate as they thinke that either themselues or their friends may fall into the like accident, and runne into the same misfortune that he hath done, whose misery doth moue them to this

this commiseration. Wherefore first of all, they that are at the height of humane misery, and cannot feare a more wretched condition then that whereunto they are reduced, are neuer toucht with any kind of compassion, for that no kinde of *Griefe* presents it selfe vnto their eies but they think they haue tried it. And also, for that they imagine that all the afflictions which may happen, are as it were mixed with those they suffer. Secondly, they that at the height of worldly felicity, haue no feeling of pittie, but are rather transported with insolency and contempt, then to haue any compassion of the miserable. For imagining themselves to enioy all kind of ioyes

ioyes & contentments, they presume that no disafter can befall them which may ouerthrow their fortunes, for that this confidence is as a part of their felicity.

This second consideration made *Aristotle* to say, that *Mercy* had no place in the diuine Essence; for that it is soueraignely happy, and that nothing is able to trouble or diminish her felicity. But here he considers *Mercy* as a sensible *Passion* which doth moue and mollifie the heart, and doth imprint a feeling of another mans misery in his soule which desires to releue him. And of this sort without doubt there can bee no *Mercy* found in God, who is as free from *Humaine Passions*, as the heauens and planets

nets are exempt from the  
 qualities and impressions of  
 the Elements : but taking  
*Mercy* according to her ef-  
 fect, which is to releue the  
 miserable, were to ruine man-  
 kind which subsists by his  
 bounty, to deny that it is in  
 him: For this soueraigne fe-  
 licity which hee enioyeth  
 from all eternity, without a-  
 ny apprehension that he may  
 euer lose it, doth not hin-  
 der him to releue vs in our  
 afflictions, & to draw vs out  
 of our misery, by the sole in-  
 clination of his bounty, who  
 hath nothing common with  
 the hardnesse of Tyrants, nor  
 with the stupidity of the  
 wretched. But let vs returne  
 to our discourse.

They that are capable of  
*Mercy*, are such as first of all  
 imagine

Imagine themselves to bee  
subiect to the accidents of  
this life, and who haue already  
tried and escaped them,  
or which apprehend to feele  
the rigot. And for this rea-  
son they which haue liued  
long are commonly inclined  
to pittie, both for that expe-  
rience hath taught them  
that neither Diademe nor  
Crowne, nor riches, honors,  
health, nor present prosperi-  
ties, can shelter man from  
the stormes and tempests  
which assaile his life; as also  
for that age filles them with  
iudgement and makes them  
wise, not to trust to fortune,  
which seemes to haue no o-  
ther constancy, but alwayes  
inconstant in the fauours  
which she bestowes vpon vs.  
In like manner men subiect

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to



to infirmities, weake persons and destitute of meanes, who see themselves exposed to all kinds of outrages; yea and learned men who haue the knowledge of the accidents and miseries of this life, are easily moued to pittie, for that they can duely consider of things, and iudge vprightly of the affaires of the world. Wherefore an excellent and wise Romane Captaine, hauing defeated a mighty King of *Macedon* in battaile, when as they brought this miserable Prince prisoner vnto him, hee rose from his seate, and with teares in his eyes went to meet him, as a great personage fallen by some misfortune, or by the wrath of the gods, into that lamentable accident:

And

And hauing cast himselfe at his feete, hee could not endure it, but raisd him vp with all humanity. Afterwards retiring himselfe, and thinking deeply of the miseries of this life, he made a speech vn-to his children and to the young men that were about him, to purge their soules from all insolency and vanity, by so prodigious an example of humane frailty. But wee must returne to our discourse.

They that haue wife, children, and a great number of friends, are also inclined to pity, for that as we haue said, they still apprehend the common miseries, and think that the like misfortunes hang ouer their families. But they that are transported with a

violent *Passion* of *Courage*, *Choller*, or *Hardinesse*, are nothing moued; for that the heate of their blood, and the excesse of their *Passion*, will not suffer them to thinke seriously of these things, and to care for future euent. An extraordinary feare doth also hinder the feeling of pittie, for that they which are seized therewith, being tied to their priuate miseries, haue no time to thinke of another mans. So he that hath lost his children, or seene his house burnt, thinkes not of him that is led to the gallowes, or to bee broken on a wheele.

But we put in the ranke of those which are touched with pittie, those soules which haue not yet lost all feeling of  
man-

mankind, but beleue that there are yet good men liuing in the world. For they that imagine there are no vertuous persons vpon earth, perswade themselues also that all men deserue the miseries they suffer, and by that reason beleue that they are vnworthy of compassion: Whereof we haue a monstrous example in that *Athenian*, who had no *Pleasure* in this world but to see the ruine of mankind. Finally men suffer theselues to be moued to pittie, when as they remember that they haue groned vnder the burthen of afflictions which they see other men endure: Or when as they apprehend the like calamities may befall them or their friends.

But let vs see what things

R 3 are

are worthy of pittie and compassion. They are generally all those which cause *Griefe* to the mind, or torment to the body : Those which take away life ; make families desolate, and cause some great changes and alterations in the fortunes of men. As for example, punishment , violent deaths, disgraces, pover-ty in age, incureable diseases, great languishings, & insupportable want , or extreame pover-ty, treachery, or losse of friends, burnings , and shipwracke , are all miserable things and excite to pit-ty. Wee may also put in this rancke the monstrous deformities of counterfaite bodies, the accidents of limmes lamed, or benumbed , and the ruines which happen to men

men by the treachery of those from whom they should expect all support. Wee may also comprehend the miseries which befall vs often, or which happen after other accidents. And in like manner the benefits which come out of season : As if a Prince should send presents of gold and siluer to one that were dead of hunger.

Finally, it is a miserable thing neuer to haue felt any good or contentment in this life, or if any hath happened, not to haue had meanes to enioy it.

But for that these obiects of misery do not alwayes make an equall impression in our senses, we must now know who they bee whom wee do chiefly pittie, when wee see

R 4 them

them ingaged in any misery. First of all, wee are greatly moued to compassion, and mercy to those persons whom we haue knowne familiarly, and with whom we haue had some kind of friendship, at the least if they be not strictly tied vnto vs by naturall affinity and blood: For as for those which touch vs so neere, we haue a feeling more violent then that of pity. In regard whereof wee reade of *Amasis* King of *Egypt*, who seeing his own son drawne to execution, he neuer shed one teare, as if he had had no feeling; whereas perceiving one of his friends oppressed with pouerty and begging his bread, hee wept bitterly, thinking that teares were not sufficient to witnesse his  
first



first *Griefe*, but they were due vnto the second. In like manner these strange accidents which happen to those of our blood, and which touch vs so neere, are full of horror & amazement, and by their excellence suppress our teares, yea and depriue vs of our speech, as if the spirit were wholly retired to consider of the violence of our *Griefe*; whereas the miseries of our other friends mollifie our courrages, and by the wound they make in our hearts, send teares vnto the eyes, which we powre forth, and are as it were the blood of that part wounded and oppressed with affliction.

Moreover, men haue pittie of those whom they see neere vnto some great misfortune:

R 5

As

As when they are ready to be buried in the waues of the sea by some accident of shipwracke; or of those who are to haue a member cut off, or to receiue some notable violence, yea or some indignity. Particularly men are toucht with pittie, when as they that are exposed to outrages, or endure great calamities, are their equalls in age, in humors, in quallities, in exercise, or in breeding. For all these things make deepe impressions in the thought; that they are subiect to the like miseries; wherefore they are moued to take cōpassion of their miseries, being an ordinary thing to pittie those which suffer any affliction, which we our selues apprehend. And to the end we may be sensible  
in

in the feeling of a misfortune which befalls another, wee must haue it as it were present before our eyes: for that we are not much moued with those miseries whose forme is remote from vs. As for example, wee are not much moued to teares by the relation of the miseries which the slaues of *Byserte* and *Algier* endure.

And in like sort our hearts are not much mollified for any tragicall accident which happened a thousand yeares since, neither do we care much for that which shal succeed after the reuolutions of many ages. Wherefore in old time the *Romans* to moue the Magistrates to mercy, strived to make a more sensible impression of their miseries, by  
call-

causing their wiues, children, and families to come desolately vnto the place of iustice: And as for themselves they appeared in iudgement with garmēts befitting their fortunes, all filthy and torne; they opened their breasts & other parts of their bodies, to shew the wounds they had receiued in the seruice of the common wealth: Yea they caused tables to bee drawne where their misfortunes were painted, the which they presented vnto their Iudges, to the end that hauing before their eyes so mourneful a spectacle, they might take cōpassion of their misery; being most certaine that the voice, attire, carriage, countenance, gesture, and presence, of the miserable, make powerfull impressions

pressions in our hearts, and incite men more to pittie: The which happens for that these things make vs as it were present by the sight of another mans misery. And therefore a bloody roabe, (as that of *Cæsar* murdered in the Senate) being showne to expresse the misfortune of a Prince, did not onely wrest forth teares, but euen inflame the people to reuenge so pitifull an accident. For the same reason wee feele our selues much touched with grieve and pittie, when as wee heare the complaints, sighes, teares, and lamentation, of these which are oppressed by some notable calamity: As when we behold the *Agonies* of those that are exposed to a cruell and shamefull death:  
And

And we are the more moued to pittie and commiseration, when they are worthy and vertuous men, whose vertue and glory past, makes their ends the more lamentable and tragicall,

For this consideration moues vs the more, both for that the euill is neere vs, and that our eyes are spectators, as also for that the Image of their vertue, and the glory of their precedent liues, increaseth the indignity of their punishment.

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Of

Of Indignation.

CHAP. 3.



*A* Mercy or pity is a signe of a good soule, so this other *Passion* which we call *Indignation*, and which is no other thing, but a griewing & repining wee haue at the good Fortune which befallles the wicked, who are altogether unworthy, is very commendable in vs. For as pittie is framed of the Griefe which we feele for the miseries of good men, or who we iudge worthy of better fortunes; so *Indignation* proceeds from the discontent we receiue to see the wicked flourish



flourish and enioy the worldly blessings which they haue not deserued; so as either of these *Passions* is commendable, for that as wee should afflict our selues to see vertuous men ouertaken by misfortunes, from the which their vertue should exempt them; so we should bee greiued to see men execrable for their crimes, aduanced to the height of honors and wordly dignities, which good men should enioy. For whatsoever befalls a man contrary to his merrit, is full of outrage and iniustice; wherefore *Aristotle* did not forbear to say, that *Indignation is a thing which is found euen in the diuinity*, to the which, the prosperities of the wicked cannot be pleasing.

But

But to enter into the matter, you must vnderstand, that as *Indignation* is a grieffe which wee feele, & a despight which we conceiue at the great prosperity of those whom wee hold vnworthy for their crimes, yet this *Passion* is not framed in our soules for all kind of prosperities which may befall them: For that no man hath any reason to bee troubled to see the wicked change their life vnto a better, to imbrace piety, to become iust, valiant, moderate, wise, and adorned with other vertues. Yea, the most innocent soules reioyce whensoever they see a man who was formerly vicious and disordered, become vertuous and temperate. There being no man liuing that is vnworthy of

of vertue, seeing that vertue by her presence doth extinguish vice, and makes man worthy of the blessings of this life; whereas they that are destitute of this ornament, deserue them not. So as if hee who was formerly wicked, becomes vertuous, by this change hee makes himselfe worthy of all good fortune, and therefore if any happen vnto him we should not be griued; as in like manner wee should not take pittie of those who remaine obstinate in their crimes, and glory in their vices.

The goods then which we griue and disdain to see the wicked enioy, are the goods of the body and those which we call of Fortune, that is to say, nobility, beauty, honors, scep-

scepters, Crownes, Empires, and such like. As for example, there is no good man but doth grieue and tremble to see the Tyrants of the East, the cruell and infidell race of the *Ottomans* hold the goodliest scepter, enioy the richest citties, and command ouer the most powerfull prouinces of the world.

And in like manner there are no vertuous soules that can without *griefe & Indignation* see other wicked men to flourish and abound in all forts of honor and riches. But especially our despight is inflamed, when as they are men who haue crept vp to the height of glory in an instant, and when they are very prodigies of Fortune, being aduanced before they were in

a manner knowne to bee in the world, or at the least were in any sort respected. For as for those which hold their Nobility from precedent ages, who are rich by succession and inheritance, and who hold all the advantages they haue from nature, although they be altogether vnworthy, yet wee endure them with lesse impatency then we do new men, who are risen to a monstrous prosperity in one day. The reason is, for that they which enioy their glory and riches from their ancestors, seem to haue nothing but what belongs vnto them by the right of nature and blood; whereas men aduanced to new honors, without merite, seeme to bee rich with the spoyles of vertue,

tue, and to enioy the goods which in no sort belong vnto them.

And for the same reason, although that sometimes the goods of the body, as beauty, health, and disposition, meeting in men which deserue them not, may raise in our soules some clouds of *Indignation* and despight to see these presents of nature so vnworthily prophaned; yet wee do not conceiue so gallina discontent, as when we see them enioy the goods which we call of Fortune, as charges, dignities, offices, the gouernment of state, and the mannaging of great affaires; all which things seeme to bee due to vertue. For this cōsideration it is an insupportable thing, to see a  
man

man of the common sort, wholly destitute of vertue, and full of all vice, attaine to the first dignities of a Realm, and in the twinkling of an eye to become as powerfull as the greatest Princes. And there is no doubt but all good men tremble when they see these prodigious advancements of persons taken from the scumme of the people, without any consideration of merit.

Yea these sudden changes are as it were odious, & contrary to nature which requires time in her actions. And for the same reason wee see, that the people submit themselves willingly vnder the obedience of a Prince who holds the scepter of his Ancestors, and is come to the



the Crowne by the right of  
succession; but when they  
seeke to giue them a new  
maister, which is not issued  
from the extraction of their  
Kings, they cannot endure  
him, but easily shake off the  
yoake, whereunto they haue  
not bene accustomed. And  
in like manner, no man is  
griued to respect them that  
are descended from ancient  
Nobility, but they can hard-  
ly yeeld honor to those whose  
nobility is but newly discou-  
ered. The reason is, for that men  
beleue, that the ancient No-  
bility being in possession of  
this glory, no man should re-  
pine to yeeld him that which  
time hath gotten him, which  
is a right in a manner equall  
to that which nature giues;  
for that the things which we  
enioy

enjoy by a long continuance of yeares, seeme to be gotten and held as it were in propriety, not by the indulgence of men, but by the bounty of nature. And withall that which hath continued so long, hath a greater affinity with the truth, whose lasting is eternall, then that which is but newly sprung vp within few dayes.

But there is one thing that filles our soules with *Indignation*, when as wee see any one enioye those goods, which haue no coherence with his quallity: As when (to the great reproach of piety) wee see a Knight, a Captaine, a Souldier, or any other making profession of armes, to hold bishoppricks, to enioy Abbeyes, and to possesse other dig-

dignities of the Church; we hold this much more vnworthy, then if they gaue the charge of Campe-maisters, and of Colonels of foote or horse to religious men or Bishops: Or if they made a singing man or Clarke of the Kings Chappell, Generall of his armies. Finally, we hold it a thing very vnworthy, to see a yong man inferior in all kind of qualities to a reuerent old man, contest with him of merit and glory; especially when it falles out betwixt men of the same profession, betwixt whom this inequality is remarkeable. And admit they be not men of the same profession, yet we hold it an vnworthy thing that one who is inferior in all poynts to another, should

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contest against him. As if a Musitian would equall himselfe to a President or Counsellor of the Court, remembering not that the charges of Iustice are farre more honorable then the profession of Musicke; this would make all men to tremble which know what difference there is betwixt gold & lead. They which easily conceiue indignation, are first of all men indowed with some eminent quality, who see themselves reiected from dignities and offices, or which see men altogether vnworthy, aduanced to the same honours whereunto they haue attained by their vertue: For doubtlesse it is no iust thing to place so vnequall persons in the same ranke. Moreouer  
ver.

vertuous soules and adorned with bounty, haue a great disdaine to see good men deprived of the iust reward of their vertue, and the wicked raised to honours which they could not hope for. The cause is, for that those soules haue their iudgement pure, and can esteeme things according to their weight and value: And therefore they abhorre vice, and haue vertue in singular recommendation. Againe, they that loue honors and charges, are subiect to indignation, especially when as they aspire to those places which are held by vnworthy persons. In like manner, they that haue a good opinion of themselves, and who beleue they deserue more then all the world besides,

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sides, are subiect to the motions of indignation, when as any one enters into comparison with them. Whereas contrariwise seruile soules, men borne in barbarisme, and grosse spirits, are not transported with any thing, hauing nothing in them that may quicken this passion. Yet there are some which do rather referre the motions of ambitious & presumptuous men to meere enuy, then to a iust indignation: For that indignation being a commendable passion, & which proceeds from the feeling of vertue, it cannot subsist with the vanity and arrogancy which accompany those men, but it must bee another passion which kindles in their soules this kind of despight.

## Of Envy and Emulation.

## CHAP. 4.



**A**S Crocodiles haue their breeding, and liue in the goodliest and richest riuer in the world; and as other venemous beasts are commonly found among the most exquisite and sweetest flowers, whose grace and beauty they pollute and corrupt; so *Envy* which is a venemous and maligne *Passion*, doth commonly assaile the most vertuous men, and such as haue attained to the greatest honor & glory in the world. Wherefore one of the most famous



Captaines of antiquity, being yet in the flower of his age, was wont to say, that he knew he had done nothing that was generous or commendable, for that he did not find any man that did *Envy* him: which shewes that there can be nothing imagined in this world more vniust or more wicked then this infamous *Passion*, which seekes her owne torment, and finds her punishment in the glory and contentments of another.

It is also the reason why men are ashamed to confesse openly that they are troubled with this *Passion*: And being conuicted, they labour to palliate their error, yea, they had rather accuse themselves of all other imperfections

ons then to iustifie this; And therefore they giue it other names, excusing themselves that it is not *Envy*, but *hatred*, *feare*, or *choller*, which transports them: the which is a silent confession they make, that of all the infirmities of the soule, they should most dissemble it, least they expose themselves to a visible shame and disgrace. But before we blame it, we must first know it with her nature and properties.

*Envy* then is a griefe, which is framed in our soules by reason of the prosperities which we see happen to our equalls or such as be like vnto vs; not that wee expect to reape any fruite by our Passion, but for that wee cannot endure the glory of another man without Griefe. It riseth first

betwixt equalls or such as are alike; that is to say, betwixt those of the same blood, of the same age, of the same profession, of the same wealth, and betwixt those that aspire to the same honors. So as we see, kinsmen *Envy* their kinsmen, and are griued at the increafe of their fortunes.

Young men also cannot suffer with grieve that they of their age should be aduanced before them. In like manner *Philosophers* are iealous of the glory of *Philosophers*; and *Painters Envy* the reputation of *Painters*; great Commanders in the warre cannot behold but with impatiency the tryumphes of their companions; rich men in like manner crosse the rising of such

such as are their equals; and finally, they that affect the same offices do what they can to keepe backe their companions. The reason is, for that *Envy* being alwaies accompanied with a certaine competition and contention, which riseth betwixt those that do passionately desire the same thing, it is necessary it should rather be among equals, then where there is no equality nor comparison: for that men being naturally desirous to excell in all things, and to exceed their companions, this desire doth alwayes breed a contention betwixt such as pretend the same thing, and from this contentiō *Envy* is ingendred; and therefore the *Philosophers* did rightly teach, that this

*Passion* was alwayes found among equalls. And therefore they which do much exceed others in glory, being about their *Envy*, feele not themselves to be crost.

And wee obserue that as the Sun at noone day makes no shaddow, so eminent vertues are exempt from the iea-lousies of *Envy*, and yet they cannot auoyd the assaults of *Hatred*. As for example, *Cyrus* and *Alexander* the Great in their ages, and in our time *Henry* the Great being raised to the height of worldly glory, by the greatnesse of their courages haue so surmounted *Envy*, as in the end they found themselves without concurrence: But they could not so vanquish the *Hatred* of the wicked, but they were exposed

fed to their rage: Especially this last, the loue and delight of Princes; whō an execrable parricide depriues of his life, when as the whole world honored his Vallour. Moreover, that which made these inuincible resolutions to triumph ouer *Envy*, was for that no man could contend any more with them of glory, whereof hauing attained the full; despaire to surmount them or to equall them, did shaddow them from the iea-lousie of all the world.

And for the same reason, they which haue attained to that height of glory, seeing their vertue raised and ad-uanced to so high a degree, as all they that would bee their concurrers cannot attaine vnto it, they enuy no man,

man, but rather disdain  
and contemne all the world,  
as incapable to mount vnto  
that height whereunto they  
haue raised themselves. As  
for example; there is no pri-  
uate Knight that doth enuy  
the power and lustre of a  
Kings Diadem, neither doth  
the King enuy his fortune. In  
like manner, there is no Ca-  
puchin, or simple religious  
man, that doth beare enuy  
to the Popes Authority or  
Crowne; or whose condition  
also the Pope doth malice:  
but if by some notable disa-  
ster a potent King or a great  
Bishop should decline, and  
bee reduced to a more base  
fortune and condition, in  
which they that were before  
their inferiors, might hope  
to become their compani-  
ons



ons and equalls; then there were no obstacles, but *Envy* might rise betwixt them, seeing that there might bee a concurrence.

Envy then discovers it selfe betwixt equalls, and those that are alike: the which must bee vnderstood of those which are alike, according to their degrees and power, but are vnlike in their fortunes and prosperities; considering that in this last point, hee which beares envy is alwayes inferior in some kinde to him whom hee envies, at the least, in those things which cause this torment.

In the meane time there is not any thing that doth so much beget *Envy*, as those things which concerne honour.

nour. Whereby the ambitious are perpetually affected, for that they are alwayes in contention with some one for preheminance and glory. Yea, what glory soeuer men enioy, yet for that they imagine the honour they haue not, is due vnto them, and that it is as it were raiisht away by such to whom the world hath giuen it, they doe commonly beare *Envy* to all those that haue any lustre or share of it. They also which haue a conceit of their wisdomes, or which think themselves to bee vertuous, are wonderfully subiect to envy. I say, those that imagine and suppose these things; for that they which are truely vertuous, and truely wise, content themselves with their proper vertue,

vertue, and with their owne  
wisedome, & knowing them-  
selues to be truely worthy of  
honor, affect no other glory,  
neither doe they feede them-  
selues with winde and smoke:  
whereas such as haue but the  
name of wise and vertuous,  
hunt passionately after this  
vanity, and desire to bee ho-  
noured and praised of all the  
world; shewing a wonderfull  
despight against those that  
contemne them: and for this  
reason they are enflamed  
with *Envy* against such as are  
aduanced to great honours.  
Cowardly mindes are in like  
manner subiect to *Envy*, for  
that beeing faint-hearted,  
when as they see things of  
small price shine in others,  
they esteeme them great and  
worthy to bee enuyed: like  
vnto

vnto little children, who seeing a piece of glasse or a pin in the hands of those of their age, afflict themselves, and strue to take it away.

They also which haue attained to some good with wonderfull paine, are enuious to see another attaine vnto the like without any difficulty, and especially if the facility which hee hath found be preiudiciall or dishonorable vnto them. As they which haue spent many yeares to learne painting and Philosophy, enuy such as are growne perfect in a short time, especially when they are to make profession in the same City.

Finally, they against whom we conceiue any *Envy*, must not be farre distant from vs, either

either in place, time, age, dignity, honour, or such like: So as the inhabitants of *Paris* and *France*, doe not enuy those of the great *Cayre* or *China*. In like manner, wee beare no enuy to those who had fauourable fortunes two or three thousand yeares since. Neither doe wee see that Kings enuy the fortune of *Alexander* or of *Cesar*, although they may enter into some emulation of their valour. In like sort, wee enuy not the dead, or those which are not yet come into the world. And there is no apparence that a yong man, though issued from a noble Family, should enuy graue old men, which enter into a Councell of State. In like manner, an Attorney of the Court

Court cannot enuy a Chancelor of *France*, being so farre short of his dignity. Neither doe shepheards enuy the Crownes and Scepters of Kings: nor Merchants malice Generalls of Armies, with whose charges their qualities haue so little proportion. But our Envy is kindled against those, whose glory doth as it were dazell our eies with their continual presence, which makes vs to thinke of the basenesse of our condition, the which wee see deiected vnder theirs. But especially when as they possesse a good which wee haue enioyed, and which is no more in our power to recover. By reason whereof, it often happens, that old men enuy the younger sort, for  
that

that beeing in Companies, they see that their age takes from them the vse, or forbids them the enioying of those sports and exercises, wherein young men take delight. And this *Envy* which they beare them, appeares in the rigors which they shew them, in their reprehensions which they make them, and in the hinderances they giue them, when as they may crosse them.

Moreouer, the things that may bee profitable or commodious vnto vs, stir vp more *Envy* then those which are onely proper to him that enuiues them. Wherefore wee do more enuy our equalls for their beauty, riches, knowledge, and honours, then for their health or long life, which



which are particular vnto themselves. And the reason is, for that *Envy* rising from this desire to bee esteemed in the world, and from the *Pas-*  
*sion* we haue to see our selues more respected then other men; the qualities which recommend them, make the deeper impression of *Envy* in our soules, the more capable they are to purchase reputatiō to him that enioyes them. And there is no question but the things which may bring pleasure, profit, or honor, not only to him that enioyes the but also to all men that shall possesse them, are euer esteemed more honorable, and more glorious then those, whose pleasure, profit, or glory, extend but to one in particular: wherefore they doe  
also

also stirre vp more *Envy*.

There is another *Passion* which is also a bud or branch of *Headinesse*, as well as *Envy*, and that is *Emulation*, which hath some affinity with it, but yet they are very different *Passions*. For although that *Emulation* bee *A* griefe which we haue conceived for the prosperity of our equalls, yet it riseth not from any bad affection wee beare them, but onely from a desire wee haue to see our selues attaine vnto the like felicities. Wherefore *Emulation* doth not merit the blame which *Envy* doth, but many times it is commendable in vs. As for example, when as wee see some vertue shine in one of our equalls, we strue in imitation of him to attaine vnto it. This *Emulation*

*mulation* is worthy of praise. So *Cæsar* is commended, to haue propounded *Alexander* for a patterne, as *Alexander* did *Achilles* : And *Themistocles* did shewe that hee was borne to great matters, when as he said that the triumphes of *Miltiades* would not suffer him to sleepe : for that it was a testimony that hee was troubled with an honest *Emulation* of his vertue. *Emulation* then is found among equalls, or at the least among those which are almost alike, for that this *Passion* stirring vp a desire in vs, inciting vs to seeke the perfection which shines in those, whose glory hath made this impression in our soules; wee must of necessity imagine that it is in our power to attaine vnto them,  
for

for that we neuer desire those things which are impossible.

Wherefore wee haue no *Emulation* of those, who haue so great an aduantage ouer vs, as it is not in our power to come neere them. Reciprocally we haue no *Envy* in regard of those that be so farre inferior vnto vs, as we see no commendable quallity in them, which wee enioy not with much eminency. Among the rest, young men are naturally inclined to *Emulation*, for that by reason of the heate of their youth, they are found more hardy, and being full of good hopes, they shew themselves more actiue to vndertake; for that all things how difficult so euer, seeme easie vnto them. And for the

the same reason great and couragious spirits; are very capable of *Emulation*, by reason of the greatnesse of their minds, which makes them conceiue that there is no designe about their valour, and that there is nothing so difficult but they may surmount.

Among other things which may induce vs to *Emulation*, those which may make a man necessary or profitable to many, hold the first rancke. As for example, learning, eloquence, riches, power, the mannaging of affaires, and such like, are greatly subiect to the force of this *Passion*. And therefore it is often commendable; that is to say, when shee propounds vnto her selfe no sort of externall goods, but the only treasures  
of

of the soule and the riches of the mind, which shee sees to shine in another subiect, whose glory inflames her, and makes her aspire to the possession of the same graces. For this consideration also we haue a particular *Emulation*, and desire passionately to equall, or to imitate those who are respected throughout the world, whom all the world commends, and all men loue, and especially when their vertues are honored by excellent penne: For that all these things are so many glorious testimonies of their merits.

These bee the Personages whose vertue makes so glorious a shew, as wee desire earnestly to imitate them: As contrariwise wee contemne

T and

and are ashamed to resemble those which are destitute of all these goodly qualities. Wherefore as man should carefully free his soule from *Envy*, which doth but trouble his rest, and afflicts him more then the party against whom it conspireth; so in some sort hee should giue way to an honest *Emulation*, which proceeds not from any euill will hee beares to another, but from the good hee desires to himselfe, to the end that in propounding to himselfe the examples of magnificence, valour, Iustice, modesty, prudence, wisdom, and of the other vertues which shine in the liues of great Personages of his condition, he may become magnificent, valiant, Iust, moderate,



rate, prudent, wise, and endowed with all the other qualities which make them glorious which are adorned therewith. But wee haue spoken sufficiently of the *Concupiscible Passion*, we must now treat of those which make their impressions, and stir vp the *Irascible*.

Of Hardinesse or Courage.

CHAP. I.



AS in the ancient sacrifices of the *Pagans* they did carefully obserue the generosity of the beasts that were to bee sacrificed; so as the priest comming to passe

a naked sword before their eyes, if they were affrighted with the brightnesse thereof, they were chased from the Altar; whereas if they stood stil without amazement, they were held worthy to be offered to the diuinity. So base and deiected minds which grow pale at any danger, were alwayes held in great contempt; whereas generous and resolute spirits, whom no kind of perill could terrifie or amaze, haue euer beene held in singular admiration. This resolution and courage proceeds from an excellent nature wherewith they are endowed, which makes them to looke vpon all the accidents of the world without any alteration, being resolved to vanquish whatsoeuer  
pre-

presents it selfe to encounter their constancy : Shewing thereby, that they apprehend a disgrace more then a misfortune, and that they had more care to preferue their honors, then to prolong their liues.

Seeing then that true *Hardinesse* and *Courage* is so commendable a thing, and that many of the most excellent men of antiquity haue preferred it before riches, the disposition of the body, beauty, and the other ornaments, whereof men do vsually glory; we must seeke out the Essence, and shew what courages she doth accompany, and in what foules shee is found.

*Hardinesse* then is no other thing, but a resolution of courage

rage, whereby promising vnto himselfe to be able to surmount the calamities which threaten him, he sees them comming without amazement, and is not terrified when they are befallen him: Or else according vnto others: *Hardinesse* is a *Passion* of the soule, which doth fortifie it, and makes it assured against the miseries which are most difficult to auoyd, and which doth encourage it to pursue those good things which are most painefull to obtaine.

Whereby it followes, that *Hardinesse* is alwayes accompanied with a certaine hope to bee able to vanquish and disperse those fearefull things which present themselues vnto the imagination of man. This confidence may grow from the opinion wee haue,  
that

that the euill which threat-  
neth vs is far from vs; or from  
our beleefe, that if it should  
present it selfe, we should bee  
able to surmount it. As when  
a Citty hath a conceit that  
no man will attempt any  
thing against the peace of  
her Cittizens; and if they  
should, they were able to re-  
pell the iniury, and to endure  
the attempts of their ene-  
mies; this beleefe makes them  
hardy and assured. Second-  
ly, it may grow, for that al-  
though wee finde our selues  
weake, and vnable to resist  
our enemies, yet wee beleue  
that wee shall bee powerfully  
assisted by our Allies, with  
whose ayde wee hold our  
selues inuincible. As for ex-  
ample, although the Duke of  
*Sauoy* bee not able of himselfe

to resist the Armes of *Spaine*; yet being fortified with the alliance of this Crowne, hee doth not apprehend them, neither is hee affraid to incense them, knowing that the assistance of the Christian King protects him of that side.

Thirdly, this confidence may grow, for that wee beleue, wee haue neither receiued nor done iniury to any man, which should make vs apprehend reuenge. And againe, for that we thinke wee haue no enemies, or else that they are so feeble and weak as they cannot annoy vs. It may also grow in regard that they who haue power to hurt vs, are our friends, and liue in good correspondency with vs, and haue assisted vs  
in

in our occurrents, as for our part we haue endeauored to bind the vnto vs by al occasions which haue bene offered. So the Allies of great Kings feare not their power, although it be fearefull to the rest of the world.

By this meanes wee find that there are diuerse sorts of persons which are full of *Hardinesse* and assurance. First, they are hardy, which imagine that all things shall succeed happily in regard of their former felicities. So *Alexander* vndertaking the conquest of *India*, apprehended nothing; by reason of the happy victories, and triumphes which he had gotten ouer the *Persians*. So *Cesar* being ouertaken with a cruel storme and in a small barke,

T 5 feared



feared nothing, but to confirm the resolution of his Pilot whom the storme had amazed, he wisht him not to feare, seeing hee carried *Cæsar* and his fortunes. Secondly, they are hardy who hauing beene ingaged in great dangers, haue yet escaped; for they imagine that good Fortune which hath beene so favorable vnto them in so many other occasions full of despaire, will not abandon them in that present danger. Finally, men are not troubled in dangers for two reasons, either for want of experience, or for the hope they haue to be speedily releued. As for example, they that go by sea, hauing neuer seene the horror of tempests, imagine that the maisters and such as  
guide

guide the ship, are expert in their facultie, and that they will easily preferue them from shipwracke; so as they are not amazed, although the stormes and waues seeme to threaten them their death.

Thirdly, men are full of assurance when as they see such as equall them not, or do not exceed them in power, make no demonstration of feare; conceyting that they are assured, they haue more cause to continue constant. Men not only hold them inferior vnto them whom they haue exceeded, but also such as cannot enter into comparison with them, or at the least are not more powerfull then those whom they haue vanquished,

Againe men are full of *Cou-  
rage*

rage and resolution, when as they see themselves furnished with all those things which may make the feareful to their enemies. Among the which we put store of coyne, disposition of body, greatnesse of minde, extent of Empire, support of friends, the power of Armies, and a great provision of all that is necessary for the maintenance of a war.

Moreouer, men hold themselves assured when they haue not offended any man, or when such as they haue offended are not able to reuenge the iniurie. And withall, men are much assured, when as they thinke that God is favorable and assistant in their designs. Wherefore, in old time great Captaines of war were not wont to giue bat-  
taile,

taile, before they had sacrificed vnto their gods, and had seene in the intrailles of their sacrifices some happy presage of diuine assistance. For the same occasion they consulted with Oracles, attended the answers, and were carefull to obserue the signes which were seene before the battaile: so that sometimes the flying of an Eagle hath assured Armies that were amazed.

But without all these signes and presages, men thinketh that God is fauourable, when as they thinke they fight for a good cause: As when they haue taken Armes for religion; for the seruice of their Prince; for the maintenance of his Crowne; and for their Countrey: yea, when

when as they imagine, that the reuenge they pursue is iust, and that they haue beene vnworthily abused. The reason is, for that Choler which is alwayes enflamed by the iniury receiued, and not by that which wee doe vnto others, makes men hardy, perswading themselves, that God assists them that are wronged and vniustly persecuted. Lastly, they that begin a warre are commonly hardy, especially when they haue a conceit that the action will succeed, and that the euent will answer the expectation.

As for the constitution of the body, which may contribute to the *Hardinesse* and resolution of man: It is certaine, that such as haue much blood

blood and spirits, and which abound in heate, are most commonly hardy and valiant. For they haue great mindes and full of generosity, which makes them to cōtemne dangers. And if in the midst of hazards some part of the blood retires inwardly, yet the better part keeps her seate, and remains firme and constant: so as they neuer grow pale, nor tremble like to other men. But if before they fight the apprehēsiō of dāger, makes any impression in their soules, they recover themselues suddainely, and expell the feare which would surprize them. And for the same reason, they which are full of wine, may become more hardy: not that this defect of it self doth contri-

contribute any thing to the greatnesse of Courage, but for that wine enflames the blood, & by accident makes men valiant; and withall, they that are ouertaken with wine, haue their reason captiuated, and their iudgement troubled: so as they cannot consider duely of the greatnesse of perill, but imagine, that all dangers are inferior to their force and resistance.

In the meane time we obserue, that many which shew a great Hardinesse and courage to cast themselves into danger, as soone as they finde themselves engaged, are often amazed; as we see in those that go valiantly to a charge, but finding resistance, they turne their backs to the enemy: whereof wee can giue no  
other



other reason, but that they are not valiant by iudgment, but by the bounty of nature. So as apprehending not the greatnesse of the danger before they enter, but imagining that they shall vanquish whatsoeuer opposeth it selfe against them; when as they finde resistance which they did not expect, they are amazed at the strangenesse of this accident, and their hearts grow cold and relent in such sort, as sometimes they flye before their enemies. But the contrary happens to those that are truely valiant; for when as they gouerne their courages by wisedome, and measure their forces, attempting nothing aboue their strength or against reason, there is no sudden accident that

that may befall them, that can trouble them in any action of Armes; whereas commonly they finde lesse resistance then they expected before they entred the fight, so as their resolution is alwayes fortified and neuer decays. And then propounding honor only before their eyes, the feare of the losse of life cannot amaze them, but their vertue surmounting all accidents, it causeth them (notwithstanding all hazards) to persist couragiously in that which they haue gloriously begunne. Yea, commonly they shew themselves more cold in the beginning, then at the ending; for that it is not the *Passion* that doth animate them, but it is iudgement which doth act  
in

in their courages. By reason whereof, in the beginning of the actiō they are more cold, & are not enflamed but with fighting. But it hath bin obserued in many valiant men, which had their hearts all couered with haire: whereof wee haue a famous example in that couragious *Lacedemonian Leonidas*, who with fūe hundred men kept the streight of *Thermopiles* against that huge Army of *Xerxes*, & who had the courage and resolution to passe through the midst of his armed souldiers, to wrest the Diademe from his head. For when as after his death the King of *Persia* (amazed at so great a resolution) had caused him to bee opened, his heart was found all couered with

with haire. Some, it may be, would put this among the prodigies, or rather among the scornes of Nature; but the reason is easie to bee giuen, for they that are extraordinarily valiant, haue an exceeding heat, which drawes from their heart a fume of excrements, which thickens, and is conuerted into haire; the which is a marke of their courage, and a signe of valour.

## CHAP. I.

## Of Feare or Dread.



ALTHOUGH it seems that feare is a dead *Passion* & that it shold not make any great impressions in our soules,

foules, nor cause any strange alterations in the world: yet as there bee certaine starres, which beeing in a manner continually hidden, haue notwithstanding very maligne and pernicious influences: so although shee seeme not to bee so active as the rest, and remaines as it were couered & hidden, yet she doth cause strange accidents in the life of man; for that shee hath sometimes ruined powerfull Armies, brought Kingdomes and States into dangers, and ouerthrowne the fortunes of priuate persons. Wherefore wee haue seene great Commanders in warre, who troubled by some sinister and vnexpected accident, in a day of battaile, haue had recourse to vowes and prayers, and haue

haue promised to build temples to *Feare* and palenesse, to diuert the ruine that threatened them, if the amazement spread ouer the whole Army, had not beene as it were miraculously dispersed.

Wherefore seeing that *Feare* doth produce such powerfull changes in the affaires of men, and withall, that this life is dayly threatened with infinite miseries, which giue vs still cause to feare; wee must see wherein shee consists, how shee is framed, and in what soules she doth reside. *Feare* then is no other thing, but *A grieffe and distresse of the soule*, troubled by the imagination of some approaching Euill, wherewith man is threatned, without any apparence to be able to auoyd it easily,

*ly, although it tend to the destruction of his being, or cause him some strange calamity in the course of his life.*

It is first of all a griefe and a distresse; for that as pleasures fill the senses with delight and ioy, so the imagination of an infallible euill, which cannot bee auoyded, fills vs with griefe and heauinesse. But secondly the causes of this griefe, are not alwayes solid nor true; but many times they are vaine and imaginary: for that wee doe frame or rather forge to our selues the miseries, whereof the apprehension afflicts our mindes, and torments our senses.

The which made an Ancient say, that there are more things which amaze vs, then that



that presse vs : and that most commonly opinion and apprehension, doth vs more harme then the thing it selfe. Wherein doubtlesse the condition of man is lamentable, for that as if he were not inuironed by a sufficient nūber of true miseries, he forgets others which are not in nature, to encrease his miseries.

For wee see daily that although there appeare no presages, nor any signes of a calamity that doth threaten vs, yet our minds do frame false imaginations, and vaine feares, which many times are the causes of our ruine.

There are some things which torment vs more then they should do, others trouble vs before the time, and some afflict vs without cause  
or

or subiect, for that we either increase our griefes and paines, or we forge them our selues, or else wee run before them and anticipate them; And whereas wee should strue against these iealousies and false opinions which cause them, wee suffer our selues to be vanquished, resembling therein certaine Soldiers who being amazed at a little dust raisd by a flocke of sheepe, turned their backes, as if the enemy had beene at their heeles.

These vaine feares may sometimes grow from the ignorance of things which they imagine to bee of bad presage, although they bee meere effects of nature which they should obserue without trembling, as we haue many

times scene an Eclipse of the Sun or of the Moone which haue their naturall causes, trouble whole Armies and terrifie their Commanders. Thirdly, wee must obserue that to cause *Feare*, the euill that doth threaten vs must not bee present but to come; for that when it is present, it is no more a *Feare* but a meere heauinesse. And then the euill which wee doubt must bee full of horror, and threaten vs with the losse of life, or some other great prejudice: For things of small weight, are not capable to make any impression of *Feare*, at the least if there remaine any sparke of generosity in our hearts.

Yea all kind of calamities how great so euer, are not a-  
ble

ble to cause *Feare*, if it be not accompanied with a certaine horror which amazeth the senses. As for example, men apprehend not to become vniust, or wicked, although they be things more to be feared then all the miseries of this life. But the nature of vice is such, as the horror of her presence is not sensible vnto vs, for that shee seemes not to destroy our being, nor to cause in vs any great alterations that should afflict vs. Moreouer, to be terrified with any euill, it must be as it were hanging ouer our heads, and threaten vs with a ruine at hand; for when as we imagine that it is farre from vs, how fearefull soeuer the forme be, yet we are not amazed. Euen so although that

death bee the most horrid & fearefull thing that may fall into the thought of men; yet for that euery man presumes it is not ready to feare upon him; we do not apprehend it as we ought; but wee suffer it to come and prepare not our selues.

There rests now to see what things wee haue tult cause to apprehend. An Ancient makes three sorts, that is to say, pouerty, diseases, & the outrages of the mighty. The two first; that is to say, pouerty, and diseases; make the least shew; but the outrages of the mighty present themselves vnto our senses with much bruite, and terrifie our eyes and eares. For euen as an executioner is the more fearefull when he brings

brings forth diuerse instruments to torture & torment the patient, so as many times they which would haue endured their punishment patiently, are dismayed, seeing so many deaths at one instant before their eyes; euen so among the calamities which oppresse our spirits, those cause most terroure which march with the greatest shew, for that they represent vnto our thoughts irons, fire, chaines, prisons, gibbets, wheelles, and whatsoeuer is most horrible and fearefull in this life. But let vs heare *Aristotle*, who also sets three kinds of things which giue vs apprehension and feare. In the first rancke he puts those which tend intallibly to the destruction of our being. For

this reason, we do iustly feare thunder and lightning; for that the life of man is full of the examples of such as haue bene miserably burnt. We *Feare* in like manner great inundations, and deluges of water, which are the causes of so many ruines vpon earth. For the same reason, being in Forrests and deserts, wee apprehend the encounter of sauage beasts, which are enemies to the life of man. And for the same subiect wee apprehend to fall into the hands of those whom we think we haue offended.

In the second rancke of fearefull things, he puts those which cause pinching vexations and griefes, as the losse of our kinssfolkes and friends, banishment, imprisonment, and



and other punishments. In the third hee placeth those which are as it were the signes and presages of these kind of miseries. Not that these signes of themselves cause vs any preiudice, but for that they are as it were the forerunners of the danger into which wee feare to fall. Thewhich makes kings and Princes apprehend the rising and apparition of Comets, for that they haue beene perswaded they are foretellings of the death of great men. These signes which amaze vs, may bee reduced to foure heads, which are found in the course of this life, and in the affaires of the world. For we are accustomed to *Feare* the wrath, and hatred of those which haue power to

bee reuenged; for that their wrath, and hatred is as it were an infallible signe of our ruine; seeing that hauing power to vndo vs, there is no question, but (by a disease commune to all men,) they will be naturally inclined to reuenge.

But secondly, wee apprehend our enemies more, when they are not stayed by some honest *Feare* of Iustice, or some other respect, but are ready to tread all diuine and humaine lawes vnder foote to satisfie their reuenge. For men which haue thus renounced all the feelings of vertue, wanting no power, & hauing a wicked inclination, are alwayes ready to do euill; and apprehend not to shew their valorous disposition. So  
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we have great reason to Feare such as in the liberty of crimes, find themselves above the lawes, and cannot bee punished by any man. As for example, Tyrants which haue seized vpon Estates & Empires, are much to be feared; for that hauing force & power to oppresse whom they please, there is no doubt but they will speedily put it in execution; for that these sauage spirits, knowing that those whom they haue made subiect to their Empire, (hauing iust cause to hate them,) haue no other designe but to take from them all meanes to hurt the, by weakning them, and terrifying them with the Feare of punishments. They are also to be feared, not only for that they haue power,

but also for that to settle their Empire, they are inclined to commit all outrages and violence.

It is true on the other side, that the same Tyrants should apprehend the fury of the people, who do but seeke occasions to roote them out, and to abate their power. Wherefore wee see the life of these plagues of mankind, is full of Iealousies and distrusts, which torment them day and night more cruelly, then those which they make their miserable subiects to suffer, who grone vnder the burthen of their Tyranny. For although they bee inuironed with their guards; that they haue powerful alliances; that they command great Armies; and haue strong townes  
and

& Forts at their command, yet nothing can assure their consciences, but they are in perpetuall terror; which makes their condition like to that of sauage beasts, which flye all the world, and all men abhorre them.

Thirdly, we haue cause to feare resolute men, who make profession of honour, when we haue offended them: for that beeing sensible of iniuries, it is certaine their courage will carry them to reuenge.

Lastly, wee should apprehend those which haue iust cause to feare vs, at the least, if they haue power to hurt vs. For beeing in continuall apprehension, lest wee should attempt something against their liues, they had rather preuent

preuent vs, then suffer vs to surprize them. From hence it followes, that there are diuers persons whose enterprises we should feare, and haue a speciall care of. First, wee should feare those to whom we haue imparted some great and important secret; which beeing reuealed, may bee the cause of our ruine: for the weakenesse of mans minde is such; as it may bee, they will either be corrupted, or induced by promises to discouer vs; or the feare to bee found confederates if the matter should be reuealed, they will seeke to iustifie themselves in accusing vs, and ruine vs to saue themselves. Secondly, we should apprehend such as haue power to hurt vs, for that commonly the will followes

lowest the power, and they will easily take liberty to effect that which is in their power. Thirdly, wee should dread such as we haue offended, or that thinke wee haue wronged them, beeing likely, that they will not leaue this iniurie vnreuenged, but will endeavour to take reuenge when occasion shall be offered. Fourthly, wee should feare those which haue wronged vs, and which are subject to feare vs: for that doubting lest wee should apprehend the iniury wee haue receiued, and hauing forces at command, it is likely they would free themselves of this feare by preuenting vs, as we haue formerly said. Fifthly, we should distrust those which dispute or contend with vs,  
for



for honour, or for any good thing, which wee cannot enjoy ioyntly together. For to take away this obstacle in their pursuities, it is to be presumed that they wil attempt something against vs. Sixthly, wee should dread such as are fearefull to greater personages then our selues. For that if they may strike a terror into the mighty, they wil more easily doe it in them that are weake. Seuenthly, wee should bee watchfull of those, which haue already tried their forces against such as are more powerfull then our selues, and haue preuailed; or that haue vsed some surprize or treachery, to bee reuenged of such as were not equall to vs in power. For that the first may easily perswade.

swade themselves to bee able to master vs, hauing vanquished those that did exceede vs. And the second, seeing their successe against the weaker, they will take courage in their crime, and promise themselves the like successe against them that are more powerfull; to whom they imagine they should be fearefull, by reason of that which they had formerly done. Eighthly, we should apprehend the friends of those whom wee haue offended: not such as are prompt to choler, and which speake much, for that it is easie to discouer them, & to beware of them; but those that are close, dissembling, and full of arte, for that it is a difficult thing to knowe what is in their

their soules, and to discover if they practise any thing against our liues.

Among the things which make an impression of *Dread*, the most fearefull, are those which surprize vs, and which wee had not fore-thought. The which happens for two reasons: the one, for that befalling vs thus vnllooked for, they take from vs the meanes to thinke of the remedies, whereof wee doe commonly make vse against the disasters that doe threaten vs: and the other, for that speaking of the accidents of this life, bee they good or bad, the more wee consider of them, the more the opinion which we had formerly conceiued, is extenuated. In regarde whereof, as there is no grieve  
so

so violent, but time doth mollifie, so there is no apprehension so great, which is not in some sort diminished by preparing our selues for the miseries which threaten vs. Wherefore *Feare* increaseth when we are surprized, and haue not meanes to thinke of the remedies.

Secondly, those things are most fearefull, when as if wee commit a fault, it is no more in our power to repaire the error, but if there bee any remedy, it depends wholly on the will of our enemies. For this reason wee haue often seene generous resolutions, and great Captaines, apprehend much to giue battaile, for that as the euent of war are doubtfull, so if he chance to lose it, there is little means  
to

to repaire the error, but most commonly he must receiue a law from the Victor, in stead of giuing it him.

Thirdly, among fearefull things, wee apprehend those which stirre vp compassion in our soules, and mollifie the heart with grieſe, if wee see them befall other men: as shipwrackes, burnings, racks, tortures, executions, desperate diseases; the losse of goods, kinsfolkes, or friends, and al other accidents which may make men miserable. Wee must not forget that *Feare* augments in vs, when as the causes which produce it come to increase. Wherefore as it riseth from the consideration of dangers which threaten vs: so many times, they which doe exactly consider

sider the hazards and dangers which threaten this life, are most subiect to *Feare*; as wise and discrete men, such as haue had a long experience of worldly affaires: whereas fooles, drunkards, and young men apprehend nothing, but hope for all.

Moreouer, the excesse of danger encreaseth *Feare*, especially when it is neere vnto vs, when it presseth vs, and when wee see no remedy nor meanes to auoyd it; as when an Army or a City is surprized, and neither Captaine, nor souldier endeauours to repulse the enemy. Yea, after that any one hath escaped a great danger, the very imagination to haue beene freed from so great a misfortune, is able to kill him; for that  
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the imagination hath that force, to represent vnto vs the thing, as if it were yet present, and as if wee were in the midst of the danger. As they report of a *Jew*, who ha- uing by night past a bridge, whereas no man did passe by reason of the danger; who when hee came to thinke of the perill wherein hee had beene, was so surprized with *Feare* and horror as he died,

On the other side, it helps much to dissipate *Feare*, to i- magine there is no kinde of danger in that where-with they would terrifie vs. The which may proceede from two causes, that is to say, ei- ther from an exact know- ledge of the nature of the things which wee haue care- fully obserued and knowne,  
and



and find therein no subiect of  
Feare; and this course is full of  
discretion: Or else from meer  
ignorance; which makes vs  
to iudge of things otherwise  
then wee ought; Imagining,  
that there is no danger in  
places or things which are  
full of amazement; which is  
a signe of want of iudge-  
ment.

Finally, there is a kinde  
of people which feare no-  
thing; that is to say, such as  
haue renounced all feeling of  
things, whereof we haue iust  
cause to apprehend the  
losse.

As they which haue lost all  
honor, abandoned all shame,  
wasted their fortunes and  
their goods, and those whose  
shames are tedious vnto them.  
For what can they feare, who  
haue

haue nothing remaining to trouble them? For this reason wee must greatly apprehend desperate persons, and such as haue abandoned the loue of this life: for as an Ancient said, *Hee that contemnes his owne life, is master of another mans.* Yet there are diuers things which may free our soules from all Feare whatsoeuer presents it self. For as they that are perswaded that nothing can hurt them, haue no apprehension nor Feare: yea, if the heauens should fall, they would not be amazed at their ruines: In like manner men do not feare to lose those things, which they thinke are safe from the outrages of their enemies. As wise and vertuous men doe not feare that the rage  
of

of Tyrants can preuaile ouer their minds to blemish their constancy.

If Tyrants threaten them with any shamefull death, they are ready to say, as a resolute spirit did once vnto a Prince who threatned to hang him: *This (sayd he) would amaze the gallant Courtiers, but as for mee, it is indifferenc whether I rotte in the Ayre, or in the Earth.*

Thirdly, men *Feare* not those whom they think haue not power to hurt them, although in effect they should apprehend them. This false perswasion hath often ruined great Commanders in the warre, who contemning the enemies, and making shew not to *Feare* them, haue lost the victory, and fallen miserably

bly into their power. In like manner, men *Feare* not when as they conceiue that the occasions which should make them *Feare*, are taken away: As they which apprehend the persecution of a Tyrant, lose all *Feare* when as they see his power overthrowne: Whereby it appears that men *Feare*, when there is appearance that they may suffer some iniury: Or when as hee that is threatened is exposed to outrages: Or when as they that threaten are powerfull: Or that time and occasion fauours him that would do an iniury.

By all this we may gather, that there are two kinds of men which are aboue all feared. The first are such as are very happy, which haue ma-  
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ny friends, abundance of wealth, great Spirits, great power; and which haue not yet tryed the miseries of this life. For this great felicity, this immoderate wealth, this exceeding power, and the other aduantages of nature and Fortune, make men hardy, insolent, outragions, and to contemne all the world. Whereas on the other side, pouerty and weaknesse make men fearefull, for that the calamity which doth presse vs, being the object of *Feare*, they which neither haue meanes nor power to defend themselves, haue cause to apprehend.

The second sort of men, are they which thinke they haue suffered the cruellist afflictions that can bee endured in

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this life, and whom the custome of forepassed miseries haue made insensible of future calamities, as they that are led to execution, after that they haue bene tortured in prison.

But the chiefe reason why these men haue abandoned all *Feare*, is that which *Aristotle* alledgeth, that *To haue an apprehension of the things which afflict vs, there must bee some hope or some shew, to be freed from it by industry.* And therefore *Feare* makes vs fly to Counsells, and to seeke out remedies: For no man consults of a businesse that is desperate. So as these men seeing no reliefe in their affaires, as they haue no more hope, so they cannot *Feare*. And touching that which  
*Ari-*

Aristotle saith, that *Feare* makes vs flie to Counsell; someone may make a question, whether that *Feare* doth contribute any thing to make men more wise, and more disperse their *Feare*. Whereunto the answer is easie, that *Feare* makes an impression in vs of greater care to seeke for Counsell, to fortifie vs against the calamities that do threaten vs; but many times it doth hinder vs from reaping the fruits which we might gather without this apprehension.

The reason of the first is, that *Feare* representing the danger hanging ouer our heads, and hard to be auoyded, it binds vs to seeke the meanes to diuert it, and makes vs to craue aduice of



our friends, to supply our weaknesse. The reason of the second is, for that they which are troubled with *Feare*, or transported with any other *Passion*, imagine things to be greater or lesse then they are; so as they that loue, value the things beloued much; & they that *Feare*, represent them more horrible. Wherefore in that regard all *Passions* are enemies to wise Counsell, and good resolutions.

*Of the Effects of Feare.*

## CHAP. 2.

**T**HE Effects of Feare are diuerse & strange; for to leaue the impression which it makes in the mind of man, (whereof we will speake hereafter,) she doth produce all these effects vpon his body. First, she shrinkes vp his heart, and doth weaken it by the liuely apprehension which she doth giue it of the affliction; By reason whereof all the heate that is in his face is forced to flie vnto it to succour it: and when as that sufficeth not,

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the blood of the other parts flow also vnto it: So as they that are affrighted grow pale. For prouident nature to preserve the life of man, hauing thus call'd backe the blood and spirits from all the parts to succour the heart which is the fountaine, speedily leaues the other parts wholly vnfurnisht and naked. In regard whereof the blood being that which giues colour, and makes man to haue a sanguine hew, it being fled, his complexion fades, and hee growes pale. For the same reason they that are amazed, are presently surprized with a continuall shaking, for that the heate which resides in the blood and spirits, being that which supports and fortifies the members of man; being

being destitute thereof they can hardly support themselves, but tremble and shake in that manner. And whereas the hands and lippes shew greater signes of alteration then the rest, the reason is, for that those parts haue a more strict bond with the heart, and haue lesse blood then the rest; and therefore cold doth more easily make an impression vpon them.

Finally, the members which haue a particular connexion with the heart, haue also a particular feeling of his agitation: wherein it is strange, that as trembling is an effect of the want of heate, and that *Feare* chafeth the heate vnto the heart, to preserue the center of life; yet they that are terrified, haue their hearts agitated,

ted, and they beate in them, as if they were destitute of heate.

The reason is, although that prouident nature to preserve the heart sends downe the heate from aboue, yet *Feare* doth not suffer it to subsist long there, but doth chase it lower; for that in them that *feare*, their spirits grow thicke, and become more heauy by reason of the cold which imaginatiō doth produce, that they are notable to resist the danger which doth threaten them: So as the spirits being growne thus heauy, by reason of the cold which this imagination leaues, tends downward, and remains not about the heart. They that are surprized with *feare*, feeble

feele strange alteration ; and are wonderfully dry; for that the heate which nature hath drawne about the heart, burnes and filles the bowells with an exceeding heate, which makes him to desire cold and moist things, wherein thirst consists, to quench this troublesome alteration, to refresh the Creature, and to free it from this insupportable heate.

And for that in this motion of *feare*, the heate descends, it made *Homer* to say of him that was without courage, that his heart was fallen to his heeles, after which there commonly followes many accidents which slacken and vnknit all the ioynts and ligatures of the body; but especially they that

are terrified haue their tongues tied & can hardly speak, causing them to fumble in their discourses: yea their voyce is very shrill and weake, for that it is abandoned by the heate which should entertaine her force; whereas in choler it shewes it selfe more strong, for that the heate which ascends fortifies it, & makes it more powerfull. Moreouer *feare* makes the hayres to stand vp with horror, for that in the absence of heate, the cold congealeth, and stoppes the conduits by which it passeth: So as the haire as it were oppresseth in the rootes, by the cold which diuerteth their naturall nourishment, for that they cannot suffer a strange humour full of excrements which doth  
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rot them, they stand vpright with horror; the which sometimes workes so strange an effect by her vehemency, as they make young men grow graye in an instant: whereof wee haue a memorable example in the age of our fathers, during the reigne of the Emperour *Charles* the fift. For *Francis Gonzague*, hauing caused a young man of his house to bee committed to prison, for that he suspected hee had conspired against him; this miserable young man was so terrified with his affliction, as the same night hee was cast into prison, his haire grew all white. In the morning his Keeper seeing him thus changed, went and made report thereof to *Gonzague*, who

who being amazed at this prodigie, cōceiued that it was a testimony of his innocence; whereupon he pardoned him.

This sudden change of the prisoners haire, proceeded without doubt, for that the vehemency of his *feare* caused the heate retire from his braine: As in like manner old men grow white, for want of heate, which decayes with age: Finally, they that haue little hot blood about the heart are naturally fearefull: So as those Creatures which haue great hearts to the proportion of their bodies, (as Stagges and Panthers) are more subiect to *feare*; for that hauing little heate, it is weakned, dispersing it selfe into a large extent, euen as a litle fire cannot so warme a large roome

roome, as it would do one that is lesse. So as the blood growes cold, & is lesse able to warme the heart, which is the seate of courage.

Whereas other creatures which haue more heat, and the heart proportionably lesse, are more hardy and couragious. For that the heat abounding in them, it is more actiue, and the subject where it workes, dispersing not her action by extent, shee workes more powerfully: so as she enflames them to all generous enterprizes, and glorious designs.

But let vs come to the effects which *Feare* breeds in the minde of man. Besides all these strange accidents which she doth produce in the body, shee causeth other disorders

ders in the soule, filling it with such confusion, as shee leaues him neither memory, nor iudgement, nor will, to encounter any danger that threatens his ruine. Wherefore it is not the worke of an ordinary courage, to haue a constant resolution in the midst of greatest dangers, and suddenly to finde remedies against the mischiefs that threaten him. As histories giue this commendation of *Hannibal*, *Iugurth*, *Cesar*, *Alexander*, and some few of those great spirits of former ages; whose iudgements were neuer danted with apprehension of any danger, but in the midst of combates they could speedily redresse all accidents, which happening suddenly, might amaze their Armies,

Armies, and depriue them of the victory.

Moreouer, *Feare* (like a seruile and base *Passion*) depriues man of all courage: and whereas the apprehension of danger is a spurre to generous spirits, to fortifie them, and to make them seek powerfull meanes to auoyde the danger; it doth so deiect faint-hearted and fearefull men, as they remaine, as it were, immoveable, and vn capable of all action.

Moreouer, it makes a man ashamed and confounded, and to contemne himselfe; he crosseth his armes, and flatters them basely and vnworthily, whom hee thinkes may ease his griefe. It fills him also with amazement, and as if it were able to conuert him  
into

into a rocke, it reduceth him to that stupiditie, as hee forgets himselfe, and becomes, as it were, insensible of the miseries which oppresse him, although they vex him worse then death.

But you must remember that wee speake of a disordered *Feare*, which doth wholly trouble the imagination of man: for there is a kinde of moderate *feare*, which striking reason but gently, makes vs aduised (to the which the *Stoickes* giue the name of circumspection) to prouide with iudgement for that which concernes vs: for that it makes vs carefull and atentiue to looke to our affaires, and to giue order for that which is necessary to shelter vs from stormes.

Of

## Of Shame.

## CHAP. I.

**S**EEING that  
*Shame* is, as it  
were, a shoote  
or a Sience of  
*Feare*, wee must  
shew wherein it consists, and  
what effects it doth produce,  
to the end we may leaue no-  
thing behinde that may con-  
cerne this subiect. *Shame*  
then is, *A griepe and a confusi-*  
*on, which growes from the ap-*  
*prehension of some crosses,*  
*which may make man infam-*  
*ous*: And vnder this kinde  
wee comprehend those cala-  
mities which are presēt, past,  
or yet to come; so as they bee  
of



of that nature, as they may trouble and breed a confusion in the soule of man. And impudency on the other side, is a contempt of the same misery, for want of feeling. By the definition of *Shame*, we may gather, that men are ashamed of those things that they thinke will breed them infamy, or lay some aspersiō vpon them, or their friends, or vpon such as belong vnto them. So as first of all, all vices, and all things that doe resemble or haue any shew of vice, are capable to breede *Shame* in our soules. As for example, it is a shamefull thing to flye from the Army in a day of battaile; for that this flight is a signe of basenesse and want of courage. In like manner it is a shamefull thing

thing to refuse to restore that, which hath beene left with vs in guard, and which hath beene consigned to our fidelity; for that this refusall is a prooffe of our iniustice & disloyalty. It is also a shamefull thing to run indifferently into all dishonest places, in the which (as *Diogenes* said to a young man) the farther he enters, the more his infamy encreaseth; for that it is a testimony of intemperance and dissolutenesse. And againe, it is a very shamefull thing to seeke to reape profite from all base and abieſt things; like to that *Romane* Emperour, who said, The fauour of gaine was alwayes sweete, from whence soeuer it came: for it is a signe of a prodigious couetousnesse.

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Moreouer, it is a shamefull thing to refuse to releue them that are in misery, and implore our aide, with money or any other thing; for it is a signe of our inhumanity: yea, it is a Shame not to assist them bountifully according to their meanes. But especially when they are our kinsfolkes, our Allies, our friends, or such persons, as at another time may requite the offices wee haue done them in their necessity. It is a *Shame* to begge for fauor or to borrow money of an inferiour, or that is poorer then our selues; and wee cannot but blush to require money of him in lone, who hath first demanded it of vs; or to require of him, who would gladly bee payd that which we

we owe him.

All these things cannot proceede but from a base minde, and voyde of integrity. Moreover, wee blush when as wee praise any one about his merit, and when as we seeke to excuse in him the defects that are inexcusable, to the end that wee may obtaine some fauour, some present, or some assistance from him. And in like manner we cannot but blush, when as to insinuate our selues into the fauour of any one, wee abandon our selues to impudency, to extoll his good fortune, and the successe of his prosperity, without measure. As also wee are ashamed of the extraordinary demonstrations we do vually make to men afflicted, to witnesse

vnto

vnto them the feeling wee haue of their griefe: as when to comfort our Friend for the death of some one that was deere vnto him, we wish (although it bee farre from our thought) that we were able to redeeme him whose losse is so bitter vnto him, with the losse of our owne blood or life: for all these are signes of insupportable flattery, which cause euen our friends to blush when they heare vs.

Wee blush in like manner, when as wee refuse to endure the toyle of honorable employments which are offered vs; and that men of greater age, more vnable, more tender, and of another quality then our selues, accept them freely: for that this refusal

to fall is a signe of our effemini-  
nacy. Moreouer, wee blush  
to receiue benefites and fa-  
uours continually from the  
same person; and wee cannot  
without some *Shame* re-  
proach them we haue bound  
vnto vs by our fauours; for  
that it is a signe of great  
basenesse.

Finally, we are ashamed  
when as we attribute praises  
vnto our selues which are not  
due vnto vs; or that we brag  
vnseasonably; or challenge  
the glory of goodly actions,  
which other men haue en-  
ded: for that it is a note of  
our arrogancy and vanity.  
So all vices, and all the marks  
of vices, make an impression  
of shame in all those which  
are infected with them.

Secondly, we are ashamed

to see our selues destitute of all honest qualities, which recommend all our equalls generally, or at the least most of them. As for example, it is a great shame not to bee adorned with valour, wisdom, knowledge, modesty, and other excellent parts, which shine commonly in those of our profession, of our age, of our blood, or of our quality. So *Cesar* seeing himselfe two and thirty yeers old, and hauing made no shew of the greatnesse of his courage, nor done any great exploit, hee grew ashamed, and began to weepe, beholding the Image of *Alexander* who seemed to reproach him. All these defects are full of *Shame* and infamy, especially when as they proceede from



from our negligence, which shewes that we haue no cause to accuse any man but to blame our selues.

Thirdly, men blush when as they are forced to do or suffer things which are vnworthy either of their condition, or of the nature of man. As for example if they would force a man of quality to do seruices vnworthy of his rancke, this fills him with *Shame*, and he cannot endure it, but with great grieve and distaste: yea we reade in Histories of generous spirits, who in the midst of their captiuitie remembering that they were borne free, had rather precipitate themselves, and chuse a voluntary death, then bee forced to do seruices vnworthy of their births.

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And

And therefore *Nero* should die for *Shame* to commit that excesse which he did with the scumme of the people vpon the Altars and in the publique places of *Rome*: But what graue or serious thing can wee attend from that infamous monster, who hath dishonored mankinde with his impudencies? In like manner it is a matter which causeth extraordinary *Shame* in men of note and quality, when by the iniuries of Fortune, or by their own basenes they see themselves reduced to that extremitie as to suffer indignities and outrages which blemish their first lustre and glory: As those kings who hauing lost battailes, & seene their Estates ruined & spoyled, to crowne their miseries

series were led in triumph to *Rome*, to serue as a spectacle to that world of people, and to be the Images and shewes of humane misery, and of the inconstancy of the world. Wherefore they branded them with infamous basenes, which did prostitute themselves to this *Shame*. either through couetousnesse, or for want of courage. Contrariwise according to the custome of the time, when as Christian religion had not yet dispersed the vanity of *Pagan* errors, nor conuerted reproches into exercises of patience, they obserued great beames of generosity in a woman borne to pleasures, and bred vp in the midst of all delights: For that being in the power of her enemy,

shee chose rather to kill her selfe by the biting of *Aspics*, then to bee led in shew; to serue as a fatall ornament to his tryumph.

But generally it is a very shamefull thing in all conditions to do or to suffer things full of indignitie and reproch: yet we must set a difference betwixt those that suffer them by their owne basenesse, and such as endure them by a violent constraint. For they that suffer them by their owne basenesse, are infamous; for that they expose themselves volūtarily to those affronts.

But wee must againe set a difference betwixt those that suffer them by constraint: For either they resolve though timerousnesse  
and

and by an apprenſion, which ſhould not fall into a conſtant ſoule; and then it is a ſigne of their weakneſſe: Or elſe for that they cannot reſiſt, being forced by ſuch as are become maiſters of their perſons; and then it is rather an effect of their miſfortune then a ſigne of their baſenes: As wee ſee in thoſe that ſuffer ſome indignity by them that are more powerfull.

But for that *Shame* riſeth from a beleeſe which wee haue to bee wounded in our reputation, the which wee meaſure according to the iudgement & eſteeme which men make of vs; it falls out many times that we are aſhamed of the diſgraces we ſuffer in the preſence of perſons which we reſpect much, and

Y 3      whoſe

whose blame and censure we apprehend.

In which ranke wee put those which haue in their power the good chances whereunto we aspire, and of whom depends the honour or contentment which wee affect with *Passion*. As for example, a souldier will bee much more ashamed to haue fled from the enemy in the view of his Captaine, then to haue committed this basenesse in his absence; and a Louer will endure an iniury done him in the presence of his best beloued, more impatiently, then all the affronts that can bee done elsewhere. For the same reason our *Shame* increaseth, when as wee receiue any reproach before vertuous persons, and such as are held

held to be iust: As when they are wisemen or reuerent old men that accuse vs; for that wee thinke men will easily giue credit to what they say of vs. Wee are also ashamed if any infamous thing befall vs in the presence of our equals, and of such which are as it were emulators and riuals of what wee pursue; for that contending with them of honor, it is a wonderfull griete vnto vs to see this breach made: in our reputation in their presence. And generally wee are ashamed of that which is done in the sight of men which obserue it, or which haue a malicious disposition, & which interpret all actions sinisterly.

For wee conceiue, that if

Y 4

they



they do not pardon innocence, they will not spare vs. *Shame* in like manner shewes it selfe in the presence of such which are adorned with vertues contrary to the defects which appeare in our actions, especially if they bee seuerer men, who are not accustomed to pardon or excuse the errors which they see committed: As the *Romans* were ashamed to do any vnworthy act before *Cato*, both for that he was a seuerer censor of the actions of the Cittizens, as also for that he pardoned no man. It troubles vs also to see our selues reprobued & scorned by ordinary Iesters, and by such as make profession to shew themselves in Theaters; for that wee conceiue it is a testimony that  
we

we are publikely defamed, or at the least wee feare that these people to the eternall infamy of our name, will teare our reputation in publique assemblies. We are also ashamed to shew our defects before those whom we thinke wee haue offended, and are not our friends: For that we know they will not faile to publish our imperfections. Finally, wee blush when as any thing vnworthy of our condition befalls vs in the view of such whose fauour & friendship wee seeke ambitiously; apprehending that this misfortune will bee an obstacle to our pursutes, and a subiect to make vs be reiect-  
ed.

As in like manner we blush to see our selues surprized in

Y 5 some

some notable fault, by such as had vs in good esteeme, especially if they be our familiar friends, or of our owne family, which discover the error, into which we had neuer before fallen, or had alwaies cunningly concealed it.

There are also diuerse other subiects which make an impression of *Shame*; and for example, at our first speech to any one whom we know not well, we blush, for that being ignorant what account hee makes of vs, or how hee is affected to vs, wee are in suspense betwixt hope & feare, and know not how hee will entertaine our discourse. And in like manner we are surprized with *Shame*, when as wee are to speake before a great multitude and a concourse of people:

people : For that in this great diuersity of minds and humors we thinke it impossible; but there is some one who hath no great disposition to fauour vs. Moreouer, when as we are to speake before a person of eminent quality, of exquisite knowledge, or of exact iudgement, wee blush and are amazed, by reason of the great respect wee haue of him; which makes vs feare to sayle before him, and this feare fills vs with *Shame*, and makes vs blush. Wee are also not only ashamed of our defects, but euen of all the signes and tokens of our vices and bad inclinations: As wee blush not only at vncleannesse, but also at all the signes of wantonnesse; especially we are ashamed at licentious

tious words, which offend chaste eares. Wherefore *Alceus* hauing opened his mouth to speake to *Sapho*, & then staying himselfe, and pretending for his excuse, that *Shame* had hindred his speech, she answered; *If you had not had some bad desire, but had meant to speake that which was honest and not licentious, Shame had not appeared in your eyes, neither had it tyed your tongue; but you would haue deliuered your thoughts freely.*

By all that we haue sayd, it followeth, that men are not ashamed to do or say any thing whatsoeuer before such as they do not esteeme, but contemne: Whereby it followes, that they neither respect nor feare the eyes of chil-

children nor beasts . But those before whom wee are most ashamed to shew our selues in our misfortune , are our enemies , to whom wee know our miseries are a sweete and pleasing spectacle: As *Cesar* seeing himselfe a prisoner in the hands of Pirats, said, That his enemy *Crassus* would be glad of the misfortune which had befallen him.

To cōclude, mē are ashamed to see thēselues defamed publicly; as to be led to execution in the midst of a multitude of people, to bee witnesses of their ignominy. And yet the Poet *Antiphon* being condemned to dye with many others , by *Denis* the Tyrant , when as hee saw his companions going to execution,

tion, & passing before a great multitude to hide their faces, as being ashamed; beeing come out of the City, he said vnto them, *What my friends, dee you feare that some one of these Gallants will see you againe to morrow, and reproash you with your misfortune?* But doubtlesse euery man hath not this resolution, nor so great a courage in the last indignities of life,

## CHAP. 2.

*Of the Effects of Shame.*

As there are certayne Plants whose roots are venemous and mortall to such as vse them, but their leaues are



are indued with excellent qualities, and proper for the preservation of the health of man: So there are *Passions* of the soule, which on the one side serue man as a spurre to vertue, and on the other side precipitate him to vice. And this is particularly incident to *Shame*, the which doth sometime induce men to decline from wickednesse, and sometime thee diuerts them from commendable & vertuous actions, by the apprehension of an imaginary dishonour.

*Timoleon* conceiuing that all the world did hate him, for that he had consented to the death of his brother, who was a plague to his common Wealth, wandred vp and down the fields twenty years together,

together, and could not resolve to embrace the defence of his Citizens generously. Others beeing ashamed to abandon their Countrey in publike calamities, haue carried themselves courageously to vndertake things, for the which they knew, they shold bee vnworthily recompenced by the ingratitude of their Citizens.

But before wee come to the effects, which *Shame* produceth in the soule, let vs see what impressions shee makes in the body: for it seemes shee stirres vp an effect farre different from the cause from whence it proceedes. *Shame*, say the Philosophers, *Is a kinde of feare, which ariseth, for that man doubts some blame and some censure of his actions.*

As

As Feare then retires the blood, and makes it descend about the heart, how comes it that *Shame* should cause the blood to ascend vnto the countenance, and make the face to blush? Whereunto they answer, that men may be threatned with two kinds of miseries, whereof the one is not onely contrary to the inclination of their senses, but also tends to the destruction of their nature and being, as extreame dangers and perills of death. Others are onely contrary to the desires of the senses, but doe not threaten man with death or the decay of his being: As for example, the blame and dishonour which wee apprehend for something we haue done. When man then propounds

pounds vnto himselfe the forme of these first kindes of obiects, that is to say, of those calamities which tend to the dissolution of his being: Nature beeing amazed by the impressiō which she receiues from the senses, striues to succour them, and drawes the blood and heate vnto the heart, which is (as wee haue said) the fountaine of life; whereupon the countenance being destitute of blood, man growes pale in these great terrors. But when as he apprehends onely the calamities of the second kinde, that is to say, those which tend not to the destruction of his beeing, but onely to the decrease of his glory; Nature is not so powerfully moued by the senses, for that the ruine

ine of her confistence is not directly in question ; but leaues the grieke in the senses, whose amazement doth not fend the heat and blood into the body, but causeth it to mount into the face, which becomes all red and sanguine.

Some beleene that this blushing is as it were a veile, which Nature extends before her to couer her *shame*, as wee see commonly, they that are ashamed carry their hands before their faces and eyes, for that those parts are most afflicted with shame, in regard they are the most noble. And the impression is particularly made in the eies, which the Ancients haue called the seate of modesty : and therefore *Plato* brings in  
*Socrates*

*Socrates* couering his eyes, when as hee would make a discourse of Loue, wherein hee thought there was some shame for a man, making profession of deepe wisdom. The reason therof is, for that wee are ashamed to see our defects knowne to men, who we greatly respect and reuerence.

The Ancients did alwaies hold it for a good signe and presage in young men, to see them blush easily; wherefore they called this blushing *The colour, or vermillion of Vertue*. Yea, that great *Roman* Cenfor said, that hee loued them better that blusht, then such as grew pale, for that to be pale, is a signe they feared some danger. So as they that grow pale, seeme to haue an  
 appre-

apprehension to be called in question for some crime, and punished: whereas they that blush, shew they are ashamed, and apprehend even the very suspicion of doing ill.

But there is no kinde of people in whom an honest bashfulness is more commendable; yea, upon the lightest occasions, then in Virgins, and Women: for to blush for words, for motions, and for the least licentious actions, is a signe of an exact modesty, which is the rarest and the most rich ornament of their sexe.

But to returne to young men; as it is a good signe to see them blush, for that being naturally inclined to follow their passions (by reason of this great heate of blood which



which abounds in them, and enflames them) it is a commendable thing to see that *Shame* is, as it were, a bridle to retire them from vice. But this kinde of shame is not much commendable in men of ripe age, who haue not this spurre to incite them to euill; and moreover, vertue should haue taken deep root in their hearts, whereby all their actions should be commendable and full of glory, so as they haue no subiect to blush. But if they fall into this defect, it is a signe that they iudge themselves, and that their vertue is not perfect nor compleat proportionable to their age.

Let vs now come to the effects which *Shame* produceth in the soule: there are some

some good, as we haue sayde in the beginning, but she also produceth badde. Many times shee hath made them valiant, who were faint-hearted and feareful; yea, we haue seene whole Armies beeing amazed and terrified, haue resumed courage by the presence of *Cæsars*, *Alexanders*, *Scipioes*, & other great Commanders, who haue brought backe their souldiers in battailes; for that the great esteeme they had of such excellent Captains, made them blush to flye before them; yea, to chuse a most certaine death, rather then to be held cowards by such wotthy men.

Moreover, there haue beene souldiers, who hauing faintly maintained an encounter,

counter, the next day to wipe away this shame, haue performed wonders, whereof the *Greeke* and *Romane* histories, furnish vs with many examples. Besides, *Shame* doth retire vs often from dishonest things, as appeared in him who confessed freely that he plaid not at dice, for that he was ashamed any one should see him lose his time in so bad an exercise.

But on the other side, *Shame* diuerts vs many times from commendable things; yea, and from those which are profitable, and which concerne the preservation of our liues. As for example, you see at banquets, some being prest to drink extraordinarily, are ashamed to refuse them which inuite them; and  
ouer-

ouer-ruled by their vniust  
entreaties, fall into forfeits  
which ruine their health.

Others in like manner see-  
ing theselues importuned or  
conuined in bad companies,  
not to bee so modest before  
their friends, suffer them-  
selues to be carried away, to  
commit great disorders, as  
with women, or at play, or  
to do other execrable villa-  
nies, for the which they are  
griued in their soules; but  
they haue not the courage to  
refuse such as presse them:  
whereby it happens often,  
that flying the smoake they  
runne headlong into the  
flame; that is to say, for that  
they are not able to resist an  
imaginary *Shame*, they fall in-  
to an eternall reproach, be-  
ing blamed by all vertuous

Z men

men, when they heare of their basenesse.

There haue bene some also who fearing that there haue bene plots laid to kill them, or to poyson them, yet surmounted by *Shame*, haue abandoned themselues to the danger.

So *Dyon* being aduertized of the conspiracy which was practized against him, and his host and friend *Calippus*; being ashamed to refuse to go whither they were both inuited, which was the place where the murther was intended, he went rashly to his death.

So *Antipater* the sonne of *Cassander*, lost himselfe for that he durst not refuse to suppe with *Demetrius*, where he was slaine. Young *Hercules*

*cules*, the sonne of *Alexander* the Great, was surprized by *Polipherchon* and *Cassander*, being ashamed to refuse their requests to suppe with them, who tended only to haue a meanes to murther him. By all that we haue sayd, we may gather that *Shame* is sometimes profitable, and sometimes pernicious; but it is alwayes commendable, when it serues vs as a bridle to retire vs from vice.

## Of Hope and Despaire.

## CHAP. I.



Ee which sayd that *Hope* was a dreame which presents it selfe to them that wake,  
Z 2 hath

hath excellently described the nature and effects of this *Passion*. For as dreames in the night fill vs. with illusions and vaine formes, which abuse vs, and which make vs imagine that wee are rich in our extreamest pouerty, that we are happy in our greatest misery, that wee enioy Scepters and Crownes, in the midst of bonds and irons, that wee command great Empires when we are restrained in a hard and slavish captiuitie; in like manner, *Hope*, abusing our imagination, fills our soules with vaine contentments, and represents vnto vs that all things are subiect to our power, that the whole world should receiue a law from vs, and if that there appeare any obstacle



stacle to hinder our designs and desires, that we are able to surmount them. Yea in the midst of our greatest disgraces, wee flatter our selues with this conceit, that humane calamities and miseries haue their bounds, and that they are weary to be alwayes about one man; as the winds and stormes in the end breake, and are pacified after the most violent gustes. Wee represent vnto our selues the constitution of heauen and earth; wee call to mind that the Starres which are in the West returne suddenly to the East, that the day follows the night, that a calme season succedes a storme, and that faire weather follows thunder and raine: Finally, we beleeue that wee must as-

sure our selues to see a change in the course of this life, and that the day which wee attend will make our condition better, and conuert our misfortunes into incomparable felicities: So as I doubt not but euen among those wretched slaues whom miseries consume in the Turkes gallies, there are some which dreame and thinke of the Scepter of the Empire of Asia.

Wherefore an Ancient sayd, that there was nothing so common in the life of men as *Hope*, which remaines euen to them that are deprived of all other good and content: For that the miserable after an absolute shipwracke, entertaine *Hope*, as the last anchor of their ruined fortune.

But

But to leaue the illuſion and  
deceits which wee frame in  
our ſelues; who knowes not  
that when they are well or-  
dered, they ſerue to mollifie  
the paines, and to incounter  
all the croſſes and accidents  
of this life? What had be-  
come of the *Romans* after the  
battaile of *Cannas*, wherein  
they loſt the flower and  
chiefe of their men of war, if  
a better *Hope* had not reuiued  
their courages, to reuenge  
the loſſe and diſgrace which  
they had receiued? Had not  
their common-weath with-  
out it, bene a prey to *Hanni-  
ball*, and the *Carthaginians*?  
Had not their Eſtate beene  
ouerthrowne, and their rich  
prouinces made deſolate?  
But theſe great perſonages  
repreſenting vnto themſelues

that many suffer shipwracke in the Port; and contrariwise others, saue themselves among rockes; fortified themselves with *Hope*, which made them not only repaire this losse, but also to giue a law vnto the victors. How many other Estates, Empires, and Kingdomes, through *Hope* haue maintained themselves against the iniuries of Fortune?

During the reigne of *Charles* the sixt, in that great deluge of English, which ouerflowed in a manner all *France*; in those domesticke treacheries, in that generall reuolt of all the Orders of the Realme, what had become of the fortune of *France*, if those great ornaments of our History, those worthy men, which

which liued at that time, by an infamous basenefle had abandoned the Ship in the middest of a storme, and had lost all *Hope* to preserve the King, and his Crowne? Was not their hope seconded by a thousand miracles which God wrought to prevent the shipwrecke of the State? And in our dayes, amidst the powerfull conspiracies of *Spaine*, and the violent factions of the League, into what misery had this goodly Crowne falne, if great *Henry*, the miracle of our age, full of good *Hope*, which neuer abandons great resolutions, had not supported it, and by his valour ouerthrowne all the obstacles, which his enemies had set before his throne to hinder his rising? But if *Hope*

hath great power to main-  
taine publique fortunes, it  
hath no lesse to assure those of  
priuate mē. So as we may say,  
that most men liue by *Hope*,  
& entertaine theselues with  
the future, this *Passion* neuer  
abandoning any man vntil he  
goes to the graue. Vwherefore  
if we shold search out the na-  
ture of any *Passiō* exactly, it is  
of this in particular, which  
hath such power ouer the o-  
ther affections of our soules.  
We must then gather the de-  
finitions disperſed here and  
there in the writings of Philo-  
sophers. *Hope*, said an ancient,  
*is an expectation of good*: *Hope*,  
sayd another, *is a cert. & cōfi-*  
*dence which we haue, that what*  
*we imagine shal be fal vs.* And a  
third writes, that *Hope is a*  
*motion and passion of the soule,*

by the which, upon the impression which wee haue of a future good, which presents it selfe to our imagination as difficult to obtaine, we endeavour to pursue it, conceiuing that we are able to attain vnto it, and in the end to get the possession. From this last Definition, which doth explicate the true nature of Hope, we gather that there are foure conditions required in the obiect. First, it must haue bounty, for that Hope tends alwayes to that which is good. Wherein it differs from feare, which hath for obiect the euill where-with man is threatned. Secondly, this good which wee hope for must bee to come, for that the presence and enioying of this takes away the Hope. So Alexander going



ing into *India* hoped to conquer it, but hauing finished his conquest, this *Hope* vanished, and was conuerted into the enioying and possession of that which hee had hoped for. So in this life we hope for the glory of heauen, but when we shall enioy it, this hope shall bee quencht and extinguished. And therein *Hope* differs from Ioy, which is a contentment of a good which we possesse.

Thirdly, there must bee a paine and difficulty to attain vnto the good whereof wee haue conceived an *Hope*, for no man hopes for that which is in his power. And therefore the Philosophers obserue, that *Hope* is alwayes mixt with some feare, by reason of the obstacles which  
present

present themselves, and may hinder mans enjoying of the good hee hopes for; wherein she differs from Desire, which extends generally to all kinde of good, without any apprehension of difficulty: And therefore Desire belongs to the *Concupiscible* appetite, whereas *Hope* is subject to the *Irafcible*.

Fourthly, amidst the difficulties which man doth apprehend in getting the good which he hopes for; yet notwithstanding hee must imagine, that it is in his power to prevent all the obstacles which might hinder his enjoying; for no man did ever hope for things which hee holds impossible. So, *Cesar* would never have hoped to finish the conquest of *Ganle*,  
if

if he had not first perswaded himselfe that the industry of a generous Captaine, might bring that enterprize to a good end, although it were difficult and dangerous. Whereby wee may gather, that although *Hope* hath her seat in the *Irascible* appetite, which hath the good for her object: yet as it is the property of powers indued with knowledge, to excite those which are capable to desire, representing their objects vnto them; her motions depend of the imagination, which man frames in himselfe of a good which he beleeueth confidently to obtaine, notwithstanding that he apprehends great crosses in the pursuit. For man, who is a credulous creature, and al-  
wayes

wayes flatters himselfe in his hopes, doth also assure himselfe to compasse that which he thinkes is not above his forces, although hee bee not ignorant that hee shall finde some resistance. So as this beleefe begets in the *irascible* part a certain confidence, which makes him vndertake that which he desireth, assuring himselfe to surmount all obstacles which may crosse him and hinder his enioying. And it is certaine, that euen brute beasts haue motions of hope and despaire as well as men. For the interior passions of creatures discover themselves, and are knowne by their exterior motions, wherewith they are agitated; whereof we haue daily experience; in the Sparrow-hawk, Tassell,

Tassel, Sacre, Lanner, and other Hawkes, who seeing their game farre from them, and not in their power to ouertake it, they neuer bate after it, nor offer to pursue it; whereas if they see it in a reasonable distance, they presently take their flight to seaze vpon it. And in like manner the Lyon going to hunt after his prey, to satisfie his hunger, runnes not after those beasts which hee thinkes can easily flye from his fury, but sets vpon those which hee imagines cannot escape him.

But wee must vnderstand, that to frame the *Hope* of any thing in our soules, it is not necessary that wee know evidently that it shall happen, and that it is in our power

power to attaine vnto it, but it sufficeth that wee haue some opinion and coniecture grounded vpon the apparence, which makes vs beleue that there is meanes to obtaine it: for that when wee perswade our selues vpon any reason whatsoever, as imagining that others haue attained vnto it, that it hath at other times succeeded, and that the same euents attend vs; that time assists vs, that the place is fauourable vnto vs, that we haue friends, or that wee are able enough of our selues to compasse our designs; we fill our selues with *Hope*, and doubt not but all will succcede happily. So as there is no reason how light soeuer, but it is sufficient to make vs hope for that  
which

which we propound vnto our selues; wherein it seemes, that amidst the miseries of this life, and all publicke and priuate calamities, which otherwise would be intollerable, the wise prouidence of God hath prouided vs this remedy, to fortifie our constancy and to keepe vs from shrinking; and falling vnder the burthen of aduersities. The which the Poets would represent vnto vs, vnder the fable of *Pandora*, in whose boxe (beeing emptied of all good things) there remained nothing but onely *Hope* vpon the brimme of the vessel.

And therefore a *Rhodian* being cast into an obscure and cruell prison, among serpents and venomous beasts,  
and



and conured by some of his friends, to make an end of so many miseries by a voluntary death, he answered wisely, that man hopes still whilst he breathes : as if he would say, that death onely could de- priue man of the hopes of life, and a better fortune.

The persons which fill themselves with *Hopes*, are first of all those which haue had a long experience and a perfect knowledge of the affaires of the world. As for example, such as haue beene in many incounters, and haue gotten great victories, promise still vnto themselves a power to vanquish, yea, when they haue beene beaten. And therefore that *Romane* Con- sull which escaped from the battaile of *Cannas*, where his  
com-

companion had beene slaine, and the whole *Romane* Army defeated, was commended for that he hoped well of the Common-weale.

And heere wee must remember what wee haue formerly said, that the object of *Hope* is a difficult good, but yet possible to attaine; for thereby followes, that one thing may contribute, and serue to entertaine our *Hope* after two manners; that is to say, either in making the thing truely possible, and put the effects into our power: Or at the least, in making vs beleeue that it is not impossible, and that we may attaine vnto it by meanes, which are not aboue our forces. In the first sort, whatsoeuer makes vs more powerfull increaseth  
our

our *Hopes*. And in this kinde wee put riches, Armes, Courage, Crownes, Empires, yea, and a long experience of things: for so we see that men powerfull in wealth assure themselves to compass any thing.

As *Philip of Macedon* said, that hee could force any place whereas money might enter. And great Kings measuring enterprizes, rather by their power and courage, then the obstacles which present themselves, haue an imagination to accomplish them happily.

And in like manner experience, by meanes whereof man hath gotten the knowledge of meanes fit to procure things to succeed easily, makes him conceiue a certain

*Hope,*

*Hope*, to haue good successe of that which hee proiects. Wherefore an Ancient said, that no man apprehends to vndertake that which hee hath learned well and can do accordingly,

In the second sort, whatsoever makes vs esteeme things easie, or which diminish the difficulties, may also serue to fortifie our hopes. And of this sort an exquisite knowlege, or a powerfull remonstrance may contribute much. And therefore in great battailes, Generalls haue beene accustomed to represent vnto their souldiers their valours tryed in many occasions, the little courage of their enemies; and whatsoever may assure them of the victory.

In

In this manner their experience may preuaile much: for by the experience which a man hath of things, he perswades himselfe that what others hold impossible, may notwithstanding succede happily. It is true also that experience may weaken Hope, according to the resolution or want of courage where it resides. Wherefore *Aristotle* said, that old men haue weak or bad hopes; for that the long experience they haue of things, the changes they haue seene, the deceits which they haue tried, the fraudes wherewith they haue beene circumvented, the practises wherewith they haue beene abused, and the little integrity and sincerity they haue found in the actions of men; fills

fills them with iealouſie and diſtruſt. Adding moreouer, that they liue rather by memory then *Hope*; for that they haue a ſmall ſhare in future things, which is the ground of *Hope*, and that they haue a great *Idea* of what is paſt, which ſerues to entertaine the memory.

But contrariwiſe young men are full of *Hopes*, for three reaſons grounded vpon three conditions, required in the object of this *Paſſion*, which we haue ſayd ſhould bee a good not yet preſent, difficult, but yet poſſible to obtaine; for young men haue little knowledge of what is paſt, and haue a great part in the future, by reaſon of their age: In regard whereof memory being of things paſt,  
and

and *Hope* of things to come, they do not much build vpon their memory, but feed themselves with hopes, which are many times vaine. And moreover young men haue much heate, and aboundance of spirit, which puffes vp their hearts, and makes them aspire to great matters, little esteeming any difficulties which present themselves.

Thirdly, as they that haue receiued no repulse in their enterprizes, nor found any obstacles in their designs, they perswade themselves easily that they shal attaine vnto their desires, young men hauing no experience of the crosles, and hinderance which are found in affaires, imagine that all will succeed happily, and therefore they

A a are



are still full of *Hope*.

They also which are surprized with wine conceiue great hopes, both by reason of the heate and abundance of spirits, caused by the excessse of wine, as also for that their spirits being drowned in wine, cannot apprehend the dangers, nor foresee the obstacles which they may find in their designs. For the same reason mad men, who are neither capable of counsell nor iudgement, are easily carried to *Hope*, for all that which they imagine; and they vndertake foolishly whatsoeuer comes into their fancies; for as *Aristotle* sayth, to speake of all things and leaue nothing vncensured, is a marke of folly; so to attempt all things, and to

*Hope*

Hope for all, is a signe of little iudgement.

If against this which we haue propounded, (that young men, such as are overtaken with wine, and madmen are commonly full of great hopes) they obiekt, that neither the one nor the other haue any kind of experience whereof they may make vse, nor any firme resolution, neither yet any great power to effect their deffignes, all which are necessary conditions to frame hopes; they must remeber that although these men in effect haue none of these qualities, but are for the most part vnprouided, yet they are rich in imagination, and thinke they enjoy them.

And we haue sayd, that the

Aa 2      obiects

objects of *Hope*, make not their impression in our soules, by the truth alone of things, but also by the vaine imaginations which wee frame in our selues. Wherefore although they bee without experience, without resolution, and without great meanes to effect what they haue propounded, yet they do promise much vnto themselves, and *Hope* for all.

And although that loue be the fountaine of all the *Passions* of the soule, yet *Hope* may be the cause that we loue any one. For *Hope* may propound vnto it selfe two things, that is to say, the good which wee hope for, and the meanes to obtaine it. Wherefore an object of good presenting it selfe vnto vs, which wee are  
not

notable to attaine vnto, but by the assistance of some other; for this reason, *Hope* doth also regard those that assist vs, and make the thing easie.

Seeing then that *Hope* regards the objects which wee propound vnto our selues, vndoubtedly loue is the root and cause of *Hope*; for that we *hope* not for any thing but that wherewith wee are in loue, and whereunto we haue tied our affections, desiring passionately to enioy it. But for that *hope* regards him which doth open to vs the meanes, and makes the thing possible; loue is a bud of *hope*, seeing that we loue him, for that we *hope* to attaine vnto our desires by his assistance. So as the first impression

which the object wee pursue makes in our soules, is an effect of the loue wee beare it, conceiuing it to bee a good fit for vs. But the consideration of the meanes to attaine vnto it, which comes from others, makes a second impression in vs, and induceth vs to loue him that doth procure it, representing him vnto vs as profitable vnto our desigine, and therefore worthy to be beloued.

Touching that which concerns the effects of *hope*, we will not make any particular discourse, but content our selues to say, that as the North Star is the mariners guide who looke continually vpon her light to assure their nauigation: so *Hope* is that which inflames vs to all the  
diffi.

difficulle actions wee vnder-  
take.

And as the brightnes of  
this Star doth fill them with  
ioy that saile by sea, but  
when as it shines not they  
are dismaide, & feare hourly  
to perish by the violence of  
some storme, or to see their  
ship split vpon some rocke:  
So whilest wee haue any re-  
mainer of *hope*, our soules are  
content; but if it bee quite  
vanished, we hold out selues  
miserable, and begin to neg-  
lect and forget our selues.

The first effect of *Hope* is,  
that it breeds a singular con-  
tēt in vs, which makes our pur-  
suites pleasing. Wherefore  
all the *Philosophers* concur  
in this Maxime, that *hope* for-  
tifies our resolutions, and  
makes them more prompt in

A a 4      their

their actions. The which is for two reasons. The first, for that she hath for her object a good hard to bee obtained, But the apprehension of the difficulty, which presents it selfe in the pursuite of the good whereunto wee doe aspire, doth vsually make vs gather our forces together, to vanquish all obstacles, and to attaine vnto it, notwithstanding all the difficulties that may bee encountered: And therefore wee employ more care and diligence, by means whereof wee attaine more easily to the end of our designs.

Secondly, *Hope* breeds this pleasure and sweetnes whereof wee haue spoken, which makes vs more actiue and more ready to pursue that which



which we desire; for that we behold nothing painful wherein we take delight. Wee must then remember here, what we haue spoken elsewhere, that *Hope is a sweete imagination which we frame in our selues, of a good, whereunto wee aspire.* And that this imagination begetts in our soules a second contentment, for that it is accompanied with this beleefe, that wee may attaine vnto it.

Wherefore as pleasure makes all actions delightfull vnto men, so the content we receiue from our hopes (according vnto the *Philosophers*) makes vs to pursue with more heate and lesse paine, that which wee haue once conceived in our thoughts. This ioy which proceeds

A a 5 from

from a certaine *hope* we haue  
of enioying, deriuing from  
the soule, disperseth it selfe in  
to all the members of man,  
the which do ioyfully receiue  
the impressions of the mo-  
uing faculty, yeelding vpon  
this occasion a more prompt  
obedience to execute the  
commandements of the *Ira-  
scible*, the which of the one  
side is inflamed with desire to  
incounter & vanquish what-  
soeuer opposeth it selfe a-  
gainst her, and on the other  
she is sweetly entertained in  
this resolution, by the plea-  
sure which *imaginatio* giues  
her, representing that shee  
may vanquish all these obsta-  
cles, and be victorious in this  
combate, and in the end ob-  
taine the good whereunto  
she aspires.

But

But particularly, this ioy  
fallies about the heart; which  
sends it backe againe: and  
makes it ascend into the eies  
and countenance. Where-  
fore we reade in their faces  
that are full of good *hope*, the  
contentment which their i-  
magination giues them.

In regard of the ioy and  
cōtentment which *hope* giues  
vs, wee do easily deuoure all  
the toyles and paines which  
présent themselves in our  
pursuites, especially when the  
good which we pursue is en-  
dued with some excellent  
perfection, which makes vs  
to esteeme it greatly, or ro-  
loue it ardently. As for ex-  
ample, at the seega of Troy,  
the Grecians were not dis-  
couraged with the tedious-  
nesse of the time, nor with  
the

the toyles and dangers of warre ; for that they imagined the beauty of *Hellen* deserved their long labor to restore her to her husband, and to reuenge the reproach and infamy of *Greece*.

So *Jacob* being passionately in loue with faire *Rachell*, hee patiently endured the rigors of her father, the toyles of his seruice, and the afflictions of his mind, for that he liued daily in hope of this incomparable beauty : And therefore *Hope* hath so great power in humane affaires, in which there is found some kinde of difficulty. The laborer would not expose himselfe so freely to the rigor of the aire, nor endure with such patience the iniuries of times, in tilling his land, if hee did not promise

promise vnto himselfe a rich harvest for the fruit of his labour: the souldier would not cast himselfe into dangers, he would not mount vp to breaches, nor thrust himselfe into the fury of combates, if the expectance of glory, or hope of booty did not animate his courage.

The Merchant would not passe through rockes, fires, waues, and stormes, running from Sea to Sea, and from Port to Port, if hee did not promise vnto himselfe great wealth in recompence of his voyages and trauailes. Yea, *Alexander* himselfe going to the warre at *Asia*, where hee should expose himselfe to a thousand dangers, protested that he was wholly thrust on by *Hope* to enioy all the glory

ry and treasures of the East, by subduing those *Barbarians*. So as *hope* is as it were, the soule of goodliest actions, making vs to surmount all the difficulties and obstacles, which might hinder the execution by the mollifying of our resolutions. Yea, it is certaine, that Courage hath alwayes beene held an effect of good *hope*: for when as man *hopes* to surmount those fearefull things, which seeme to threaten him, he goes courageously to encounter them; whereas when he is surprized by feare, he faints, and abandons himselfe vnto the misfortune, his despaire rising from the difficulties which he apprehends in the good which he should hope for.

But to haue full knowledge

ledge of this subiect, and of the whole matter, we must in the end of this chapter shew, how despaire is contrary to hope, and seek the reason why it may sometimes make men valiant, and to winne great victories. First of all, you must remember what wee haue formerly sayd, that among the Passions of the soule, they obserue two kinds of opposition. The first is found among those that haue contrary things for objects: and that is onely among the passions of the *Concupiscible* part: as for example, betwixt Loue and Hatred, whereof the one regards the good, and the other the euill. The second is obserued betwixt those that in truth regard the same object,



iect, but with diuerse considerations, and that is found among the *Irascible* passions, whereof the one seekes the good, and the other flies it, by reason of the difficulty which doth inuiron it. As for example, Courage and Feare do both regard an imminent danger, which presents it selfe to the imagination; but, courage lookes vpon it to encounter and vanquish it, and feare regards it to annoyd it and flye from it, if it be in her power. After this manner, then despaire is contrary to *hope*, for that the object of *hope* which is a good difficult, to obtaine, drawes vs of the one side, that is to say, so farre as wee doe imagine a power to obtaine it. But it doth reiect vs

on

on the other side, as when we apprehend, that wee haue no meanes to enioy it : for this apprehension daunts our resolution : or that, as *Aristotle* teacheth, the impossibility which wee imagine in things, makes vs to giue ouer their pursuit.


Wherefore in this consideration, despaire is quite contrary to *hope*. But some one may say, How comes it that many times in warre, despaire makes men valiant, and giues them great victories, as well as *Hope*, for that it is not the custom of nature to produce the like effects from contrary causes ? To which we answer, that when in the midst of despaire men resolute to fight valiantly, as we reade of the English in the plaines of *Poictiers*,

*Poictiers*, where they tooke one of our Kings prisoner; it happens for that they haue not lost all *hope*: for they that see no apparence of safety by flying, and apprehend that it cannot preserue them from falling into their enemies hands, but will purchase them eternall shame with their miserie; losing all *hope* of that side, they resume new courage, and resolute to sell their liues dearly, and to reuenge their deaths gloriously. Wherefore great Captaines haue alwaies held opinion, that enemies should not bee thrust into despaire beeing put to flight, but rather make them a bridge of gold, & to giue them meanes to passe riuers, lest that finding themselves staied, and de-

despairing of all safety, they should take more courage, and generously reuenge their first basenesse, by a cruell slaughter of their enemies.

*Of Choler.*

CHAP. I.

 F all the *passions* of the soule, there is not any one that takes such deepe root, or extends her branches farther then *Choler*; wherof, neither age, condition, people, nor nation, are fully exempt. There are whole Countries which liuing vnder a sharp & rough climate, are not acquainted with pleasures: there

There are others, who contenting themselves with those benefits which nature presents vnto them, are not enflamed with any ambition. Some there be, to whom misery is familiar, as they fear not any accidents of fortune. But there is not any, ouer whom *Choler* doth not exercise her power, and shew the excesse of her rage: Yea, she enflames whole kingdomes and Empires; whereas the other passions doe onely trouble and agitate priuate persons.

Wee haue neuer seene a whole Nation surprized with the loue of one woman. It was neuer found, that a whole City hath beene transported with a desire to heape vp treasure: Ambition doth puffed.

puffe vp but certaine spirits.  
But we see Cities, Prouinces,  
and whole States, enflamed  
with Choler; and transported  
by this fury; with a publicke  
conspiracy of great & small,  
young and olde, men, and  
children, Magistrates, and  
multitude; we see Commo-  
nalties, whom this fury hath  
incensed, runne all to Armies,  
to reuenge a disgrace, or a  
wrong; which they pretend  
hath beene done them. We  
haue also seene great and po-  
werfull Armies, which haue  
bene the terror of the world,  
ruine themselves by this fu-  
ry, which hath thrust them  
into mutiny against their  
Commanders. Wherefore  
if there be any passion which  
is pernicious vnto man-kind,  
it is this, which seemes nei-  
ther

ther to haue bounds nor limits, nor any shew of reason. It shall bee therefore fit to know the nature, properties, and effects thereof; to the end, wee may finde out some remedy, to diuert the miseries which shee brings into the world.

Let vs begin by the Definition, which giues a full light of the Essence of the thing, and makes vs to know perfectly.

*Choler is an ardent passion, which vpon the apparence there is to be able to reuenge our selues, incites vs to a feeling of a contempt and sensible iniury, which we beleue hath been vniustly done, either to our selues, or to those we loue. Whereby it appeares first, that Choler is accompanied with a heate, which*



which is framed and ingendred in vs, for that this passion enflames the blood and spirits, which are about the heart, by meanes of the gall, which in this heat exhales it selfe, and ascends vnto the braine, where it troubles our imagination. This heate differs from that which proceeds from loue, for that the heate which is found in loue, tending to the thing beloued to vnite it selfe with it, is mixt with a certaine sweetenesse, so as the Philosophers compare it to the moderate heate of the ayre or blood.

Wherefore we say, that sanguine complexions are most capable of loue, & that the bounty of the liuer wheras the blood is framed, induceth to loue. But the heate of  
*Choler*

*Choler* is boyling, full of bitterness, and accompanied with sharpenes, which tends to the destruction of the object which it pursues, and is properly like to the heat of a great fire, or to adust *choler* extraordinarily mooued, which consumes the subject whereunto it is fixed, and therefore the Philosophers maintaine, that it proceeds from the gall,

It appeares also by the Definition of *Choler*, that she hath alwayes for object the particular persons which haue wronged vs. Wherein she differs from hatred, which extends to a multitude of men. As for example, wee detest all murtherers, all theeves, all poysoners, and all slanderers: euen as wee abhorre

horre all serpents, vipers and  
venemous beasts. And there-  
fore it is not sufficient to sa-  
tisfie our *Choler*, that he that  
hath done vs wrong fall into  
some disafter, which might  
suffice to giue satisfaction to  
our hatred: But moreouer (to  
giue vs full contentment) hee  
must know that we haue pro-  
cured him this crosse, and  
that wee are the authors of  
the reuenge and afflictions  
which he endures.

So *Vlysses* hauing put out  
the eye of *Cyclops*, dissembled  
his name no longer, as he had  
done before, but would make  
himselſe knowne vnto him;  
as if he had not bene suffici-  
ently reuenged of this mon-  
ſter, velleſſe hee had let him  
know that he was the author  
of his disafter. We learne

B b also

also by the same definition, that to incense vs to Choller, it is necessary, that he who is the obie& haue done vs wrōg, or to some one whō we loue, or that belongs vnto vs. As for example, wee are discontented with those that wound our reputation, which attempt against our liues; which crosse our pleasures, or vndertake any thing against our kinsfolkes or friends: But wee cannot bee angry with him which causeth a Iew to be put vnto the chaine at *Constantinople*, or a Moore to be whipt at *Rome*; for that the outrage done vnto these persons doth nothing concerne vs. But if it doe casually happen that one man is angry against another, hauing receiued no cause

cause of distaste from him, only by a certaine antipathy and contrariety of humors; the reason is, for that in this naturall antipathy, he that is angry against the other, conceives in his imaginatiō that hee is able to do him some wrong, or at the least he hath such a distaste of him as it is troublesome vnto him to looke on him.

So as this antipathy supplies the place of an iniury, and workes the same effect that the imagination did to haue receiued some wrong.

Wee gather also from the same definitiō, that to excite *Choler* we must imagine that wee are able to execute the reuenge whereunto we aspire: And therefore wee dare not be angry, or at the least verie

B b 2 lightly,

lightly, against kings, and great personages that haue wronged vs; for that we know their authority protects them from our reuenge.

Yea, there hath bene a father, whose son a great king drawing flaine in the midst of his cups with the shot of an arrow, suppress his griefe in such sort (seeing hee could not reuenge it) as forbearing to complaine of this most stous cruelty, hee commended the Princes dexterity in shooting. But we may say, that this actiō fauored more of flattery, then of constancy,

For the last obseruation we must remember that the causes which excite Cholera are not alwayes true, but many

any times are such as we frame  
in our owne imaginations;  
for this *Passion* with her o-  
ther defects hath also that ex-  
cell, that she is witty to finde  
out meanes to cloake her vio-  
lence and fury. As it appea-  
red in that *Roman*, who trans-  
ported with this fury, suppo-  
sed three crimes to put three  
innocents to death, vnder  
some colour of Iustice. By  
that which we haue formerly  
sayd, it may be gathered that  
*Choler* is alwayes accompani-  
ed with some kind of plea-  
sure, which proceeds from  
the hope we haue to reuenge  
the wrong which hath beene  
done vs. For there is a con-  
tent to promise vnto our  
selves to bee able to attaine  
vnto that which wee desire  
passionately; whereas no man



man wisheth for those things which he thinks are about his power. Wherefore as he that is incensed against any one, pursues a reuenge whereunto hee thinks hee may attaine, this hope fills his soule with ioy, and giues him a singular content; wherefore *Homer* makes *Achilles* to say, that *Choler* disperseth it selfe in the hearts of generous men, with a sweetnes which exceeds that of hony.

But this great content doth not only arise from the hope wee haue to be able to reuenge our selues; but it also proceeds from the working of our imagination, which thinking continually of the same object of reuenge, breeds in vs a pleasure like  
vnto

vnto that which they feele  
that haue delightful dreams,  
and which take pleasure in  
their vaine apparitions, Yet  
we must remember that *Choler*  
is also full of griefe and  
bitternesse, for that it pro-  
pounds the iniury receiued,  
the which shée cannot easily  
digest, presupposing that it  
is accompanied with some  
notable contempt which  
tends to the impayring of  
his honor and reputarion. So  
as the sweetnesse which is  
found growes from the opi-  
nion of reuenge; and the bit-  
ternesse proceeds from the  
conceite of the iniury which  
we cannot endure. Finally,  
as our *Choler* is inflamed by  
the contempt and bad opi-  
nion which they seeme to  
haue of vs; as there are diuerse

kinds of contempt, so it may grow from diuerse subjects. For many times although the contempt be not accompanied with any iniury, making only a shew that they do not hold vs in such esteeme as we thinke wee are worthy of, this simple contempt prouoketh vs to *Choler*, holding our selues wronged, for that wee are not honored as we thinke wee haue deserved.

As if we should yeeld to a King all the honors of the world, and yet forbear to giue him the title of a King, this were sufficient to enflame his *Choler*: At it appeared in *Alexander*, to whom *Darius* hauing written a letter full of great and large offers, but had forgot to giue him

him the title of King; this  
generous spirit bare it so im-  
patiently; as in the end of  
that which he sent for an an-  
swere, hee added for the last  
conclusion of all their confe-  
rences by writing, *Finally,*  
*when thou writest vnto me, re-*  
*member that it is not only to a*  
*King, but vnto thy Ring that*  
*thou writest.* The which hee  
added for that hee had defea-  
ted *Darius* in battaile. In truch  
he that yeelds not to any one  
the honour that is due vnto  
him, makes shew to contemne  
him, and that he deserues not  
the honor which he doth en-  
ioy: For that if hee regarded  
him as hee ought, hee would  
not seeke to diminish those  
honors which all the world  
belies seeke vnto him. And  
therefore we may prouoke a-

any one to *Choler* by our silence, for that it may bee a signe of our contempt. But the wrong wee receive from those which depraue vs openly, and dishonor vs either in deed or word without any cause, is more hard to digest. For that he which doth this outrage without any subiect, makes a visible demonstration that he doth not esteeme vs: it being most euident that when as wee hold any good regard of a man, we are careful not to offend him without cause; yea wee endeavor to insinuate our selues into his friendship.

There is another kind of contempt which prouokes *Choler* more then that whereof wee haue spoken; as when any one takes a pleasure to  
 wrong

wrong vs and to crosse our  
designes, reaping no profit  
by the crosses which he giues  
vs, but the contentment to  
haue crost vs, and to haue  
hindred the course of our in-  
tentions. For it is an appa-  
rent signe of a wonderful con-  
tempt, seeing that he wrongs  
vs in a thing whereof hee  
reapes no profit but the dis-  
content hee giues vs, & with-  
all he shewes to haue an opi-  
nion that wee are not able to  
hurt him; otherwise he would  
apprehend to wrong vs vpon  
so weake a subiect: and that  
hee attends no kind of good-  
nesse from vs; for if hee did  
hope to reape any profit by  
our friendship, hee would  
seeke it and cherish it by all  
good offices, and not take  
that liberty to discontent vs.

So

So as hauing so many testimonies of contempt, and of the little esteeme hee makes of vs, we thinke wee haue iust cause to bee moued, and to reuenge our selues of him. But when as this contempt proceeds to outrages, and that any one without cause seekes to blemish our reputation by scandalous reports made in companies: Then our choler hath no bounds, but is inflamed beyond measure, and makes vs burne with desire to reuenge so great an affront. In like manner he, who without prouocation doth vs wrong both by word and deed, and who dissembles not his bad disposition, but doth publish it in all places, makes shew that hee doth wonderfully



fully contemne vs. For as he is not ignorant, that so sensible an iniury deserves reuēge, seeing that he makes no difficulty to doe it, but in despite defames vs in all companies where he comes; hee shewes plainly how basely he esteemes vs, and that hee thinks wee are either too faint-hearted to vndertake, or to weake to execute the reuēge, which so sensible an affront deserues.

In the meane time we suppose that hee which hath wronged vs in this manner doth it for his pleasure, hauing not giuen him any apparent subiect of discontent: for if it were to repell a former injury. which hee had receiued from vs, it were no more a contempt or an outrage,

rage, but a reuenge which he would take of vs.

But you must not wonder at that which we haue said, that there are some people, which take a delight to commit outrages: and the reason is, for that naturally men cannot endure that any one should exceede them in those things wherein they take delight: yea, they desire to excell those whom they thinke are competitors with them in that which they vnder-take. Wherefore if they encounter any one that is able to oppole himselfe against the, they contend with him, and vpon the first occasion doe him some affront, to the end they may shewe how much they exceede him in power. And therefore yong men,

men, and such as are rich and powerfull, doe most commonly fall into this excesse. For young men, and such as haue their blood hot and boyling, are wonderfully ready to commit insolencies: and as if they wanted better employments, they busie themselves to doe harme; yea, vn- to those which haue not offended them. Whereof wee haue great and notable examples in the life of *Alcibiades*, who scandalized the whole City of *Athens*, by the insolency of his actions.

Rich men in like manner, and such as are powerfull, are full of this vaine ambition to seem great, by the outrages they doe to their inferiours, imagining that this insolency is a marke of their  
great-

greatnesse. For they presuppose that they are farre advanced aboue those, whom they dare so visibly wrong. And therefore they take a certaine kinde of content, to do them some affront, which is also the ordinary end that they propound vnto themselves, which take a delight to wrong others.

Finally, we must remember, that men are commonly moued to *Choler*, when as they see themselves contemned in any of those manners which we haue related. And if we shall seeke the cause in the Center, wee shall finde that the reason is, for that men desire passionately to see themselves honoured, and they beleue, that such as are inferior vnto them, bee it

in

innobility, power, vertue, or any other eminent quality, are bound to yeeld them all sorts of duty and respect.

Rich men also will be reuerenced and respected by the poorer sort, who are inferior vnto them in the goods of fortune. And hee that is indowed with singular eloquence, desires that such as haue not attained to the like perfection, should acknowledge the aduantage he hath ouer them.

In like manner men of authority and command, will haue such as are subiect to their gouernement, honour them with their seruice. And if their inferiours faile to yeeld them the honor which they think is due vnto them, they cannot endure this iniury,

iury, but fall into rage; which makes them to seeke all occasions to punish this contempt.

And therefore it was truly said, That the indignation of a King is great and fearefull; for that when as a great king is incensed against any one that is not of his quality, although he temper and moderate his *choler* for a time, yet hee smothers it in his brest, and is neuer satisfied vntill hee hath made him feelee the effects of his power, that durst presume to offend him.

Wherefore an Ancient said, that *Choler* encountering with a great power, was like a thunder-bolt, which breakes in peeces whatsoever stands in its way. But not  
only

onely Kings, but euery priuate person is impatient to see himselfe contemned by those which are his inferiours. And to speake truth, there is nothing but the wisdom of God, and the Law of Iesus Christ, that can pull out of our soules, this feeling of a contempt, or of an iniurie receiued vnworthily.

For a conclusion of this chapter, we will obserue, that Philosophers make three kindes of *Choler*: and that as among serpents, there are Aspicks, Vipers, and Dragons, whose poyson encreaseth daily; so they hold opinion, that of these diuerse kindes of *Choler*, some are accompanied with more violence, and shew more fire then the rest. For there is a kinde



kinde of *Chaler*, whose motions are sudden and prompt and which enflame vpon the first occasions, and the first objects which present themselves.

*Aristotle* calls those that are subiect to this passion, sudden, active, cholerick, and adust; for that this suddenesse to bee mooued, riseth from the abundance of adust *chaler*, or from the gall. But as it is kindled suddenly, so it is quencht with little paine, like vnto the waues of the Sea, which rise and breake at the same instant. There is another kind of *Choler*, which takes roote, and is fashioned in the soule, by a long continuance of time, during the which, man doth represent vnto himselfe the forme of  
that

that party which hath wronged him, and preserves the memory of the injury he hath received.

*Aristotle* teaches these three kindes, direct, and secret: Such was the choler of *Achilles*, which the death of so many brave Princes slain at the siege of *Troy*, during his despatch, could hardly mollifie. There is a third kinde (although it differs not much from the second) the which doth wholly transport men, torments them perpetually, and neuer gives them any rest, vntill they haue satisfied their reuenge. *Aristotle* calls those that are agitated with this frenzy, violent, outrageous, and insupportable. The first is found in the best dispositions, but the two other are

are signes of bad inclinacions. To conclude, there is not any one of them, but we should auoyde and flie from, as a poyson which kills charity, which should shine in all the motions and actions of Christians. And if we are at any time surprized, let vs bee angry, but sinne not; let Nature worke her first effect, but let vs stay her violence, and aboute all, let not the Sunne go downe vpon our wrath.

*Of those against whom  
we are angry.*

CHAP. 2.



**E**c. which said  
that man was a  
creature which  
is passionate for  
glory, seemes to  
haue discovered all the roots  
of *Choler*: for if we obserue  
the obiects which excite it,  
and against whom we are an-  
gry, we shall finde it general-  
ly true, that it neuer disclo-  
seth it selfe in our hearts, nor  
is framed in our soules, but  
vpon a conceit we haue, that  
they seeke to diminish our  
glory, and to blemish our re-  
putation,

putation with some notable contempt, or by some great outrage which wee cannot beare: so as this passion is kindled first, by a contempt and an iniury which we imagine we haue receiued, the which maketh an impression in our soules: this ~~the~~ discontent to ~~be~~ wronged, makes vs to seeke meanes for reuenge, being thrust on by the nature of griefe, which alwayes seekes ease, and which in this occasion cannot finde it but onely in reuenge, the desire whereof makes his heart to swell, and stirres vp his courage. For it is certaine, that reuenge quencheth the heate of *Choler*, and we are pacified, when as wee see the wrong which we haue receiued, sufficiently

ficiently punished: For that we conceiue by this meanes that our reputation is repaired, and the contempt reuenged. But before this reuenge, the griefe of the iniury stickes fast vnto our soules and inflames, vs to seeke reparation.

An Empresse of *Constantinople* hauing let slippe certaine words of contempt against *Narses* that generous Captaine, who had reduced *Italy* vnder the obedience of the Empire: and sayd in disdain that they must send for that Eunuch and make him spinne amongst her women; this valiant man being incensed at this outrage, protested in the midst of his griefe, that hee would weaue such a webbe for the Emperour and

his Empresse, as all their power and industry should not be able to vndo: And thereupon he drew the Lombards into *Italy*, and dismembred those goodly prouinces from the Empire: whereby it appeares how dangerous it is to incense a great spirit. Secondly, when we are much transported with *Passion*, and do vehemently affect any one thing, wherein we are crost & haue some obstacle giuen vs, be it directly or indirectly, by ouert meanes, or secret practizes, our *Choler* is inflamed against those that are the authors of this let: And therefore sicke men are angry with such as to repaire their health, refuse them water or fruits, or some other thing which they earnestly desire:  
And



And they that are in loue, frowne on them that flatter not their *Passion*, and which seeke to diuert them from the pursuite of that they loue. But about all, men are bitterly incensed, when as they contemne their present condition, and the estate whereunto some calamity or their owne indiscretion hath brought them.

Hence grow the complaints and vexations of the miserable, of poore people, of the diseased, of those which apprehend some notable affliction, and of those which see themselves exposed to the violence of the mighty; yea there haue beene men which haue died of sorrow & griefe, for that they were reprocht with an imperfection

of nature which they brought with them into the world. Moreouer we are discontented against those, who wee thinke are the authors or abettors of any disastrous accident which wee expected not, holding them for our friends.

For as any great felicity which befalls vs beyond our expectation, fills vs with extraordinary ioy; so great misfortunes which happen, not foreseene, and contrary to our expectance, afflicts vs strangely, and excites vs wonderfully to *Choler*. And sometimes the circumstance of places where wee are, the humors, wherein we are, the time wherein they take vs, with a thousand such, like serue to prouoke vs to wrath.

As

As for example when wee are sad and full of sorrow, *Choler* doth easily become mistresse of our senses opprest with griefe: And in like manner, if they giue vs any words of cōtempt in cōpany or before such persons as we loue, we beare thē impatiently, and let slippe the reines to *Choler*. These are the chiefe roots of anger which breeds in our soules, and these are the powerfull objects that may excite it.

But moreouer there are other mouing causes which haue power to prouoke it, although they bee alwayes grounded vpon the contempt which is done vs: For men are also discontented against those that cause them to suffer some indignity, or that

scoffe at them, or at such persons whose reputations are as deere vnto them as their owne. So the Cittizens of *Millan* being besieged by the Emperour *Frederike*, hauing spoken something against the honor of the Emperesse, the Emperour bare it so impatiently, as hauing them in his power, he caused them to suffer all the indignities that might bee inflicted vpon the vanquished; yea hee ruined their Citty and sowed it with salt, to take from them all hope of rising or to see it built againe. The reason of this extraordinary *Choler* is, for that these opprobrious scoffes are signes of a notable contempt. Men are also moued against those which do them some sensible out-

outrage, the which brings no profit to the author, but dishonors him that receiues it. Wherefore *Choler* made a powerfull impression in the soule of the Emperour *Iustinian* the second, by reason of the outrage which they of *Constantinople* (deposing him from the Empire) caused him to suffer, in cutting off his nose; who being restored to his estate, whensoever there distilled any humor from his wound, hee sent for some one of them whom he thought to haue had a part in the conspiracy, and put him presently to death, or sent him into exile.

The reason is, for that these kinds of outrages blemish the things wherein they take any kind of content, as they that

are passionately affected to armes,, cannot endure to heare the profession taxed without *Choler*: Neither had it bene the meanes to winne any great fauour with *Cesar*, *Alexander*, and Great *Henry*, so haue made discourses vnto them in disgrace of Martiall exercise.

And in like manner they that loue Philosophy, cannot see it contemned without perturbation. Yet wee must obserue, that such as thinke they haue attained to the perfection of any thing, are not so apt to bee moued for words that are spoken to the disgrace of their profession, as they that haue but weake beginnings, and are but new apprentices; and which thinke they haue no  
great

great opinion of them, or which know their owne defects: For these men are easily incensed for any thing that is spoken against the profession they imbrace: Whereas the others being assured by the knowledge they haue of their owne merits, make shew to neglect the blame is giuen thē without iudgement. But there is no contempt more insupportable then that we receiue from our friends, and from such as wee thinke are bound to contribute to our glory: for when as wee see that instead of aduancing our honour they seeke to blemish it, we can no longer maister our despight.

Wherefore we haue scene great personages, who find-



ing themselves vnworthily  
intreated by their common-  
weale, or by their Cittizens,  
for whose preseruations they  
had exposed themselves to a  
thousand deaths, haue borne  
this iniury so impatiently, as  
they haue giuen way to de-  
spight; and hauing no other  
meanes to reuenge this in-  
gratitude, for the last monu-  
ment of their wrath, haue de-  
nied their ashes vnto their  
Country, desiring to be bur-  
ied in other places. Where-  
fore the Ancients held opi-  
nion, that the *Choler* of bre-  
thren was cruell and hard to  
pacifie: For that the loue of  
brethren being tyed by the  
most powerfull bonds of na-  
ture, being once broken, *Cho-  
ler* turnes into fury, which  
continues euen after death.  
Againe.

Againe, men are mooued against those which hauing made profession to honour them, grow cold againe, and yeeld them not that respect which they had formerly done: For that they imagine this coldnesse proceeds from some kind of contempt, as if they had discouered some imperfection in them, the which they had not formerly obserued: for they discourse in themselves; if these men had not changed their opinions, and if they had not conceiued some new contempt, which withdrawes the from vs, they would liue as they had formerly done; the which they neglecting, they attribute it to an opinion which those men haue conceiued, that instead of honoring

ring them, they should bee honored by them.

Men are also incensed against such as they hold ingrateful, and who they think haue no feeling of the benefits they haue receiued from them : For they imagine that this ingratitude is a meere contempt both of them and of their fauors, as if they had bene due vnto them, or that they were much their inferiours. They are also discontented against those which take a contrary part to that which they imbrace, which contradict their counsells; oppose their resolutions, and which are of another opiniõ in all occasions which are offered : for they conceiue that this contradiction proceeds from the little esteeme the  
op-

opponent makes of their sufficiency & industry, and also from a conceit they haue to bee more capable and sufficient, which is a visible contempt.

But men are wonderfully incensed to see themselves disdained by the baser sort, which are in no estimation, holding this contempt to be much more insupportable, then that of eminent persons, and which are in reputation. The reason is, for that as wee haue said, *Choler* riseth from the indignity of the contempt; but we cannot endure a contempt accompanied with a greater indignity, or a more sensible outrage then that which comes from base persons, and which are our inferiours, who should yeeld all honour

honour and respect to those that exceed him in dignity and merit. Wherefore men of honor cannot endure but with much impatience, to see themselves contemned by the scum of the people.

Men are also discontented against their friends, if they refuse to commend them, or to oblige them by their courtesies and fauours, but especially if they doe the contrary: that is to say, if they braue them, and reiect them, seeming to bee ignorant of their necessities, or if they accommodate not themselves to their desires and passions. And in truth it is a great signe of contempt, when as any one feignes not to know that which his friend desires and affects

affects with passion : for that we strive to know the affaires and inclinations of those, of whom we haue any care, and loue dearly.

Men are also incensed against those which reioyce at their calamities, or haue not the true feeling they ought. For to scorne, or take delight in them, is a marke of Hatred; and not to care for them, is a signe of contempt. Men are also discontented with such as neglect them, and hold it an indifferent thing to displease them, or to doe an act that may offend them. Wherefore we doe commonly hate such as bring ill newes, conceiuing that if they had borne vs the respect they ought, they would not haue beene the messen-

messēgers of that which they knew wold afflict vs, lest they shold giue vs occasion of discontent, but would haue left the cōmission to some other.

In like manner they are mooued against those which take delight in scandalous speeches made to the preiudice of their reputation, or which laugh with the rest, or take pleasure to be spectators of their miseries: for that the first argues a contempt, and the second shewes an hatred. So as wee see true friends vndertake wordes of reproach deliuered in the absence of their friends, and are mooued with griefe, when as they happen to be spectators of their misfortunes. As it chanced to that poore man, who held himselfe happy to be  
be



be vpon the coast of *Egypt*, not farre from *Alexandria*, where as *Pompeys* slaues performed his last funerall rites, to the end hee might witnesse his griefe, and pittie for the misery of so great a Personage. But men are particularly mooued against those which contemne them before foure kindes of people: that is to say, before those with whom they contend for honour and glory. As *Alexander* could not endure the contempt of those which preferred *Darius* before him: Nor *Cesar* such as equalled *Pompey* vnto him. Or before such as they admire, or by whom they desire to be admired: As *Alexander* could not without griefe endure they should blemish the glory of his conquests before

fore the *Athenians*: for that hauing their vertue in singular recommendation, he desired in like manner to bee admired by them, and attended from them the most glorious ornaments of his triumphes. Or before such as they loue and honour, as children grow into *choler* against those that contemne them before their parents; and he that is passionate in loue with a woman, cannot endure an affront which is done him in her presence. Or else before those by whom he will be reuerenced: As fathers grow bitter against such as discover their imperfections to their children, by whom they cannot endure to be contemned.

Moreouer, men are discontented with those that  
con-

contemne or offend such as are deare vnto them, whom they are bound to assist, vnlesse they will be partakers of their disgrace: the which hath bene the cause of great warres to reuenge an iniury done to the wiues, daughters sisters, and mothers of Kings: Princes hold themselves interested to reuēge the reproch done vnto those persons, that Nature hath tied vnto them by so powerfull bonds.

Moreouer, they are angry with such as doe not thanke them, nor acknowledge the fauours they haue receiued from them: for when as they see themselves deprived of this iust acknowledgement, which they had propounded vnto themselves, for the fruite of their good turnes;  
or

or at the least, which they expect from the good disposition of those they held obliged vnto them, they attribute it vnto a meere contempt. And their *choler* is kindled against those which haue deprived them of an honour whereof they helde not themselves vnworthy.

They are angry also with such as dissemble things, and make a ieast of that which they haue done seriously: for this dissimulation and diuersion of their intensions, is a signe of scorne.

Finally, men are discontented with those which doe good to all the world, yet do none to them in particular: for they are conceited, that such as haue no care to bind them vnto them, shewing an  
inclina-

inclination to oblige all the world, witnesse thereby, that they esteeme them not as they do other men, but haue a most base conceit of their merit.

This consideration hath bred discōtents in the courts of great Princes; for euery one holding himselfe as worthy as his companion to attain vnto the offices of State, when as any one is aduanced without mention made of them, they conceiue that his good fortune is a blemish to their glory, & makes them to be esteemed inferiour to his merite. To cōclude, forgetfulness prouokes *choler*, for that forgetfulness is a signe of the little care they haue of men. And this little care is a mark of contempt; for that the things

things whereof they make account, are most carefully recommended to memory.

CHAP. 3.

*Of the Effects and remedies  
of Choler.*



**A**MONG all the Passions that trouble & transport the soule of man, there is not any accompanied with so great violence, which shewes such brutishnesse, or that produce such fatall and tragicall effects, as *Choler*; which seemes properly to be the spring frō whence flowes  
all

all the miseries and ruines which happen in the world. For whereas other passions, as *Loue* and *Ioy*, *Desire* and *Hope*, haue certain beams of sweetness, which makes them pleasing; *Choler* is full of bitterness, & hath no sweeter objects the punishments, blood and slaughter, which serue to glut her reuenge.

These be her delights, these are her ioyes, these are the sweetest and most pleasing spectacles which she can behold. But if you desire to see how shee is the fountaine of all the horrors which are dispersed ouer the world, and make it desolate: reade in histories of the sacking of Townes, of Prouinces ruined and made deserts, observing the extortion and ouerthrow  
of



of Empires; Diademes troden vnder foote; Princes basely berrayed, and smothered by poyson; Kings murdered; great Commanders in Warre cast into chaines; and seruing as an example of humane miserie. Consider that whole multitudes haue beene put to the sword, or made Gallyslaues; whole Nations rooted out; the Temples (wheras Diuinity dwels) prophaned; the Altars beaten down; and whatsoeuer was most holy and most reuetend among men, vnworthily violated, and they shall find that all these tragicall spectacles are the effects of that cruell and inhumane fury. But setting apart the horror of the effects which shee produceth generally, let vs obserue

serue the miseries whereof she  
is the cause in private persons  
that suffer themselves to bee  
transported with this Passi-  
on.

First then if the saying of  
Physicians be true, that of all  
the infirmities wherewith we  
are afflicted, there are none  
worse nor more dangerous  
then those which disfigure  
the face of man; and which  
make it deformed and vnlike  
vnto himselfe; we must con-  
clude by the same reason,  
that of all the Passions of  
man, there is not any one  
more pernicious, nor more  
dreadfull then *Choler*, which  
alters the gracefull counte-  
nance and the whole consti-  
tution of man. For as furi-  
ous and mad men shew the  
excesse of their rage, by the

Dd      vio-

violent changes which appear in their bodies; euen so a man transported with *Choler* giues great signes of the frenzie that doth afflict him: his eyes full of fire and flame which this *Passion* doth kinde, seeme fiery & sparckling; his face is wonderfully inflamed as by a certaine reflux of blood which ascends from the heart : his haire stands vpright and staring with horror, his mouth cannot deliuer his words : his tongue falters, his teete and hands are in perpetuall motion. He vomits out nothing but threats, hee speakes of nothing but blood and vengeance: Finally, his constitution is so altered, and his lookes so terrible, as he seemes hideous and fearefull euen to his dearest friend

friends. What must the soule  
then be within, whose out-  
ward image is so horrible?  
Wherefor an Ancient sayd,  
that *Choler* was a short fury:  
And another maintained,  
that all violent *Choler* turned  
into madnesse: The which we  
may confirme by that which  
is written of *Hercules*, who  
growing furious knew not  
his owne wife and children,  
vpon whom he exercised his  
rage, tearing them inhumane-  
ly in peeces; euen so they o-  
uer whom *Choler* hath gotten  
absolute power, forget all af-  
finity and friendship, and  
without any respect make  
their owne kinsfolkes and  
friends feeble the effects of  
their fury. For it is a *Passion*  
which growes bitter against  
all the world, which springs

aswell from loue as from hatred, and is excited aswell in sport as in the most serious actions.

So as it imports not from what cause it proceeds, but with what spirit it incourters: As it imports not how great the fire is, but where it falles; for the most violent cannot fire marble, whereas the smallest sparkles will burne straw.

Hereby wee gather, that this *Passion* domineers principally in hot and fiery constitutions; for that heate is active and wilfull, and giues an inclination to these kinds of violence, making vs to grow bitter easily, yea vpon the least subiect that may be. Finally, to returne to our first purpose, *Cholera* doth not only

ly disfigure the body, but many times it ruines it wholly: For some being extraordinarily moued, haue broken their veines, and vomited out their soule with the blood; yea they which haue slaine themselves, owe their misfortune to *Choler* which hath forced them to this last fury: hauing then left such cruell signes of rage vpon the body, she assailes the mind, shee doth outrage to the soule, and smothers reason in man, and like vnto a thicke cloud, will not suffer it to enlighten him; and by this meanes fills him with disorder and confusion. So as hee begins to shut his eare to all good aduice, he will no more heare speake of that which may helpe to mollifie his

Dd 3 courage

courage, which is full of bitterness and violence; so as taking pleasure in his owne affliction, he abhorres all remedies, and flies the hand of the Physitian which might cure him: yea in this transport hee is offended at any thing, and imitates the savage beastes, whom the most cheerefull colours thrust into fury: An innocent smile, a shaking of the head which signifies nothing, a glance of the eye without designe, is capable to draw him to the field.

But how often haue wee seene this inhumaine fury dissolue euen the most sacred friendship vpon very frivolous subiects? hath shee not prouoked dearest friends to duells, and made them serue  
as



as spectacles of infamy both to heauen and earth, for quarrells imbraced without any ground? It is then very apparent, that this *Passion* is not only infamous, but also most wretched, seeing that vnder an weake pretext of reuenge she doth precipitate men into most horrible villanies, & makes them tread all diuine and humaine lawes vnder feete, to satiate her insolency and rage. Wherein doubles she is more to bee blamed then all the other Passions wherewith the soule of man is afflicted: For that the other Passions haue this property, that euen at the very instant when as they are as it were in the height of their transport, giue way somewhat to reason, and yeeld in

Dd 4 some

some sort vnto her commandements, when as shee presents her self to pacifie them: Whereas *Choler* doth like vnto Marriners which are amazed or corrupted, and will giue no eare to the voice of their Pilot: Or as mutinous souldiers, which will not heare the aduice of their Leaders: Yea shee despites truth if shee opposeth against her rage, and although she come to know the innocency of the party whom shee persecutes, yet she holds obstinacy more honorable then repentance: So as nothing shalbe able to make her desist from her vniust and violent suites.

And continuing this Injustice against himselfe, shee sometimes constraines the  
most

most couetous profusely to cast away their most pretious treasure, and to make a heape of their wealth, and then to set fire on it; and many times also shee forceth ambitious men to refuse and reject the honours which they had passionatly affected before their despight: who doth not then see that this *Passion*, (more then any other) quencheth the light of reason?

The cause is, for that of all the Passions, whether they haue the good for their obiekt, or regard the euill, those cause the greatest perturbations in our soules which are the most violent; there is not any that doth exceed or equall *Choler* in violence, which doth inflame

D d 5 the

the whole blood, and all the spirits which flowe about the heart, which is the most powerfull organ of Passions: by reason whereof there followes a wonderfull disorder not onely in the sensible and corporeall powers, but even in the reason. For although she vse no corporeall organs in her proper functions, yet to produce them forth shee hath need of the powers of the senses, whose actions are droft and disquieted by the trouble which riseth in the heart and the whole body; by reason whereof *Choler* doth darken, yea hinder the whole light which she strives to cast forth: whereof wee haue two apparant signes, for that the members, wherein the image of the heart doth

doth most shine, as the tong,  
the eies, & the countenance,  
feele the most violent force of  
this fury.

It is true that *Aristotle*  
sayth, that *Choler* doth in  
some sort giue care to reason:  
But that must be vnderstood  
touching the report which  
she makes of the iniury recei-  
ued; wherein shee takes a sin-  
gular content; but shee giues  
no care vnto her, but rejects  
her aduertizements in the  
measure and moderation  
which shee ought to hold in  
the reuenge. So as in truth  
there must bee some kind of  
reason to prouoke *Choler*; for  
that men which are stupid &  
dull are not capable of these  
motions; but when this *Passion*  
is fully inflamed, then she  
doth wholly darken reason.

And

And as the same Philosopher sayth, that they which are full of wine and drinke, are not mooued with any thing for that their reason being drowned in wine, they are not capable to ballance an iniury, or to obserue a contempt: But such as are not fully drunke, are moued to *Choler*, for that there remains some weake beames of iudgement to discern that which hath an appearance of iniury or outrages; but this *Passiō* riseth in them without subiect and without any great occasion, for that their reason is captiuated by the wine which hath gotten the maistry.

Euen so in the beginning of *Choler*, reason may giue some light to the *Irascible* power;

power; but whē she hath gotten the absolute cōmand, and is become Mistresse of the senses, Reason is darkened, and is of no vse in a soule thus transported.

But we must not conceiue that this mischief is absolutely incurable, but wee must rather imagine, that as *Helleborum* hath power to cure mad men, so there are remedies against *Choler*. The most powerful are those which are taken from the Law of God, who teacheth vs nothing but patience, charity, mildenesse, humanity and sufferance. But wee will rest satisfied to set downe the instructions of Philosophy, which may serue to this effect: First of all, Philosophers aduise vs to entreate this passion as they do  
mon-



monsters and serpents, whom they strue to smother as soone as they are disclosed: for they will that man should haue a care to the beginning of *Choler*, which many times ariseth from so light an occasion, and so poore a subiect, as it is vnworthy a great spirite should bee transported therewith. And as it is easie to quench a fire of straw in the beginning, but if we suffer it to take holde of more solid matter, it passeth all our labour and industry, and makes a pittifull ruine: euen so, he that will obserue *Choler* from the beginning, seeing it beginne to fume and kindle for some light quarrell and small offence; it is easie for him to suppress it, and to stay her course. But if shee  
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be once setled and beginnes to swell, and that he himselfe blowes the bellowes; that is to say, if hee stirres it vppe and enflames it, it will bee hard for him afterwards to quench it, whereas he might easily haue done it before by silence,

Wherefore as Pilots foreseeing a tempest, doe vsually retire themselues into a road or vnder the Lee of some rock, before the storme come; so he that feels the first motions of *Choler*, should haue recourse to reason, and oppose it to the passion, to controule her violence. For the first meanes to vanquish *Choler* as an vniust tyrant, is not to yeelde any obedience to her, nor to beleue her in any thing she saith or doth, to inflame

flame vs to reuenge; we finde in other Passions, that the liberty wee giue them, brings some ease. As when young men which are enflamed with Loue, goe in maske, make dances, combates, or feasts, in fauour of the party they loue; all this giues some ease vnto their passion: and when as they suffer those that are afflicted to weep in the midst of their afflictions, the teares they powre forth, carry with them a part of their griele, But *Choler* hath nothing of all this, she growes bitter, and is incensed by the liberty wee giue her, and is enflamed the more in that we giue way to her fury. And as they that are subiect vnto the falling sicknesse, hauing any signe or beginning of their fit, retire them.

themselves suddainly, and take all the remedies which may diuert so troublesome an accident, or at least, hide the shame; so they which see themselves transported with *Choler*, should retaine themselves, and strive to moderate their passion, and diuert the infirmity which seekes to seaze vpon them. Wherevnto they should the more willingly resolve, for that all other passions doe but draw men to euill, but this dorch precipitate them; those doe shake them, but this doth ouerthrow them; Those when they haue the vpper hand, suffer themselves to bee curbed, but this beeing mistresse will obey no law; like vnto the thunder-bolt, which being once faine from the cloud wherein

wherein it was enclosed, can no more bee stayed. Other Passions stray from reason, but *Choler* treads it vnder feete, and leads it as it were, in triumph. Wherefore by all these considerations, men should be carefull not to fall into the hands of so furious a mistresse.

The second remedy that may be giuen, is to represent the defects of this passion, & the miseries wherewith she is accompanied; the which are such, as it seemes they carry the Palme of vice, and to bee more detestable then all other crimes, wherewith the soule may be polluted. Auarice, in truth, is a shamefull greedinesse of getting, but yet it sometimes gathers together that, which falls into the  
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the hands of a good man that succedes a miser: whereas *Choler* scatters all. For what expences, what profusiō doth she not to attaine vnto the reuenge which shee doth meditate? How often doth shee make a man ruine his owne fortune? the husband to separate himselfe from his wife; the sonne abandons his father; the people arme against the Magistrate; and he which aspired to honour, checks himselfe, and giues ouer his pursuite.

*Choler* is also worse then voluptuousnesse, for that lusts make men to plunge themselves in particular pleasures; whereas *Choler* makes them of so bad a disposition, as he is delighted in another mans miseries. It is much more

more wicked then Enuy: for that if Enuy desires to see any one miserable, it is *Choler* which procures the misery.

But we must not continue our great desires in the reuenges of *Choler*, for generous spirits are as it were, impetrable to offences; whereas they that cannot resist, shew their weakenesse; whereby we see that women, children, sicke folkes, and olde men are most subiect to these motions and impressions.

The highest and goodliest part of the world, and nearest to the firmament and starres, is neuer couered with clouds; and in whose bosome there is neuer any haile; rain, windes, nor other tempests congealed: there is neuer a-

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ny thunder nor lightning, although the thunder-bolts fall from thence vpon the earth. In like manner, a spirit truely elevated, a generous soule, is alwayes quiet, moderate, and graue, neuer suffering it selfe to bee transported with the furious motions of *Choler*; shee represents vnto her selfe the defects of this passion, shee sees that they which abandon themselves vnto it, disrobe themselves of all shame, and lose all reason: for who is he that in the midst of his despight & wrath, seems not to haue reneunc'd all moderation, and modesty? Can hee refraine his tongue, or containe the other parts of his body in their duty? But how many great personages haue we seene expose them-

themselves to bee a scorne of the world by the excesse of their *Choler*? Witnesse that famous Prince, who wrote letters to a Mountaine, and who caused a Riuer to bee whipped, which had been an obstacle to his passage.

Wherefore as in seeing the shamefull motions of them that are drunke, we conceiue a certaine horror of the excesse of wine: so great spirits seeing the deformity of *Choler*, endeauour what they can not to bee infected with a vice, which is as it were a reproach to humane Nature. But to preuent it, wee must first flye all affaires that are aboue our reach, lest that finding our selues oppressed, as with an insupportable burthen, grieve kindle our wayward-

wardnesse and *Choler*. We must also flye the company of quarrelsome persons, lest by a certaine contagion they poyson vs with their Passions.

Drunkards prouoke to drinke, voluptuous men mollifie the most couragious, and auarice poysons those that haunt the couetous. In like māner, cholericke men infuse into vs their troublesome humours, or at the least in frequenting them, wee expose our selues to the dangers of quarrels with them; whereas conuersing with quiet men (besides the good example) we are freed from that danger.

Philosophers produce other remedies to cure *Choler*, aduising them that haue any inclina-

inclination to this passion, to leaue al great and waighy occupations of the minde, yea, the most serious studies; and they exhort them to imitate those that are weake sighted, who ease themselves in fixing their eyes vpon the most cheerefull colors; aboue all things they coniure them to auoyde the occasions and subiects which are giuen the, to remember that it is not expedient for man to see all, nor to heare all, and that wee must let many things passe which are spoken against vs; for that many times hauing neglected them, it is a kinde of iustification. That which prouokes vs to *Choler* (say they) is the opinion we haue to haue beene outraged; but we must not so suddenly giue credit

credit to this opinion, nor presently receiue the reports which are made vnto vs, how cleere and euident soeuer the proofes of the iniury may seeme vnto vs; for there are many things which hauing a shew of truth, are notwithstanding false; so as wee must reserue one eare to heare the reasons of him that is accused, or else shut them both to the reporters, who many times take a delight to sowe discord, and to breed quarrells for their owne pleasures.

And doubtles we may many times repent to haue run rashly to reuenge, whereas we haue cause to bee glad to haue deferred it. For the same reason wee must flie suspitions and ieaiousies, which ma-

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ny times incense vs, as well as the inſteſt ſubieſts of *Choler*; for that taking in ill part a looke, a ſmile, or ſome other light action, wee conceiue a deſpight, and runne to field againſt thoſe that are innocent, and which had no deſire to wrong vs.

Finally of things that offend vs, ſome wee haue by report, others wee haue either ſcene or heard our ſelues. As for thoſe which are reported wee muſt not eaſily giue credit vnto them, conſidering the praſtizies which are vſed at this day to abuſe the moſt credulous: A flatterer will ſeeke to inſinuate himſelfe into fauour by accusing an innocent; he wil ſuggeſt an outrage & make a bad diſcourſe to perſwade that hee hath heard

heard it with griefe of mind; another will seeke an occasion to dissolue the most sacred bonds of friendship: Another full of venome & poyson will desire to, haue the sport of a quarrell, and will bee glad to bee spectator of a combate which he hath kindled, so as he be none of the party. It is then a notable lightnesse to condemne a friend suddenly before he be heard, and without an exact knowledge of the matter whereof he is accused; and it is a prodigious iniustice to bee incensed against him before that hee know who accuseth him, or what crime is imposed vpon him.

As for those things whereof we our selues are witnesses, we must cōsider the dispositi-



on & will of those that haue committed them; if it bee a young man, let vs impute it to his age and beare with his youth. Is it a father? Having receiued so many other benefits from him, it is reason wee should endure, and that remembrance of things past should mollifie our present bitternesse; and we must duly consider with our selues whether hee hath not iust cause to entreat vs with that rigor, whereof wee now complaine.

If it be a woman, this sexe doth not alwayes follow the motions of reason, and her weakenesse should serue her for an excuse. If they bee persons subiect to a greater power, it may be they haue bene forced, and being solicited by

by such as they could not disobey, would you then bee angry against necessity? another may offend vs after that he hath bene outraged by vs: and what wonder is it if hee requite vs with the like? If he be a Magistrate or a Iudge from whom wee pretend to haue receiued some iniustice, his sufficiency must bee of more weight then our priuate opinion, and wee should rather accuse our owne crime then suspect him of corruption. If it be a King or Prince, that punisheth some malefactor, we must beleeue that hee doth it iustly: But if hee oppresse an innocent, we must not complaine, but giue way to the miseries of humane nature, remembering that the weaker are

subiect to the lawes of mighty.

If it bee a brute beast or a peece of timber or stone that hurts vs, we must beware that we become not more stupid then sencelesse things, thinking to reuenge our iniuries of them. If it be a good man, we should not thinke that he had any will to hurt vs, being confident of his innocency. If hee bee a wicked man, why are wee amazed if the effects resemble the cause? Moreouer if we thinke that wee are wrongfully oppressed, let vs remember that many times wee thinke that vniust, which is not so in effect: This proceeds from too great a loue which wee beare vnto our selues: and in a word, it is ignorance or insolency

folency that thrusts vs into *Choler*, neuer remembering that humane nature (like vn-to a field full of weeds and thornes) brings foorth spirits that are ingrate, trecherous, enuious and wicked. He that shall duely consider this, will not easily giue way to *Choler*.

These are parts of the remedies which Philosophers propound against this furious Passion. There are others which were too long to relate; and to say the truth, most of them are rather remedies of Emperickes which palliate the euill, then solide medicines which cure our Passions. The soueraigne remedy is to cast our eyes vpon the examples of patience which the seruants of

God and the Saints haue taught vs in this world, and especially to fixe them vpon those which the Sonne of God hath left vs, who being outraged by men did not curse them; being persecuted, hee did not threaten his executioners; being crucified, hee prayed for his enemies; and who in the end by a Philosophy farre different from that of the world, hath put our saluation in his crosse, our triumphs in his reproches, and our glory in his punishments.

Of Mildnesse and Gentle-  
nesse.

## CHAP. I.



**S**CHOLER  
enflaming man  
to reuēge, trans-  
ports him in  
such sort as ma-  
ny times he seemes to be de-  
prived of all kind of humani-  
ty; and that it hath conuer-  
ted him into a savage and  
cruell beast, which breathes  
nothing but blood & slaugh-  
ter, so there is a motion con-  
trary to this *Passion* which  
restores man to the estate of  
man, and casting as it were  
water vpon the fire of his  
wrath, makes him tractable

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to pardon the outrages which hee pretends to haue beene done him vnworthily. This *Passion* hath no proper name, but may be called *Gentlenesse*; *Mildnesse*, or clemency, according to the subjects where it encounters, and it is no other thing but a motion which reduceth the soule to a quiet estate, and makes him forget all kinds of iniuries & reuenges.

Wherefore as men are ordinarily incensed against those that contemne them, & this contempt being an injury which proceeds from the will of him that offends vs, it is visible that our *Choler* is easily pacified when as wee see there is no cause of contempt in vs; for that they of whom we might complaine,

haue



haue done it against their inclination, and not by any affected malice: And the reason is, for that humane actions depend of the intention of him that doth them. Wherefore imagining that they haue no bad intention against vs, we hold them free from crime.

By the same reason we do easily forget the *Choler* which wee haue conceiued against those, who being mistaken shew their griefe, and desire to line otherwise; for that this desire is a testimony that their will hath beene surprized. As for example, a friend in our infirmity may giue vs a receipt which hee thinkes fit to cure our disease, but haning taken it, our paine increaseth; yet wee are not bitterly,

terly incensed against him, for that it appears his will was to giue vs ease, although our paine increased. And particularly wee shew our selues easie to pardon those which doe vnto themselves what they haue done vnto vs: For that we cannot conceiue that they haue condemned vs in those things wherein themselves are engaged; being apparent that no man condemnes himselfe. We also pardon those easily which confesse their faults freely, and shew repentance for their offences; for that wee imagine this grieue is a sufficient punishment for their wrong.

Whereof we haue a familiar example in our seruants; reprehending more sharply, and

and punishing more seuerely, those that palliate their offences, or that answer vs arrogantly; and we entreat them more graciously which acknowledge their faults and demand pardon. And the reason is, for that it is a signe of impudency to maintaine an error which is apparent, and this impudency is a notable cōtempt of him against whom they contest so boldly: for that wee contemne those with whom we shew no respect or reuerence.

We are easily pacified, when as they whom we pretend haue offended vs, humble themselues before vs, endure our reproofe, and doe not contradict vs; for that this submission is as it were, a signe of feare or reuerence  
which

which they beare vs, whereby they silently confesse, that they are our inferiours: so as we conceiue they doe not contemne vs: for that no man contemnes him whom he feares. Wherefore euery man layes aside all choler against those that humble themselves: we haue an example in the Lyon, a generous beast, who neuer shewes his fury, but pardons those that lye prostrate vpon the ground to saue themselves. We also shew our selues mild to those which making the same profession, honour vs, and speake not slanderously of vs: for that this respect shewes they haue vs in good esteeme, and that they contemne vs not.

Wee also pardon those  
willing-

willingly, from whom wee haue receiued some notable fauour, & particularly when they entreat vs and coniure vs with passionate prayers, to forget the iniuries they haue done vs, and not to take reuenge of them; for that these kinde of ntreaties are signes of their submissi-  
on.

Wee also pardon those willingly, which are not reputed to be insolent, slanderers, mockers, or contemners of others, but are knowne to be good men, doing outrage to no man vnlesse it be to the wicked, among whom we desire not to sort our selues. Wee checke and controule our choler, when as we know that they that haue offended vs are powerful persons, from  
whom

whom wee might feare some greater iniurie, if wee should attempt to reuenge that which they haue done vs: for wee seldome make demonstration of choler against those whom we feare, beeing vnpossible that at the same instant wee should feare any man, and yet bee in choler against him. Yea, wee passe ouer their faults lightly, that haue wronged vs in the heate of their choler: so as if wee are incensed against them, it is with lesse feeling and bitterness, for that we conceiue that what they haue done, was not through contempt, seeing that no man euer contemned him whom hee held worthy of his choler: for that contempt is without griefe and apprehension, but choler.

ler is full of grieve and feeling of the iniury receiued.

Places, times, employments, companies, helpe many times to make vs mild and quiet, and to keepe vs from being transported with choler, if it bee not for some outrageous iniury: for in sports, at banquets, and publique feasts, among our friends, in the midst of our great prosperities, during the happy successe of our affaires, and in the midst of our good hopes, we do not easily receiue any impressions of choler, vnlesse (as we haue sayd) they do vs some notable outrage which exceeds all patience.

In like manner, when as we suffer much time to passe before wee seeke reuenge of the iniury, by little and little we



we forget it, and time hauing  
affwaged our heate, wee lose  
all desire of reuenge. But  
one of the things which  
helpes most to quench our  
choler, is, when as some o-  
ther then that party against  
whom it is enflamed, hath  
beene seuerely punished or  
sent to execution, before wee  
could satisfie our reuenge a-  
gainst him.

Wherefore *Philocrates*, be-  
ing demanded why hee did  
not purge himselfe of the  
crimes whereof he was accu-  
sed, during the time the peo-  
ple were in choler against  
him; answered, that the rea-  
son was, for that he expected  
some other should be vniust-  
ly accused and condemned  
before him; imagining (as it  
is true) that when as men  
haue

haue powred forth their choler and splene vpon any one, then they grow more milde, and their rage is turned to pittie. As it happened to *Ergophilus*, against whom although his iudges were more incensed then against *Calisthenes*; yet they pronounced him innocent, and freed him from punishment; for that the day before they had condemned *Calisthenes*.

Moreouer, men shew themselves milde and tractable to those ouer whom they haue gotten some fauourable decree, and also to such as they see exposed to more cruell afflictions, then they would haue imposed vpon them for their reuenge: For they conceiue that they are punished sufficiently for their offence,

offence, and that for their part they are fully reuenged of the iniury they haue receiued.

But particularly our choler is not often enflamed when as we conceiue the iniury that we suffer is done vs iustly, & that wee haue well deserued that chastisement; for then it rather makes shew of a reuenge iustly pursued, then of a contempt or iniury vniustly procured. Choler hath iniustice for her object, be it true or apparent: for that as we haue obserued in the Definition, it is a feeling of an indignity which wee thinke we haue receiued wrongfully, and without merite: wherefore when as we apprehend there is no iniustice in the wrong wee receiue, our choler

Choler breakes not forth and  
runs not hastily to reuenge.  
And therefore when we will  
reprehend any one, it is fit to  
represent vnto him the sub-  
iect wherefore we vse this se-  
uerity, that making him  
know wee haue iust occasion,  
it may stay him from choler.  
The which wee should prac-  
tise particularly with our ser-  
uants, who will take our re-  
prehensions in better part,  
and serue vs with more af-  
fection when wee shew them  
that they haue erred, and let  
them know the office which  
hath moued vs to this rigor.  
Our choler is not easily mo-  
ued against such as wee hold  
insensible of any thing that  
we shall doe or say; for that  
Choler will haue her effects  
knowne. Wherefore no man  
of

of iudgement will bee angry against insensible things. But the choler which we shew against the liuing, is mortified in regard of the dead, for that they haue endured the last misery of life, and they haue no more feeling nor knowledge of iniuries, which choler doth wonderfully desire. Wherefore *Homer* to pacifie *Aclilles*, who insulted ouer the dead body of *Hector*, let him know, that he did but beate the earth, and outrage an insensible thing. These are briefly the persons to whom *Mildnesse* or clemency extends, and which can command their choler.

This *Mildnesse* is commendable in all men, for that it is a bud of true humility, or rather a true character of the  
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the children of God. But it hath a greater lustre and a more eminent shew when it is found in the soules of kings and Monarchs of the earth: For what praise, what triumph, and what glory is it to a great Prince, to haue the command of so many millions of men, to bee arbitrator of their liues, to be master of their goods and fortunes, to be able in an instant to leuy fearefull Armies, and in the twinckling of an eye to ruine Townes & Countriee, without the feare of any Lawes? And yet in this prodigious power, not to suffer his eyes to be daxeled with so great a splendour, nor to bee transported with choler, and in offences not to vse seuerity; to spare blood, to containe  
his

his Passions, and to make it his whole glory to doe good to those that are subiect to his authority.

Wherefore this bounty and clemency in Princes, makes them not onely to bee beloued, but euen to be adored by their subiects, who are rauished with a sweete excessse of ioy, when as they see themselves subiect to a power which hath nothing insolent, but all things tend to their preservation, and propound vnto themselves no more glorious obiects then their safety.

Subiects hide not theselues from these good Princes, and flye not from them, as if a Tiger, a Lyon, or some other sauage and cruel beast, did present it selfe; but they runne to meete



meete them, to behold them,  
and admire them, as starres  
of good influence, of whom  
depend all their happinesse.  
The subiects runne vnto their  
Temples for such good Prin-  
ces, & poure out their vowes  
and prayers for their honors  
and safety. It is for them  
they watch and are in care,  
and it is for them they are  
ready to suffer a thousand  
deathes, rather then any at-  
tempt shold be made against  
their liues, whereunto they  
know their safeties are tyed:  
For their mildenesse and cle-  
mency, as a powerful charme  
bindes the affections of their  
subiects vnto them, and doth  
purchase their loue, which is  
the most powerfull bond and  
the safest guard wherby Mo-  
narches may assure their e-

states : For there is no Empire nor gouvernement, more firme then that which pleaseth the subiects ; whereas those that are odious ; are soone ruined : yea, they that could temper their authority by Clemency, haue alwayes enioyed a happy successe in their gouvernement. And to speake in a word, clemency is as a soueraign ornament to all the other royall vertues ; yea, it is to Princes as a way to heauen, and immortality to vse so eminent and fearefull a power moderately ; to loue their subiects, to pardon the humble, to abstaine from all cruelty, to do no violence, not to bathe their hands in blood, to let their time passe, to pacifie their choler, and to procure peace and quietnesse

to

to the world. For these reasons their subiects apprehend not them, but apprehend only for them: whereas the violence of Princes striks a terror into the minds of their subiects, but it makes them neither more powerfull, nor to be more respected by them.

And these feares and terrors of the subiects are weaketyes and bands of their affection and loue: for when as they imagine they haue no more subiect of feare, they beginne to hate. But admit that the horror of punishments and tortures were able to settle Empires: who knows not, that as it is an incomparable shame for Phisitians to fill vp graues, putting their skill in practize: So it is a  
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great reproach to Princes to maintaine their greatnesse by tortures. They should vnderstand all the defects of their estate, but wisdom binds him to excuse some: and if they be forced to vse seuerity, they must doe it in punishing crimes which deserue no pardon; yet with a testimony of griefe and remorse. And finally, they must shew their clemency to those where there is some hope of amendement, not alwayes seeking to inflict punishments, but sometimes to bee satisfied with the repentance of them that haue offended.

They must remember that it is a glorious thing to pardon him whose offence hath already made miserable, and that

that it is a seuerer punishment  
to be forced to craue pardon  
for his crime. They must  
imagine that cruell and vio-  
lent commands are more  
sharpe then durable; that no  
man can bee feared of many,  
but he must feare much: and  
that the life of Princes, is as  
a perpetuall warre, and a per-  
petuall death, if they bee for-  
ced to distrust, and to guard  
themselves from so many milli-  
ons of men which hate their  
power, if it bee insolent and  
insupportable.

## CHAP. I.

*Of the diuerse Passions of  
men, according to their ages  
and conditions.*



All the Countries and parts of the world, are not equally shaken with the tempests of the aire, yet there is not any corner of the earth, nor portion of the Vniuerse, in which there riseth not some little winde, or some small stormes: Euen so, although that all men are not subiect to the furious motions of the same Passions, yet there is not any age nor condition,

dition which doth not feele ſome effects, & is not in ſome ſort agitated. Onely there is this difference, that the one haue a feeling of one ſort, & the other of another: ſome are more violent, and other haue them more quiet and temperate. For ſome are Paſſions beſitting yong men; others are incident to men of perfect age; and ſome are thoſe of olde men: Some the rich and mighty are ſubiect vnto, and others transport the poore and miſerable.

And firſt touching that which concernes the Paſſions of young men, they are hot and fiery by reaſon of the blood which boyles in their veines; and what they once deſire they affect with vehemency. Yet they ſhew this



heate more particularly in the motions of Loue, whereunto their age which is in the flower, giues them a violent inclination, which appears in the heate of their pursuites. But they are subiect to all kindes of changes, and haue no constancy in their affections; so as their Passions are properly like to the hunger and thirst of sicke persons, which passe away with the fit of their disease. Or to speake more properly, they resemble Meteors, or wandring fires which are kindled in the aire, and suddenly extinct.

They are in like manner very ready to the motions of Choler, and are easily transported with disdain, especially when as they seek to blemish

with their honour, or to doe them any kinde of outrage. They are alſo ambitious, and loue glory paſſionatly, ſo as they preferre victory before any other thing, for that it is the higheſt degree of excellency whereunto they aſpire. But they are not couetous, neither doe they loue money, for that they haue not yet tried the miſeries of pouerty: like vnto him whom an Ancient reproached, that the contempt hee made of gold, was a ſigne that hee had not yet felt the ſweetneſſe thereof, for if he had taſted it, his hands would be more ready, and he would bee more diligent to gather it together. Neither are they maliciously diſpoſed, but ſhew more plaineneſſe then cunning in

their actions, for that they haue not yet learned the subtilties, nor tried the malice of the world. But they are credulous, and doe easily beleeue what is said vnto them: for that they haue not yet tried the fraudes of men, nor haue bin often abused.

Moreover, they are full of great hopes, like vnto the that are surprized with wine, both in regard of the heate which abounds in them, as for that they haue not yet felt the iniuries of Fortune. And therefore they liue in hope; for that Hope regards future things, as memory is imployed about that which is past. And as for them, they apprehend, that the time they haue to liue, is long; and they make no account

count of that which is paſt.  
And for the ſame reaſon in  
the flower of their age, they  
remember not what is ſlipt  
away before their time, but  
hope for all that is to come,  
ſo as they are eaſie to bee de-  
ceiued: for that hauing this  
beleefe and hope, it is eaſie  
to make them belecue and  
hope for that which is not.  
By conſequence they are va-  
liant and hardy, both for that  
they are cholerick, and alſo  
for that they are full of good  
hopes: for Choler takes  
from them al feare, and hope  
makes them hardy; whereby  
they haue a great confidence  
of the ſucceſſe of that they  
vndertake.

Moreouer, yong mē are baſh-  
full, knowing nothing in this  
life, but what they haue lear-  
ned.

ned from the Lawes, or from their education : wherefore when as any thing presents it selfe, of whose nature they are not well instructed, they remain as it were in suspence, and know not what to resolve, and therefore they are commonly subiect to blushing. They are also magnanimous and generous, both for that they haue a good opinion of themselves, as also for that they haue a proud conceit of their courage, holding themselves fit for any great action: and in like manner, for that they haue not yet tried the calamities and miseries, which overthrow the fortune and constancy of men, but are ignorant of the afflictions whereunto this life is subiect.

Finally,

Finally, they desire rather to vndertake those things which are honorable, then that which concerns profit. For that they gouerne themselves rather by their owne courage, and the bounty of their nature, which hath the honesty of things for object, then by the discourse of reason, which doth commonly propound for end, that which is most profitable. Young men doe also loue indifferently the company of such as are of their age and condition, not making any curious choyce of their friends; the which shewes, that they haue more curiosity then care of that which may auaille them in the course of their liues.

They are also violent, and  
observe

obſerue no moderation in their motions and actions: ſo as if they loue, they loue furiouſly; and if they hate, it is extreame: and ſo in all other things they keepe no mediocrity. The which grows from their preſumption, and for that they haue a conceit to know any thing; which makes them to ſpeake boldly, and to defend their impertinencies wilfully. They commit many errors, but commonly they are the defects of youth, which proceede from the heat of blood, ſo as there is more inſolency in their actions, then affected crimes.

They are moreouer pitifull and gentle; for that meaſuring others by their own innocency, they beleewe that al the world is good; and that



that they which suffer any extraordinary miserie, haue not deserued it: and for that reason they haue compassion of them.

Finally, young men are pleasant, witty, and loue to laugh, and to heare a witty iest, which they thinke is a signe of a good spirit, and therefore admire him. They also loue horses, dogges, huntings, combates, and other exercises, which haue some kinde of violence or pleasure.

To conclude, young men are commonly rich in inuention, but poore in matters of iudgement: they are fit for execution, but incapable for any great desaigne. They are borne to excite troubles, but are not able to pacifie them:

They

they imbrace much, but hold little: they aſpire to the end, but looke not to the meanes, and when they haue committed an error, they will hardly acknowledge it and leave it; like vnto thoſe reſty hories which leape and bound, and will neither ſtand ſtill nor go forward.

As for thoſe that grow to age, they haue Paſſions in a manner quite contrary to young men: for hauing liued long, and beene often deceiued, hauing themſelues committed many errors, and knowing alſo that the world is full of ſubriley and villany; they are not aſtuted of any thing, but looke vpon all things with diſtruſt: and if they deliuer their opinion in any buſineſſe, it is with a kind  
of

offeare: ſo as it ſeemes they will make it knowne, that in all things there is more coniecture then certainty: wherefore their ordinary reſtriction in their answers and diſcourſes, is, *It may be, peradventure it is true.* The which proceeds from the great *Idea* they haue of the inſtancy of things, & the deceits of men. For the ſame reaſon they are malicious, being a meere malice to interpret, as they doe, all things in the worſt ſence; and for the ſame reaſon they are alſo diſtruſtfull and ſuſpicious: ſuſpicious by reaſon of their diſtruſt, and diſtruſtfull, in regard of the experience they haue of things. Finally, they neuer loue entirely, neither is their hatred furious, but they loue commonly

monly as if they should hate,  
and they hate as if they should  
be moued to loue.

Moreouer, their courage is weake, both in respect of the coldnes of their blood and spirits, as also by reason of calamities past, and the miseries which they haue tried. And for this reason, vnlesse they haue some spice of folly, they doe seldome attempt any hardy enterprizes, nor hazard their fortunes and honors, but they are content to seeke that which may protect them from necessity: whereby they are couetous and fast, fearing to diminish that which they thinke is necessary for them: whereunto they are drawne by experience which hath taught them, how hard a thing it is

to gather great wealth, and how eaſie it is to loſe it. They are in like manner fearefull, and encrease their apprehenſions by imagination, and by the fore-ſight of the future: wherewith they are alwayes troubled, the which proceeds from the coldneſſe of their blood. For this coldneſſe which is common to olde men, makes them enclined to feare, whereas heate incites courage and reſolution.

Moreouer, they loue life much, and eſpecially vpon the declining of their dayes; for that men deſire that naturally, whereof they haue great neede; and when as they feare it ſhould fly from them, then they deſire it more paſſionately. They commonly powre forth cōplaints, which  
are

are ſignes of their weakneſſe, and which makes them impoſtune: And then they rather imbrace that which is profitable, then what is honorable: wherein they ſhew themſelues commonly extreme, euen baſe; the which growes from the loue they beare vnto themſelues: For profit is the good of that priuate perſon that doth enioy it, but honour tends to good abſolutely, without conſideration of the intereſt of any particular.

After this they are rather impudent then baſhfull; for reſpecting not honour ſo much as their owne commodities, they care not for the opinion of the world, but contemne it. Finally, they renounce in a manner all good hopes,

hopes, and haue none but bad, both for that they are diſtruſtfull and fearefull, as for that experience hath taught them, that moſt things are bad, and that they impair daily: ſo as they liue rather by memory then hope, for that they haue not long to liue, and haue liued long: for hope is of future things, and memory of what is paſt.

And this is the cauſe that old men are great talkers, for that they take a ſingular content to commend the times paſt: *In our times* (ſay they) *we did this, wee did that*: taking a wonderfull content to remember what is paſt. As for their choler, it is ſudden and violent, but it is like a fire of ſtraw, that is ſoon quencht. Their deſires are mortified  
or



or weak, and cannot be quickened, or receiue any vigor, vnlesse the loue of money possesse them. And therefore they are temperate, and loue frugality, which is a kinde of sparing, for that they gouerne themselves rather by the discourse of reason, then by their owne genius, or their proper inclination: for (as wee haue said) discourse ayms at the end; and courage hath a respect to honesty as a companion to vertue. Their faults fauour more of iniustice then insolency or outrage. They are inclined to mercy, yea, more then young men, but for diuers reasons; for young men are pittifull by humanity, and old men by weaknesse, whose age makes them apprehend the

the miseries wherewith they see other men afflicted, as if it hung ouer their heads; which is a consideration (as wee haue said else where) moues to mercy and pittie: And for this reason they doe nothing but complaine, and they loue not to see any one laugh; neither doe they willingly frequent any that are pleasant and Iouiall; for that their age hath cooled the blood, and made an impression of melancholy which loues severity.

As for vigorous and perfect men, such as are betwixt these two ages, they participate of both their humours, yet they prune off that which proceeds both in youth and age. Wherefore they obserue a mediocrity in all things, so  
as

as they are neither too audacious nor too timorous, but they hold a meane, neither trusting in all the world, nor distrusting eury thing, but they examin all affaires by the rules of wisdom & truth. And in like manner they are neither miserable nor prodigall, but measure their expences by the lawes of their power & by honesty. And in like maner they obserue this mediocrity in the other motions of the *Irasible* and *Concupiscible* powers. Their valour is tempered, and their temperance is accompanied with courage, wherein they participate both with young and old: For yong men are valiant, but without moderation; and old men are temperate, but full of apprehension

sion and feare. And to say in a word ; all the good qualities which are found diuided both in young and olde ; are as it were vnited and tied together in a middle age, which containes it selfe within the bounds of his temper, and naturall inclination : And as for those which haue any excesse or superfluity, either in youth or age ; a man that is in this middle age, checks them and cuts them off, reducing them to the point of vertue and honesty.

We must now see what the Passions of men be, in regard of their fortunes : that is to say, wee must know the Passions of Noblemen, of Rich, and of the powerfull of the Earth; namely of Kings, and Princes. Noblemen haue

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this particular Passion, to desire honors vehemently: For as all men naturally wish to encrease the goods they enjoy; Noblemen seeing themselves rich in glory, and full of honor, desire to augment their treasure, to the end they may not seeme to plant their triumphes vpon that which their Predecessors haue left them. But as they haue giuen them light by their glory, so they desire to transferre the same beames of brightness to their posterity: and commonly, Noblemen hold it a generous vanity not to continue in the same ranke, with those which haue bene equal to their Ancestors; yea, many times they contemne them. Wherefore they desire to adde some thing to the

the ornaments of their birth, and to haue a subiect to re-commend themselves aboue others. For in truth, the tro-phies of Families are some-times so ancient, and so worn with time, as it is an easie thing to surmise any thing. Wherefore generous spirits should preserue that which nature and their birth giues them; otherwise, if they de-generate, it is a famous spec-tacle of infamy & reproach. As in truth there are some, which degenerating from the magnanimity of their fa-thers, make vs to see thicke clouds in the midst of their shining glory, as it was said of the sonne of Great *Sci-  
pio*.

This misery happens to Families as to fieldes where

G g 2      corne

corne and fruites grow; for whileſt the ſoile is good, it yeelds good fruites and rich harueſts, but growing barren, it yeeldes nothing that is pure and excellent. So good Families continuing in their vigor, produce worthy plants for a time: But this generous vigor decaying by little and little, they yeelde not ſuch braue and valiant men as formerly they did. In this Realme alone, how many great and worthy Families (whoſe names are ſo many ſtarres, and ſo many flowers which beautifie our ancient Hiſtories) are extinct and loſt? Or if there remaine any Reliques, they reſt vnknowne.

Finally, when as Nobility comes to degenerate, it giues



giues vs monsters of fury: for he that is puffed vp with the glory of his Ancestors, and will stray from their vertues, imagineth, that hee cannot make better shew of the splendour of his birth, then by the insolencies and violencies which accompany their actions: Whereof wee haue scene prodigious examples in the carriages of the descendants of *Dionysius* the Tyrant, and *Alcibiades*. And it is a misery in humane things, that as good trees grow wild and sauage, either for want of pruning and manuring, or for that the soyle is not favourable: So great Families lose the glory of those that were their founders. And as Philosophers affirme, that there is no worse corruption

then that which growes from things soueraignly excellent, as we finde in the corruption of perfumes: so it happens that Families full of magnanimity and courage, degenerate into dull and stupid spirits, as wee haue seene in the posterities of *Symon*, *Berides*, and *Socrates*, forbearing to speake of our owne age.

As for the Passions of rich men, they are knowne to all the world, for that euery man sees that these men are proud, insolent, and outrageous. For feeling themselves supported by their wealth, they imagine that all things are in their power. For that riches, through the couetousnesse of men, set as it were, a price of all other things which they may buy.

Rich

Rich men are alſo voluptuous, effeminate, and full of oſtentation, and vanity, that makes them to glory of their treaſure; they are voluptuous and effeminate by reaſon of the cōtinuall delights wherein they plunge themſelues: they are vaine, and glory of their wealth, for that their thoughts are perpetually imployed in the imagination of their abou'dance, whereof they are rather ſlaues and idolaters, then true poſſeſſors and maſters. And moreouer they imagine, that all the world loues what they loue. Wherein they are not much deceiued, for that infinite numbers of perſons haue neede of the aſſiſtance of riches. ¶ Wherefore a Philoſopher being demaunded by a

Princeſſe, whether it were better to be rich or wiſe : he answered, that it was better to be rich ; for, ſaid hee, we commonly ſee wiſe men at rich mens gates to beg their fauours. Rich men alſo haue commonly this vanity, that they hold themſelues worthy of great imployments, becauſe they are rich, in regard whereof, they thinke it reaſonable they ſhould command others: And to ſpeake in a word, the riches of a happy man (deſtitute of wiſedome) diſcouers his inclination. But there is great difference betwixt the Paſſions of thoſe that are newly raiſed to great fortunes, & ſuch as haue enjoyed them long : And we muſt not doubt, but that they that haue newly gotten their wealth,

wealth, are more vicious and more insolent, then such as haue enioyed it from their Ancestors; for they enter into their riches as into a new possession, in the which they are altogether ignorant. As for the crimes which either of them commit, they saouour more of insolency & incontinency, then of malice; for commonly they are polluted with adulteries, and doe outrage to such as resist their desires.

It rests now to speake of Princes, Kings, and the great men of the earth, whose Passions also are well knowne, for that they much resemble those of rich men; yet wee must confesse, that they haue sometimes bin more moderat and more milde; for great

men are commonly more  
iealous of their honour, and  
more generous then the rich:  
for that they are imployed in  
greater actions; and haue a  
more eminent glory to pre-  
ferue. Wherefore they are  
contented to maintaine  
their dignity, not caring for  
any affected grauity: for that  
dignity giues a greater splen-  
dour vnto men. And there-  
fore they shew themselves  
temperate, and hold a medi-  
ocrity, for that dignity is  
sweete, and grauity is reue-  
rend.

Finally, when they once  
breake out, they commit no  
small mischiefes; For that  
commonly the effects are  
proportionable to their cau-  
ses; and finding themselves  
armed and powerfull, they  
execute

execute their Paſſions violently, and doe vnſpeakeable wrongs; like vnto great riuers, which breaking forth ſpoyle the harneſt, and ruine the labourers hope. Whereunto we may adde, that proſperity doth alſo make them more insolent; for that ſeeing theſelues powerful in means, and fortunate in their deſignes, they grow proud, and liue without any conſideration of vertue or vice, by reaſon of the fauours of Fortune which blind their eyes. And yet there are ſome good natures, who in ſteed of growing proud, or forgetting themſelues in the height of their fortune, become more temperate, more religious, and more fearing God: for that they acknowledge their greatneſſe



greatnesse as a giift, and  
fauour of his prouidence, to  
the which for this considera-  
tion they are more affection-  
nate, and more deuout, then  
other men, considering the  
great benefits they haue  
receiued.

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